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Abstract 
 
An Analysis of the Law, Practice and Policy of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade in relation to International Standards and the International Organization for 
Standardization: Implications for Least Developed Countries in Africa. 
Tonny Okwenye 
A mini-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Magister 
Legum in the Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape. 
 
This study examines the legal and policy objectives of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) with specific reference to international 
standards and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). The study sets out the 
history and development of the TBT Agreement and the relationship between the TBT 
Agreement and selected WTO Agreements. The study also explores the application and 
interpretation of the TBT Agreement under the WTO dispute settlement system. More 
importantly, the study addresses the legal, policy and practical implications of the TBT 
Agreement for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa. A central argument put forward 
in this study is that, albeit international standards have been recognised as an important tool 
for LDCs in Africa to gain access to foreign markets, there is no significant ‘political will’ and 
commitment from the key players in standardisation work, that is, the national governments, 
the private sector  and the ISO. At the same time, some developed and developing countries 
tend to use their influence and involvement in the activities of the ISO as a means of 
promoting the use and adoption of their homegrown standards. The study proposes, among 
others, that a more participatory approach which encompasses representatives from consumer 
groups, the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from these LDCs in 
Africa, should be adopted. 
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“Following several rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, quantitative restrictions have 
basically been abolished and tariff levels of countries have been gradually reduced... Today's 
and tomorrow's barriers to trade are and will be more in the area of standards…”   
 
Mr. Pascal Lamy, 
 Director-General of the WTO 
 Speech in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 17 August 2007. 
 
 
 
“A world without standards would soon grind to a halt. Transport and trade would seize up. 
The Internet would simply not function. Hundreds of thousands of systems dependent on 
information and communication technologies would falter or fail — from government and 
banking to healthcare and air traffic control, emergency services, disaster relief and even 
international diplomacy.” 
 
Mr. Renzo Tani, President of the IEC,  
Mr. Hakan Murby, President of the ISO, and  
Dr. Hamadoun Touré, Secretary-General of the ITU. 
Message for the 38th World Standards Day, 14 October 2007  
Under the theme ‘Standards and the Citizen: Contributing to Society’  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, 
multilateral trading agreements (MTAs) have led to an increased reduction in tariffs, thereby 
expanding trade.1 There have, however, been increased concerns about the use of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), especially the proliferation of national and international standards as 
disguised barriers to trade.2 As a result, multiple and divergent national standards have 
become prevalent despite the existence of the 1979 Tokyo Round “Standards Code” and the 
successor to that Code, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
(hereafter referred to as the TBT Agreement).3 At the same time, international standards which 
do not suit the trade needs, development plans and technological infrastructure in the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa continue to play a pivotal role in world trade.4 
                                            
1 Rose (2004) 99; Wilson (2002) 428; Bhala (2001) 499; The GATT entered into force on 1 January 1948 as a 
provisional agreement and remained so until it was superseded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
framework on 1 January 1995 (Goode (2003) 150). WTO (2005) 29; See WTO official website 
 < http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm > [accessed on 20 April 2007]. The WTO’s 
main objective is to improve the welfare of the people of the Member countries by expanding the production of, 
and trade in goods and services. The WTO established some fundamental principles to ensure that its Members 
support the expansion of trade through standards development.   
2 Marceau and Trachtman (2004) 278; A “standard” is defined as a document approved by a recognized body, 
that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes 
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory (TBT Agreement, Annex 1 para 2). This 
definition was interpreted and applied in European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, (hereafter 
referred to as EC-Sardines) WT/DS/231/R, 29 May 2002, Report of the panel  WT/ DS 231/ AB/R 26 September 
2002, Report of the Appellate Body (AB) in which the AB noted that the definition of the term “standard” in the 
ISO/IEC Guide includes a consensus requirement and found that “Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement does not 
require approval by consensus for standards adopted by a “recognized body” of the international standardization 
community.” (EC-Sardines AB supra at para 227). Whereas firms must comply with a technical regulation, they 
may choose not to comply with a standard (Maskus and Wilson (2000) 15). The TBT Agreement is reproduced 
in Annexure A. 
3 WTO (1999) 121; The “Standards Code”, a plurilateral agreement on TBT was signed at the conclusion of the 
Tokyo Round in 1979 by thirty two (32) Contracting Parties to the GATT (WTO (2005) 29). The “Standards 
Code” covered mandatory and voluntary technical specifications, mandatory technical regulations and voluntary 
standards for industrial and agricultural goods (Marceau and Trachtman loc cit). In contrast, the Uruguay Round 
TBT Agreement covers standards drafted as process or production methods (PPMs) if product related. It contains 
provisions for the harmonization, reduction and elimination of such barriers (TBT Agreement, Preamble, Articles 
1 to 15 and Annexes 1 to 3).  
4 In this thesis, LDCs in Africa refer to those countries which have been designated as such by the United Nations 
and are Members of the WTO. These are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
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Some Member countries have exploited the “claw back provisions” relating to international 
standards under the TBT Agreement as a means of limiting imports into their territories and at 
the same time promoting their homegrown standards within the framework of International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO),5 a leading international standardization body.6 These 
methods have not only been seen as an abuse of international obligations but also as an 
obstacle to international trade with dire consequences to developing countries and most 
particularly the LDCs in Africa.7 Yet, international standards have been, and shall remain, an 
important and necessary means of addressing global issues, some of which shall be the focus 
of this thesis.8 As Prof. Masami Tanaka, the former President of the ISO, rightly observed: 
“…International standards have the power to connect the world’s peoples in coordinated 
activities addressing global issues…. In the end, all we produce are ‘‘documents’’, strings of 
words and symbols in print and electronic files. But documents can change the world, giving 
people the chance to form a sense of solidarity in working to solve global problems…” 9 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. 
See WTO official website  
< http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm > [accessed on 20 April 2007]. For purposes 
of a detailed analysis of the topic, however, the thesis focuses on Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. A list of these 
LDCs is reproduced in Annexure C. 
5 Claw back provisions in this context refer to those provisions under the TBT Agreement which permit a 
member to limit the application of voluntary standards, such as paras 6 and 7 of the Preamble, Articles 2.2, 2.10, 
5.4, 5.7 and para F of Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. Countries which have used these “claw back provisions” 
include: the European Communities (all Member states of the EU), the United States of America (US), Belgium, 
India, Japan, Netherlands and China (Minutes of the TBT Committee, 31 July 2006 G/TBT/M/39. See WTO 
official website < http://docsonline.wto.org/... > [accessed on 20 April 2007]). 
6 The ISO is a “standard-setting” body  composed of representatives from national standards bodies and was 
founded on 23 February 1947 as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) with the aim of producing world-
wide industrial and commercial standards (See ISO official website  
< http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html#two > [accessed on 20 April 2007]. The ISO has 
published over fourteen thousand nine hundred (14,900) international standards (WTO (2005) 29); Other 
internationally recognized standards groups are: Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), International Electro 
technical Commission (IEC), and International Telecommunication Union (ITU), inter alia. This study will, 
however, focus on the activities of the ISO. 
7 Charnovitz (2002a) 1; WTO (2005) 29; See also Mutume, G ‘Africa: EU Uses Safety Standards to Lock Out 
Africa Exports’ The East African 21 February 2007  
< http://allafrica.com/stories/200602210959.html > [accessed on 20 April 2007]. 
8 Some of the issues to be addressed include sustainable development, free trade and market access.  
9Address under Agenda Item 1.1 of the 29th ISO General Assembly, Ottawa, Canada, 13 September 2006.                             
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While the use of international standards aims at harmonizing standards, international standards 
can also be significant barriers to trade.10  In fact, at the Uruguay Round the Members of the 
WTO agreed, within the context of the TBT Agreement, that in circumstances where technical 
regulations do not exist, international standards should be used as the basis of technical 
regulations.11  
 
For the LDCs in Africa which lack the skilled personnel, resources and infrastructure to deal 
with these challenges, the concerns relative to multiple and divergent standards still remain, 
despite the technical assistance, and special and differential (S&D) treatment accorded to them 
by the WTO. These TBT have been identified as a major issue by international institutions.12 
According to the World Bank,13 these concerns are multi-faceted and stem from:  
 
a) The “suspicion that important standards and technical regulations can,  and will, be 
used as a trade protection measure and be applied in a discriminatory manner”;  
b) The contention that these LDCs “lack the administrative, technical and other 
capacities to comply with the emerging requirements”; and  
c) The “proposition that such institutional weaknesses and rising compliance costs will 
serve to marginalize weaker economic players” such as small enterprises and small-
scale farmers in these countries.14  
                                            
10 In this thesis, “technical barriers to trade”, refer to the use of standards as a means of protecting domestic 
producers, with the objective of promoting local industry (UNCTAD (2003) 3); TBT also extend to “invisible 
barriers to trade”, which are defined as, “government regulations that do not directly restrict trade, but indirectly 
impede free trade by imposing excessive or obscure requirements on goods sold within a country, especially 
imported goods.... Examples include labeling requirements...size or measurement standards.” (Hinkelman (2002) 
107).  
11 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4. 
12 These international institutions include: the World Bank, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Fontage, L 
et al. ‘Estimating the Impact of Environmental SPS and TBT on International Trade’ 2 
 < http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/fontagne/papers/LFMMJMP_A_publi.pdf > [accessed on 20 April 2007]. 
13 The World Bank consisting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
International Development Association (IDA) offers financial and technical assistance to developing countries 
around the world. See World Bank official website < http://web.worldbank.org/... > [accessed on 20 April 2007]. 
14 See World Bank official website < http://go.worldbank.org/NNH7VQY1Z0 > [accessed on 20 April 2007]. 
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Despite these concerns, however, in EC-Sardines,15 the AB differed from the panel’s ruling 
and found that: 
 
 “… the burden of proof rests with Peru to demonstrate that Codex Stan 94 is an effective and 
appropriate means to fulfill those “legitimate objectives”… of the EC regulation.” 16  
 
This finding implies that the complaining party would have to speculate on the legitimacy of 
the objectives pursued by the responding party, since the complaining party lacks reliable and 
adequate information about the measure or regulation imposed by the responding party.17 The 
lack of adequate information and technical expertise and the intricacies which surround 
bringing a case before the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB), would therefore make it 
difficult for a LDC in Africa to challenge such a regulation.   
In the same matter, the AB rejected the European Communities’ (EC) argument regarding the 
interpretation of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement on the use of “relevant international 
standards” as a basis for their technical regulations. The AB made it clear that a Member could 
not ignore relevant international standards and must therefore use international measures “as a 
basis” for domestic measures.18  The AB also found that the obligation to use international 
                                            
15 In that dispute Peru challenged Council Regulation (EEC) No.2136/89 (the EC Regulation), which laid down 
marketing standards for preserved sardines. The EC Regulation stipulated that only one species of fish – Sardine 
Pilchardus Walbaum, could be named “sardines”. Thus, Sardinopus Sagax, which inhabited the coastal waters of 
Peru and Chile, could not be identified in the European Market as - “Sardines”. Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, the United States and Venezuela participated in the panel proceedings as third parties (EC-Sardines 
panel supra at para 2.1 to 6.1; See also McDonald (2005) 253ff. 
16 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 315(g). Though, Peru, a small developing country prevailed over the EC, the 
analysis and findings of the AB regarding the shifting of the burden of proof and the increasing influence of 
international standard setting bodies pose difficult questions for developing countries that export their products 
(Shaffer, G and Mosoti, V ‘EC Sardines: A New Model for Collaboration in Dispute Settlement? Bridges 
Comment, 16  
< http://www.trade-environment.org/page/ictsd/Bridges_Monthly/sardines_case_10_02.pdf > [accessed on 25 
April 2007]). 
17 Horn and Weiler (2004) 21. 
18 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 258; McDonald op cit 254ff.  
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standards is qualified in certain important respects.19 The AB’s findings were therefore not in 
agreement with the EC’ submissions to the panel that: 
“…there is no obligation to review and amend existing technical regulations whenever an 
international standard is adopted or amended and that such obligation would turn standardization 
bodies virtually into “world legislators’’…” 20 [Emphasis added] 
A central argument put forward in this thesis is that the participation of national 
standardization bodies of the LDCs in Africa (as Member, correspondent and subscriber 
Member bodies of the ISO),21 in the activities of the ISO, is limited by, among others, lack of 
resources and qualified personnel.22 In contrast, countries which are able to develop their own 
standards, like the US and China, always strive to increase their influence in the ISO.23 To this 
end, these countries have used the ISO to impose their homegrown standards onto the rest of 
the world.24 The ISO has acquired so much influence in standardization work and yet LDCs in 
Africa do not fully participate in its activities.  
 
                                            
19 For example, when such international standards or relevant parts would be ineffective or inappropriate means 
for the fulfillment of legitimate objectives pursued. The AB also agreed with the panel that legitimate objectives 
referred to under Article 2.4 should be interpreted in the context of Article 2.2 namely; national security 
requirements, the prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human health, or the environment. Further, 
given the use of the term, “inter alia”(as used in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement), the objectives covered by 
the term, “legitimate objectives,” in Article 2.4 extend beyond the list of the objectives specifically mentioned in 
Article 2.2 (EC-Sardines AB supra at para 286). 
20EC- Sardines panel supra at para 7.77; McDonald op cit 259. 
21 A correspondent Member is defined by the ISO as a Member usually an organization in a country which does 
not yet have a fully developed national standards activity. Correspondent Members do not therefore play an 
active role in standardization work but are usually informed about the work of interest to them. In contrast, a 
subscriber member, usually small economies, pay reduced membership fees which allow them to maintain 
contact with international standardization (See ISO official website  
< http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isomembers/index.html > [accessed on 20 April 2007]). 
22 The WTO encourages its Members to participate in the activities of the ISO. See Olanyo, J ‘Uganda Cannot 
Meet WTO Requirements’ Financial Times, 31 March 2006 < http://web.lexis-nexis.com/professional/...> 
[accessed on 15 May 2007]. 
23 Velikov, V ‘Incorporation of High Level Regional and International Standards into National Standardization 
Systems – A model for Global Administration Law?’ < http://www.cdams.kobe-u.ac.jp/archive/dp07-5.pdf  > 
[accessed on 15 June 2007]. 
24 See Lovelace Consulting ‘China Adopts Homegrown DTV Standard’ Digital TV News 11 September 2006 < 
http://www.dtg.org.uk/news/news.php?id=1923 > [accessed on 15 April 2007]; Velikov op cit 17. 
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Although standards development is of great importance for LDCs in Africa to gain access to 
EU and US markets,25 the standardization bodies in these countries are inadequately funded by 
their national governments.26 At the same time, these LDCs mostly rely on donations and 
grants from developed countries, which are sometimes unreliable. Thus, most LDCs do not get 
the opportunity to acquire technological know-how directly and to influence the technical 
content of standards which are of importance. Furthermore, delegates from these countries do 
not gain adequate hands-on experience in standardization work that can be put to use in 
building up their own national infrastructures.  
 
In view of the above, standards development in LDCs would therefore require more time and 
stronger commitment towards technical assistance from the developed countries. 
Michalopoulos argues that the problem lies with the weaknesses in the institutional capacity of 
these LDCs and that extending time limits for implementation may not be the solution.27 
Instead, the benefits of S&D treatment in the WTO should be targeted only to low income 
developing countries.28 In support of this view Michalopoulos argues that, in some cases, the 
time limits for the extensions have already passed, and there is little evidence that these 
countries have made sufficient progress in institution building to permit them to implement 
their obligations fully.29 Although targeting only low income developing countries would be a 
viable option, one should consider that some of these countries are affected by corrupt 
                                            
25 The WTO panel’s decision in EC-Sardines demonstrated how standards can be of great importance for LDCs 
to gain access to EC and US markets, especially where the developed countries have lowered their tariffs in 
goods, but adopted other technical methods to foreclose market access (Shaffer and Mosoti op cit 15). These 
countries cannot, however, afford to send their delegates to attend conferences and meetings from time to time 
(Morikawa, M and Morrison, J ‘Who develops ISO Standards? A Survey of Participation in ISO’s International 
Standards Development Processes’  
< http://www.pacinst.org/reports/iso_participation/iso_participation_study.pdf > [accessed on 25 April 2007]). 
26 For example, in Uganda, the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) requires a budget of Ugshs. 12 
billion and yet it currently operates on a budget of Ugshs. 4.8 billion (See Obore, C ‘Producers, Dealers in Fake 
Goods Exposed’ Daily Monitor 6 August 2007  
< http://www.monitor.co.ug/news/news08062.php > [accessed on 24 August 2007]). 
27 Michalopoulos, C ‘The Role of Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in GATT and the 
World Trade Organization’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2388. See World Bank official 
website < http://www.wds-worldbank.org/... > [accessed on 25 April 2007]. 
28 Michalopoulos ibid. 
29 Michalopoulos ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 7
practices.30 In addition, one must have regard to the levels of “political will” and commitment 
in support of the national standardization bodies which exist in some of these LDCs.31 
Meanwhile, some of the products from these countries cannot gain access to foreign markets 
because they do not comply with the required international standards set by international 
standardization bodies.32 Even those products which meet such standards and have access face 
stringent time consuming conformity tests.33  
The following is a synopsis of this dilemma: 
Dilemma: Company “X”_____________________________ _____________________ 
 
Domestic Constraints 
Company “X”, a local fish company in Uganda (a LDC) wishes to export its products to the EU 
and US markets.34 To ensure that its products are “ISO Certified”, the company would have to 
employ an expert familiar with the relevant national and international standards. In addition, the 
company would have to purchase very expensive laboratory equipment. This would inevitably 
increase its production costs to unprecedented levels.35 The UNBS, a government body charged 
with the duty of ensuring compliance to standards and quality, does not have proper structures 
and institutions in place for standards development. In fact, 70 percent of its standards are 
                                            
30 The 2007 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) results show that whereas some 
African countries such as Namibia, South Africa, Seychelles and Swaziland had high scores, there was a 
significant drop in perceived levels of some other African countries, particularly the LDCs. An indication that 
corruption is still a serious challenge for most developing countries in Africa. For more details, see Transparency 
International official website  
< http://www.transparency.org/policy_research ...> [accessed on 1 October 2007]. 
31 For instance, Uganda’s current Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) does not adequately address the trade 
issues which arise from the WTO ( Rudaheranwa, N and Atingi-Ego, V B, ‘Uganda’s Participation in WTO 
Negotiations’ WTO official website  
< http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case41_e.htm > [accessed on 13 June 2007]); John 
Okumu, a senior materials engineer and standards officer of the UNBS also suggests that the Government of 
Uganda should provide sufficient funding to the UNBS (Communication Between the Author and John Okumu, 
28 June 2007 to 24 July 2007 – Available on file with the Author). 
32 Wilson op cit 432. 
33 Wilson ibid. 
34 On 1st January 1995, Uganda, as a state party to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO entered into 
the TBT Agreement as part of the single undertaking principle. 
35 The findings of the OECD show that the costs of meeting differing standards and technical regulations in its 
Member nations, along with the costs of testing and certification, can amount to between 2 and 10 percent of 
overall product costs (Wilson op cit 431). 
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international standards.36 Consequently, the UNBS has to base its standards on international 
standards. The UNBS’ participation in the Technical Committee (TC) of the ISO is limited 
because the Government of Uganda cannot afford to send delegates to all meetings and 
conferences of the ISO.37 The UNBS also cannot influence the development of the international 
standards within the Technical Committees of the ISO because it does not have any voting 
rights. These domestic constraints therefore make it difficult for company “X” to obtain 
international certification of its products for export to foreign markets. 
 
International Constraints 
If Company “X” manages to overcome the domestic hurdle, these fish products would also have 
to be subjected to lengthy conformity assessment procedures and differing national standards at 
the various foreign country entry points. In case the company’s fish products are rejected by the 
EU, the US or any other country, the Government of Uganda will have to adduce evidence that 
the policy objectives of the prohibition are not legitimate, and that the international standards are 
capable of fulfilling the objectives pursued.38 The ability to do so, however, will also depend on 
its capacity to enter into negotiations and to bring the case before the DSB.39  
In regard to the TBT Agreement enforcement mechanisms within the WTO, there have been 
very few decided cases involving the interpretation of the TBT Agreement since its inception 
compared to the more recent Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (hereafter referred to as the SPS Agreement), and yet the salient provisions of the 
TBT Agreement are an issue of much concern, particularly for LDCs.40 Macdonald suggests 
that one of the reasons for this is that the TBT Agreement does not particularly address 
politically sensitive issues.41  The complaints before the WTO Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (hereafter referred to as the TBT Committee), however, show that developed 
countries seemingly have a lot of interest in this area, and yet the issues raised are not political 
                                            
36 See UNBS official website < www.unbs.org.> [accessed on 13 April 2007]. 
37 A survey conducted in 2004 on the participation of ISO Members in ISO’s international standards development 
process shows that Africa’s participation in technical committee is only 4 percent and yet the African region 
represents 30 percent of ISO Membership (Morikawa and Morrison op cit 9). 
38 McDonald op cit 264. 
39 Wilson op cit 436. 
40 The EC- Sardines matter in 2002 was the first dispute to fully subject the salient provisions of the TBT 
Agreement to legal interpretation. 
41  McDonald op cit 250. 
 
 
 
 
 9
but economic.42  It is therefore apparent that LDCs have not fully exploited all their available 
options under the TBT Agreement and yet standardization (as a potential barrier to trade) 
continues to affect the development and expansion of trade in those countries. In addition to 
the above issues, this study will address the question of whether or not LDCs have failed to 
exercise their rights and obligations embedded in the TBT Agreement.43 
The emergence of social, labour and environment standards which are not explicitly covered 
by the TBT disciplines has also posed difficult questions for LDCs.44 These standards aim at 
encouraging social responsibility, corporate governance and sustainable development.45 
Although these standards fall outside the TBT Agreement but are within the WTO framework, 
they have acted as TBT as some countries do not readily accept products and services from 
countries which do not meet these standards. Hence there is a real need to extend the TBT 
Agreement to non-product related PPM standards.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The Contracting Parties to the GATT, and subsequently WTO Members, through the TBT 
Agreement and its predecessor the “Standards Code” chose to delegate the duty of setting 
standards.46 Several international organizations have therefore been established for this 
purpose.47 In a bid to participate in these international standardization bodies, LDCs in Africa 
                                            
42 Developed countries include: the EC, US and Canada. In respect to the EC-Sardines matter, the involvement of 
the developing countries - Morocco, Ecuador, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela should also not be ignored.  
43 Maskus and Wilson argue that standards advanced by developed countries are typically voluntary but could 
have exclusionary effect when set by a small set of national and industry interests and propose that developing 
countries should play a greater role in standard setting (Maskus and Wilson op cit 20). 
44 These standards are non-product related PPMs and yet the TBT Agreement covers only PPMs (TBT 
Agreement, Annex 1 paras 1 and 2). 
45 Leipzinger (2003) 13. 
46 Address by the Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy at the 29th ISO General Assembly, WTO News 13 
September 2006 WTO official website 
< http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl34_e.htm > [accessed on 1 April 2007]. 
47 Internationally recognized standards groups which have been established include: inter alia, ISO, CAC, IEC, 
ITU, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Some formal standardizers whose standards 
are used internationally but without a network of national, one per country Member bodies include: American 
Society for Testing of Materials (ASTM), American Petroleum Institute (API), American Society of Mechanical 
Engineering (ASME) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (OECD (1999) 25ff). As noted earlier, this 
work focuses on the ISO. 
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became Members of the ISO through their national bodies.48 They have, however, played a 
“standard taking” role rather than that of “standard setting”. With the advent of new standards 
due to technological and climatic changes (such as environmental, technological and social 
standards) the implementation of the TBT Agreement has become a major concern for LDCs, 
as many of these countries lack the skilled personnel, resources and infrastructure to deal with 
these new challenges.49  
This study investigates the impact of standardization as applied by the ISO, upon progressive 
liberalization of international trade in Africa, and assesses the impact of the TBT Agreement 
in selected LDCs in Africa. Most importantly, this study aims to review the ongoing Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) and the implementation of the TBT Agreement relative to the 
position of LDCs. Recommendations and proposals for reform will be made particularly in 
view of the findings set out in the EC-Sardines matter. 
1.3 Purpose  
The purpose of this thesis is: 
a) To explore the history, growth and development of the TBT Agreement and its 
relationship with other WTO Agreements. 
b) To analyze the salient provisions of the TBT Agreement relating to international 
standards as interpreted by the DSB. 
c)  To explore the role of standardization bodies with special emphasis upon the ISO 
and its new role in the facilitation and liberalization of international trade in LDCs in 
Africa.  
d) To assess the implications of the TBT Agreement in relation to international 
standards and of the ISO on LDCs in Africa. 
                                            
48 As of this writing, ten (10) national standardization bodies - representatives of LDCs in Africa are 
correspondent Members. Two (2) are subscriber Members and only two (2) are Member bodies (See ISO official 
website < http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isomembers/MemberCountryList.Member > [accessed on 1 April 
2007]). 
49 See Bonaglia, F and Fukasaku, K ‘Trading Competitively: Trade Capacity Building 
in Sub-Saharan Africa’ OECD official website < www.oecd.org/dev > [accessed on 1 April 2007]. 
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e) To investigate whether the needs of these countries have been dealt with in light of 
the recent developments in the area of standards development and to set out 
proposals for the way forward. 
1.4 Methodology 
This study relies heavily on primary sources but also considers secondary sources for up to 
date information. Thus, data for this thesis has been obtained from the TBT Agreement, WTO 
case authority, discussion papers, ISO publications, reports, books, journals, and the Internet. 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This study covers the following:  
a) The TBT Agreement. 
b) International Standards. 
c) The ISO and the WTO. 
d) Selected LDCs in Africa. 
1.6 Overview of Chapters 
This study is divided into six chapters, as follows: 
 
a) Chapter 1 contains the background, purpose and contents of the study.  
b) Chapter 2 focuses on the development of the TBT Agreement and the relationship 
between it and the GATT, SPS, Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA),50 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).51 
c) Chapter 3 explores the key principles  relating to international standards and the ISO 
as contained in the TBT Agreement  
                                            
50 WTO (1999) 383. 
51 WTO (1999) 284. 
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d) Chapter 4 examines the interpretation of the provisions relating to international 
standards under the TBT Agreement by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, and 
addresses selected concerns.  
e) Chapter 5 investigates the implications of the TBT Agreement for international 
standards relative to the position of LDCs.  
f)   Chapter 6 contains the conclusion, recommendations and possible solutions.   
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TBT AGREEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The emergence of the TBT Agreement was as a result of the need to eliminate NTBs and to 
balance two conflicting policy objectives, that is, trade liberalization and protectionism.52 
NTBs in the form of multiple and divergent national standards within the multilateral trading 
system posed difficult questions for WTO Members.53 The TBT Agreement therefore aimed at 
striking a fine balance between trade liberalization and protectionism in the area of 
international standards. In this respect the TBT Agreement covers technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures in relation to goods and PPMs.54  
 
The TBT Agreement does not, however, explicitly cover environmental, labour and social 
standards, since they are not clearly related to PPMs.55 There is therefore debate as to whether 
or not social, labour and environmental standards fall within the TBT Agreement and the 
WTO system. This work, however, is not an extension of the debate, but rather examines 
                                            
52 Declaration of Ministers Approved in Tokyo on 14 September 1973, Min (73) 1, para 3 (b).  
53 Marceau and Trachtman loc cit. 
54 TBT Agreement, Article 1 and Annex 1. 
55 Environmental standards include Eco-labels. Eco-labeling is a concept which was introduced in 1977 and 
endorsed in 1992 by 156 countries that were signatories to Agenda 21, at the Earth Summit, United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio Janeiro. Eco-labeling programs are aimed at conserving the 
environment through, among others, promoting consumer awareness, creating markets for green goods (Melser 
and Robertson (2005) 50); These non-product related PPMs, unlike PPMs, do not affect the good or service being 
traded (WTO (2005) 35). 
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selected issues which relate to international standards under the TBT Agreement. Thus it 
remains to be seen whether greater provisions should be developed within the TBT Agreement 
or whether a new agreement will be developed by the TBT Committee as was the case for 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  
 
As a WTO multilateral agreement, the TBT Agreement is also closely linked to other WTO 
Agreements, such as the GATT, SPS Agreement, GPA and the GATS.  In the application of 
certain barriers to trade, in areas of sanitary measures, services and government procurement, 
reference is usually made to the TBT Agreement. 
 
Today new forms of international standards have emerged and at the same time the influence 
of the ISO has grown tremendously.56 The ISO has extended its traditional role of promoting 
the standardization of products, services, processes, materials and systems to developing 
standards which address most aspects of human activity.57 The need to address the flaws in the 
existing TBT Agreement therefore remains a challenge for WTO Member countries. Stronger 
commitments by developed country Members on technical assistance ought to be made and 
the S&D treatment provisions need to be strengthened. These developments would enhance 
the growth and development of the TBT Agreement and at the same time ensure that its 
provisions are relevant to LDCs.  
 
This chapter focuses on the history, scope and application of the TBT Agreement and its 
relationship with other WTO agreements.  
 
2.2 TBT Agreement 
 
The TBT Agreement is the multilateral agreement on TBT, which entered into force on 1 
January 1995.58 On the one hand, the TBT Agreement ensures that technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade, 
                                            
56 New forms of standards include environmental, labour, social, and technology standards. 
57 See Patir, Z ‘Participating in the Future International Standard ISO 26000 on Social Responsibility’ ISO 
official website < http://isotc.iso.org/...  > [accessed on 30 May 2007]. 
58 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 1A (WTO (1999) 4). 
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and on, the other hand, it allows Members to protect human, animal and plant life, national 
security and other policy interests. The TBT Agreement therefore lays down a general 
framework for WTO Member countries to use standards, technical regulations and conformity 
assessment systems as a means of “improving efficiency of production and facilitating 
international trade.”59 Simultaneously, it also ensures that these “technical regulations and 
standards, including packaging, marking and labelling requirements, and procedures for 
assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards, do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade.”60 
  
With respect to standards, the TBT Agreement recognizes that voluntary international 
standards may constitute an important source of NTBs to trade, and yet it also provides that no 
country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its 
exports, protecting human, animal, plant life, health and environment, preventing deceptive 
practices and preserving essential security.61 
 
A central element of the TBT Agreement in relation to international standards is the obligation 
to use relevant international standards as a basis for technical regulations.62 Although the TBT 
Agreement provides for situations whereby a Member may not use relevant international 
standards, there has been a growing move towards having no more than one international 
standard for each area of standardization.63 Yet, many developing countries, and particularly 
LDCs, do not play a full part in leadership, standard development and the proceedings of the 
ISO.64 
 
To this end, the TBT Agreement recognizes that developing countries may encounter special 
difficulties in the formulation and application of standards, and makes provisions to assist 
                                            
59 See TBT Agreement, Preamble para 3. 
60 See TBT Agreement, Preamble para 5. 
61 TBT Agreement, Preamble paras 5, 6 and 7. 
62 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4. 
63  Schawamm, H ‘Reducing Technical Barriers to Trade: Second Triennial Review of the WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) – Results and Scope’ ISO Bulletin February 2001 
 < http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/commcentre/pdf/WTOTBT0102.pdf> [accessed on 4 June 2007]. 
64 Morikawa and Morrison op cit 15. 
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them in their endeavours.65 The Agreement, however, encourages WTO Member countries 
and standardizing bodies to participate meaningfully, within the limits of their resources, in 
the development of international standards for products for which they have already adopted 
or intend to adopt domestic standards or regulations.66 
 
Most notable, though, is that the TBT Agreement “gives with the one hand and then takes with 
the other”; and yet, as one of the more technical agreements of the WTO, it is often interpreted 
with caution. The provisions relating to technical assistance and S&D treatment are, however, 
explicit and do not require significant elaboration. While these provisions give developing 
country Members an opportunity to reap the benefits of the TBT Agreement, given the level of 
technological advancement in these countries, it is increasingly difficult for LDCs to compete 
favourably with the developed country Members. The area of standardization is one which 
requires experts and technicians,67 and yet most LDCs lack qualified experts in the field of 
international standardization. Stronger commitments from developed countries to the 
developing country Members may therefore be required, but this should, however, not 
compromise the policy objectives of the developed country Members of the WTO.  
 
2.2.1 Standards 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of the term “standards.”68 In the context of world 
trade, however, standards for products have been defined as, “a specification or set of 
specifications that relates to some characteristic of a product or its manufacture.”69 Process 
standards are those that “specify the manufacturing or quality control measures to be taken to 
ensure that product quality is maintained.”70 These specifications may relate to size, 
                                            
65 TBT Agreement, Preamble para 9. 
66 TBT Agreement, Article 2.6. Decision of the TBT Committee on Principles for the Development of 
International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT 
Agreement (G/TBT/9, Annex 4). This decision is reproduced in Annexure B of the thesis. 
67 Borraz (2007) 61. 
68 Stephenson, S M ‘Standards, Conformity Assessment and Developing Countries’, (1997) World Bank Policy 
Working Paper No.1826  World Bank official website < http://www-wds.worldbank.org/...  > [accessed on 30 
May 2007]. 
69 Stephenson ibid; WTO (2005) 29. 
70 Wilson op cit 428; WTO (2005) 34. 
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dimensions, weight, design, function, components, or any number of other product attributes.71 
In addition to specifications, standards may also be classified in terms of target and 
performance.72 Standards may also extend to services, materials, management systems and 
non-product related PPMs.73  
When a particular set of product or process specifications acquires a sufficient market share 
and international recognition, it is considered as a “de facto” standard.74 But even standards, 
which are not widespread, but developed by a national or international organization, have been 
often recognized as international standards. Therefore, whether “standards” are termed product 
standards or non-product and process standards, the underlying notion is that standards are 
voluntary, since standards arise through, “common usage” or through “voluntary consensus.”75 
Standards (as voluntary specifications) therefore emanate from the market.76 
The TBT Agreement, however, defines, the term “standard” as a 
 
“Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with 
which compliance is not mandatory.  It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method.”77 [Emphasis added] 
 
                                            
71 Stephenson loc cit. 
72 Krajewski (2003) 23ff. See also TBT Agreement, Annex 3 which provides the same preference for standards 
based on product requirements in terms of performance (Bossche, P et al, ‘WTO Rules on Technical Barriers to 
Trade’ Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2005/6, 22  
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=978167 > [accessed on 30 May 2007].  
73 WTO ‘Service Standards for Open Global Markets’ WTO News 14 September 1998  
< http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news98_e/iso.htm > [accessed on 3 July 2007] See also Eco-labels (Melser 
and Robertson op cit 49-62). 
74 In this context, a “de facto” standard means a standard without formal commercial sponsorship, but established 
simply through widespread usage (Stephenson loc cit); See also Borraz (2007) 58. 
75 Stephenson op cit 6. 
76 Egan (2002) 52. 
77 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.2; The explanatory note to this definition is to the effect that standards only relate to 
products, or PPMs, and that standards are voluntary. Further, standards prepared by the international 
standardization community, whether based on consensus or not, are recognized (TBT Agreement, Annex 1.2). 
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Charnovitz argues that the definition of the term “standard” is insufficient for three reasons:78 
(i) although voluntary standards are important, the mandatory standards, such as those in 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), are a central part of the trade, environment and 
development debate; (ii) TBT definition only addresses product standards and their “related” 
processes and production methods; and (iii) the TBT definition only deals with “recognized” 
bodies, which excludes the new unrecognized bodies. 
 
The requirement that standards must be voluntary and not mandatory distinguishes standards 
from technical regulations.79 A standard may, however, be mandatory for an exporter if a 
Member insists that non-compliance would cause fundamental climatic, geographical and 
technological problems.80 This is especially so if there are no technical regulations in place in 
the importing country, since in such cases the Members often insist on the exporter’s 
conformity to international standards. Hence standards, though lacking the force of law, may be 
hindrances to commerce because firms, customers and suppliers will not accept products or 
services that do not conform to local standards.81 
 
2.2.2 International Standards 
 
International standards are not defined under the TBT Agreement. This uncertainty has 
therefore caused confusion in international trading.82 Charnovitz defines an international 
standard as a norm for market based activity, presented or recommended by an international 
institution set up for that purpose.83 The explanatory note to the definition of the term, 
“standard”, as contained in Annex 1, paragraph 2, of the TBT Agreement, however, provides 
that:  
 
                                            
78 Charnovitz suggests, that since the word “related” in the TBT Agreement definition of “technical regulations” 
and “standards” has not yet been adjudicated upon, panels could adopt a broad definition of related to embrace all 
sustainability standards” (Charnovitz  (2002a) 5). 
79 Technical regulations are those whose compliance is mandatory (TBT Agreement, Annex 1.1). 
80 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4. 
81 Egan loc cit. 
82 Schawamm op cit 6. 
83 International “in the sense that it involves participation of individuals from more than two countries.” 
(Charnovitz (2002a) 2). 
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“…[s]tandards prepared by international standardization community are based on consensus. 
This agreement covers also documents that are not by consensus.”84  
 
Annex 1, paragraph 4 of the TBT Agreement also defines an international body or system as a 
body or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.  
Although this does not define the term, “international standards”, it has been interpreted to 
mean that international standards are those prepared on the basis of consensus,85 which implies 
that international standards have two elements: (i) international standards must be prepared by 
an international standardizing body, whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at 
least all Members, and (ii) international standards need not be adopted by consensus. 
 
It is worth noting that international standards which are not adopted by consensus are also 
within the scope of the TBT Agreement. Therefore, international standards adopted, whether 
by consensus or not, constitute relevant international standards since the approval of 
consensus is not a strict requirement of the TBT Agreement. Thus in EC-Sardines, the AB 
went on to emphasize that: 
 
“…[T]he fact that we find that the TBT Agreement does not require approval by consensus for 
standards adopted by the international standardization community should not be interpreted to 
mean that we believe an international standardization body should not require consensus for the 
adoption of its standards. That is not for us to decide.” 86 [Emphasis added]  
 
In a bid to encourage the use of international standards, the TBT Agreement invites signatory 
Members to ensure that the standardizing bodies in their countries accept and comply with the 
Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards (hereafter 
referred to as the Code of Good Practice).87 In accepting the Code of Good Practice of the 
                                            
84TBT Agreement, Annex 1 para 2; The ISO/IEC Guide 2 defines an international standard, as “a standard that is 
adopted by an international standardising/ standards organisation and made available to the public.”   
85 EC- Sardines AB supra at para 223. 
86 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 227; Further, a “standard” is relevant if it bears upon, relates to or is pertinent to 
the situation (EC-Sardines AB supra at para 232). 
87 TBT Agreement, Annex 3; UNCTAD (2001) 16.  
 
 
 
 
 19
TBT Agreement, the WTO Members agree to the rules and procedures relating to the adoption 
of international standards.  
 
2.3 A Historical Overview of the TBT Agreement 
 
Standards, as barriers to trade in the multilateral trading system stem from the GATT 1947. 
The GATT 1947 did not, however, provide a framework for the enforcement and regulation of 
TBT. Consequently, the GATT provisions were often abused, which prompted the need for 
more specific and comprehensive principles than those provided for thereunder.88 In addition, 
the application of the GATT principles of liberalization through reciprocal concessions in 
negotiations is practically difficult to implement in the area of standards.89 
 
After the Kennedy Round, however, there was a growing momentum towards the need for an 
agreement to regulate non-tariff measures. The Tokyo Round TBT Agreement therefore aimed 
to reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures (as potential barriers to trade) and to bring these 
measures under more effective international disciplines.90  
 
2.3.1 Standards Code 
  
The Tokyo Round was aimed at, among others, reducing or eliminating non-tariff measures 
(as potential barriers to trade) and bringing these measures under more effective international 
disciplines.91 Paragraph 4 of the Ministerial Declaration provided that: 
 
“The negotiations shall cover tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other measures which impede or 
distort international trade in both industrial and agricultural products, including tropical products 
and raw materials, whether in primary form or at any stage of processing including in particular 
products of export interest to developing countries and measures affecting their exports.”92 
                                            
88 Trachtman, J P ‘Lessons for the GATS Article VI from the SPS, TBT and GATT Treatment of Domestic 
Regulation’, (2002) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=298760… > [accessed on 30 May 2007]. 
89 Stephenson op cit 39. 
90 Declaration of Ministers Approved in Tokyo on 14 September 1973, Min (73) 1, para 3 (b). 
91 Declaration of Ministers Approved in Tokyo on 14 September 1973, Min (73) 1, para 3 (b). 
92 Declaration of Ministers Approved in Tokyo on 14 September 1973, Min (73) 1, para 4. 
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At the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979, the first agreement on TBT (signed by only 
thirty two GATT Contracting Parties) was concluded.93 This agreement, often referred to as 
the  “Standards Code”, however, served as the legal basis for TBT and was an important tool 
in regulating NTBs, specifically multiple and divergent national standards. The Standards 
Code was terminated on 1 January 1996.94 
 
2.3.2 Uruguay Round TBT Agreement 
 
Although the Standards Code had laid down specific principles relating to NTBs, it was 
ineffective in curbing agricultural protectionism and was also limited in scope.95 The 
Contracting Parties to the GATT therefore agreed to enter into negotiations in order to 
introduce greater disciplines for agricultural products.96 In addition, the Standards Code only 
applied to all products, including industrial and agricultural products.97 The rules relating to 
non-governmental or private standards organizations were also inadequate.98 The Standards 
Code also contained weak provisions relating to dispute settlement, which were remedied by 
the Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement Understanding.99 
 
With the objective of reducing and eliminating non-tariff measures and obstacles to world 
trade, and determined to halt and reverse protectionism, at the same time removing distortions  
to trade, the GATT Contracting Parties at Punta del Este in 1986 declared, among others, that: 
 
                                            
93 WTO (2005) 29. 
94 Decision on the Termination of the Tokyo Round TBT Agreement, Adopted on 20 October 1995 (TBT/M/50). 
WTO (2003) 598; See also WTO official website < http://www.wto.int/gatt_docs/...> [accessed on 30 May 
2007]. 
95 Marceau and Trachtman loc cit. 
96 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT/1396, 25 September 1986, 2/3. 
97 Standards Code, Article 1.3; The TBT Agreement extended to PPMs and manufactured products (TBT 
Agreement, Annex 1 Definitions). 
98 See Standards Code, Articles 2.3, 2.9, 2.10, 10, 11.2 and 12.6. The Uruguay Round TBT Agreement, however, 
extended the rules to non – governmental organizations and central governments (TBT Agreement, Article 3).  
99 Marceau and Trachtman loc cit. 
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“Negotiations shall aim to improve, clarify, or expand as appropriate agreements and 
arrangements negotiated in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Negotiations.”100 
 
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and in furtherance of the objectives of the GATT, a 
new TBT Agreement was signed on 1 January 1995 under the single undertaking principle. 
The Agreement extended to PPMs and manufactured products and also included a Code of 
Good Practice.101 
 
2.3.3 Reviews 
 
Article 15.3 of the TBT Agreement is to the effect that the TBT Committee shall review 
annually the implementation and operation of the TBT Agreement, taking into account the 
objectives thereof. Article 15.4 of the TBT Agreement also provides that:  
 
“Not later than the end of the third year from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement 
and at the end of each three-year period thereafter, the Committee shall review the operation and 
implementation of this Agreement, including the provisions relating to transparency, with a view 
to recommending an adjustment of the rights and obligations of this Agreement where necessary 
to ensure mutual economic advantage and balance of rights and obligations, without prejudice to 
the provisions of Article 12.  Having regard, inter alia, to the experience gained in the 
implementation of the Agreement, the Committee shall, where appropriate, submit proposals for 
amendments to the text of this Agreement to the Council for Trade in Goods.”102 
 
In essence, the reviews provide answers to why the TBT Agreement was set up and how it has 
functioned.103 Further, the triennial reviews serve the purpose of recommending adjustments 
to the rights and obligations of the Agreement, and at the same time ensuring mutual economic 
advantage as well as balancing of these rights and obligations.104 Standardization bodies, such 
as the ISO, IEC, United Nations Economic Commission of Europe (UN’ECE) and the OECD 
                                            
100 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT/1396 25 September 1986, 8. 
101 TBT Agreement, Article 4 and Annex 3. 
102 TBT Agreement, Article 15.4. 
103 Schawamm op cit 5. 
104 Schawamm ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 22
are also given the opportunity to participate in the activities of the TBT Committee. The 
review also serves the purpose of assessing the technical assistance and S&D treatment given 
to developing countries and LDCs.  
 
2.3.3.1 First Triennial Review 
 
The First Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement was concluded on 13 November 1997 and 
adopted on 19 November 1997.105 The TBT Committee examined the provisions relating to 
technical assistance and S&D treatment to developing countries in respect of developing 
countries, the role of international intergovernmental organizations.106 The TBT Committee 
re-iterated the important contribution that international standards can make to improve 
efficiency of production in order to facilitate the conduct of international trade. The 
Committee, however, noted the difficulties faced by WTO Member countries, for example, the 
absence of international standards, and the potential trade effects arising from international 
standards. In particular, the TBT Committee noted the concerns raised by developing 
countries, relating to the participation in the discussions, elaboration and adoption of 
international standards. The TBT Committee agreed, among others, to explore ways and 
means of improving the implementation of Articles 2.6, 5.5 11.2 and 12.5 and paragraph G of 
the Code of Good Practice with a view to enhancing Members awareness of, and participation 
in the work of international standardization bodies. 
 
As regards technical assistance, the committee agreed that Members that require technical 
assistance are invited to inform the committee of any difficulties they encounter in the 
implementation and operation of the Agreement, and of the kind of technical assistance they 
might need. 
 
2.3.3.2 Second Triennial Review 
 
                                            
105 See WTO official website < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt5.htm > [accessed on 4 June 2007]. 
106 TBT Agreement, Articles 11 and 12. 
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International standards represented the key issues in the Second Triennial Review of the TBT 
Agreement held in November 2000.107 Most remarkably, the TBT Committee reviewed the 
principles and procedures relating to the development of international standards and made 
recommendations in relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. The purpose 
of the decision of the TBT Committee on the principles for the development of international 
standards was to ensure transparency, openness, impartiality, consensus, effectiveness, 
relevance and coherence as well as to address the concerns of the developing countries. As 
regards transparency, it was agreed that all information on current work programmes should 
be made accessible to all interested parties in all WTO Members.108 The TBT Committee also 
agreed that for developing countries, which may not be able to effectively communicate via 
the internet, hard copies of such documents should be availed upon request.   A central 
element of the Second Triennial Review was the re-iteration of the need to have 
standardization bodies whose membership is open on a non-discriminatory basis to relevant 
bodies of all WTO Member countries.109 This would entail technical discussions, submission 
of comments on drafts, reviewing standards, voting and adoption of standards, and 
dissemination of adopted standards.110 
 In respect to participation, the TBT Committee decided that all relevant bodies of WTO 
Members should be provided with meaningful opportunities to contribute to the elaboration of 
international standards.111  Impartiality in participation includes, among others, access to 
participation in work, submission of comments on drafts, decision-making through consensus, 
and obtaining of information and documents.112  
 
2.3.3.3 Third Triennial Review 
                                            
107 Minutes of the TBT Committee Meeting (G/TBT/9/Corr.1) WTO official website  
< http://docsonline.wto.org/... > [accessed on 4 June 2007]. See also ISO official website  
< http://www.iso.org/iso/en/commcentre/isobulletin/articles/2002/pdf/codeofpractice02-10.pdf > [accessed on 4 
June 2007]. 
108 Decision of the TBT Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards and 
Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement  (G/TBT/9, Annex 4 para 
3).  
109 G/TBT/9, Annex 4 para 6. 
110 Schawamm op cit 7. 
111 G/TBT/9, Annex 4 para 8. 
112 G/TBT/9, Annex 4 para 9. 
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The Third Triennial Review was concluded on 7 November 2003.113 The issues discussed 
included: implementation, regulatory practices, transparency, technical assistance, and S&D 
treatment.114 The review highlighted technical assistance as an area of special concern.115 The 
TBT Committee also recognized that the lack of awareness of the TBT Agreement, lack of 
capacity, lack of infrastructure inhibits the implementation of the TBT Agreement.116 The 
TBT Committee therefore recommended that the developed country Members should provide 
more than the required 60 days for comments in order to improve developing countries ability 
to comment.117 
 
2.3.3.4 Fourth Triennial Review 
 
On 9 November 2006 the TBT Committee adopted its Fourth Triennial Review report. The 
report provides an overview of the TBT Committee’s work since the inception of the TBT 
Agreement and sets out an agenda for the future.118 The report considered, among others, the 
implementation and administration of the TBT Agreement, transparency, technical assistance, 
and S&D treatment. 
Regarding international standards and the ISO, the TBT Committee agreed to encourage 
standardizing bodies that communicate their work programmes via the internet to specify the 
exact web pages where the information on work programmes is located under the item 
"Publication" of the notification form, and with regard to the acceptance of the Code of Good 
Practice by regional standardizing bodies. The TBT Committee also agreed to encourage 
regional standardizing bodies to accept the Code of Good Practice and to notify their 
                                            
113 See Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 13 November 2003, Vol. 7(38), International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) official website < http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-11-13/story4.htm > 
[accessed on 4 June 2007]. 
114 Minutes of the TBT Committee Meeting (G/TBT/13) WTO official website  
< http://docsonline.wto.org/... > [accessed on 4 June 2007]. 
115 G/TBT/13 para 42. 
116 G/TBT/13 para 51. 
117 G/TBT/13 para 26. 
118 Minutes of the TBT Committee (See G/TBT/19) WTO official website  
< http://docsonline.wto.org/... > [accessed on 4 June 2007]; See also WTO official website  
< http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/meeting_nov06_e.htm > [accessed on 4 June 2007]. 
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acceptance of the Code to the ISO/IEC Information Centre. At the same meeting, China raised 
issues of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) issues in standardization.119 China argued that 
IPR issues in preparing and adopting international standards had become an obstacle for 
Members to adopt international standards and facilitate international trade. 
Further, the TBT Committee considered the aspect of technical assistance as contained in 
Article 11 of the TBT Agreement and agreed, among others, to review, in 2007, the use of the 
format for the voluntary notification of specific technical assistance needs and responses, 
including the possible further development of the demand-driven technical co-operation 
mechanism; and to exchange experiences in respect of the delivery and receipt of technical 
assistance with a view to identifying good practices in this regard.120 
2.4 Scope and Application of the TBT Agreement 
 
The TBT Agreement applies to all products, industrial and agricultural but does not apply to 
purchasing specifications prepared by government bodies and sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures.121 The SPS measures, which are not covered by the TBT Agreement, include 
those to protect, animal or plant life, human or health and to prevent or limit their damage 
within the territory of a Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests as defined 
under Annex A to the SPS Agreement.122 
Although Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement would seem to indicate that non-product related 
PPMs are not covered under the TBT Agreement, there has been debate as to whether or not 
                                            
119 Background Paper for Chinese Submission to WTO on Intellectual Property Rights in Standardization 
(G/TBT/W/251) WTO official website < http://docsonline.wto.org/... > [accessed on 4 June 2007]. 
120 G/TBT/19 para 78.  
121 TBT Agreement, Article 1.5; In European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos – 
Containing Products (Hereafter referred to as EC-Asbestos AB) WT/DS/135/R1 2 March 2001 Report of the AB, 
the AB, in reversing the findings of the panel that “part of the measure at issue” were not within the scope of the 
TBT Agreement found that the “measure at issue is to be examined as an integrated whole, taking into account, 
as appropriate, the prohibitive and the permissive elements that are part of it.” And therefore, found that the TBT 
Agreement was applicable to the dispute (EC-Asbestos AB supra at para 64); WTO (2003) 598. 
122 In European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998 Report of the AB para 165 (Hormones), the complainants (United States and 
Canada) claimed that measures taken by the EC were inconsistent with: (i) GATT Articles III or XI; (ii) 
Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the SPS Agreement; (iii) Article 2 of the TBT Agreement; and (iv) Article 4 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture. The panel, referring to Article 1(5) of the TBT Agreement, found that, since the 
measures at issue were sanitary measures, the TBT Agreement was not applicable to the dispute. 
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these non-process methods fall within the TBT Agreement.123 The discussion on whether or 
not PPMs include non-product related PPMs did not result in consensus during the 
negotiations of the TBT Agreement during the Uruguay Round.124  
 
In the context of international standards, there is need to consider the extent to which 
domestic regulations should be adopted in cases where international standards exist.125  In 
considering this issue, the panel in EC-Sardines found that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement 
applies not only to the preparation and adoption of technical regulations, but also to the 
application of existing measures adopted prior to the establishment of the WTO.126 
 
The TBT Agreement also imposes an ongoing obligation on Members to reassess their 
existing standards.127 This obligation is four-fold. Firstly the obligation applies only where 
technical regulations are required. Second, the obligation exists only to the extent that the 
international standard is relevant for the existing technical regulation. Third, if it is determined 
that a technical obligation is required and the international standard is relevant, Members are 
to use that international standard as a basis. Finally, Members are not obliged to use the 
relevant international standard if such international standard is ineffective or inappropriate to 
fulfil a legitimate objective pursued by the technical regulation.128 
If a Member does not enact technical regulations or determines that the technical regulation is 
no longer required, that Member need not consider the international standard.  Yet, to use an 
international standard “as a basis of”, does not mean that Members must conform to or comply 
                                            
123 Bossche et al  op cit 7. 
124 Bossche et al ibid. 
125 Horn and Weiler op cit 13. 
126 EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.85; The EC had argued that, “…“the predecessor standard” to Codex Stan 
94 should have been invoked because Codex Stan 94 is not the relevant international standard as it did not exist 
and its adoption was not imminent when the EC regulation was adopted…” (EC - Sardines panel supra at para 
7.83).  On appeal it relied on the general principle of treaty interpretation against retroactivity, claiming that the 
preparation and adoption of its regulation was an act which took place before the entry into force of the TBT 
Agreement (EC-Sardines AB supra at para 30) It based this on Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties that provides that such measures cannot be affected without express treaty language creating 
retroactive operation. In its findings the AB upheld the findings of the panel that, “… Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement applies to measures that were adopted before 1 January 1995, but which have not “ceased to exist” 
and that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement applies to existing technical regulations, including the EC regulation.” 
(EC-Sardines AB supra at para 315 (d)). 
127 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4; See also EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.78. 
128 EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.78. 
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with the relevant international standard.129 This gives an opportunity to a Member wishing to 
enact a regulation which is not in conformity with the relevant international standard. 
 
Further, the TBT Agreement applies to central governments, local governments and non-
government bodies.130 The TBT Agreement imposes an obligation on Members to take 
measures in order to ensure compliance with the TBT Agreement by local government bodies 
and non-governmental bodies.131 At the same time, the TBT Agreement requires Members to 
refrain from taking measures that could encourage actions by other bodies that are inconsistent 
with the provisions of the TBT Agreement. 
 
The scope of the TBT Agreement, therefore, defines the area which the Members intended to 
regulate, that is, products and related process, production methods and manufactured products. 
Those products and services which fall outside the TBT Agreement may, however, be covered 
under the WTO legal framework. It is also worth noting that the scope and application of the 
GATT is often applied on a case by case basis. 
2.5 Relationship with Selected WTO Agreements 
The area of international standards is one which cannot be treated in isolation since standard 
regulatory practices often overlap into the other aspects of WTO law. As a WTO multilateral 
agreement on trade in goods, the TBT Agreement therefore contains provisions similar to 
those in other WTO agreements. In the application and interpretation of the TBT Agreement, 
reference is usually made to the general provisions of the GATT. The TBT Agreement is also 
often cited together with the SPS Agreement, especially in relation to measures affecting 
human health and safety although the SPS Agreement provides stricter provisions than those 
provided for under the TBT Agreement. In addition, the TBT Agreement does not apply to 
purchasing specifications covered under the GPA. Most notable, though, is the exclusion of 
the TBT Agreement in the area of service trade. 
                                            
129 EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.78; This position was confirmed by the AB in EC- Sardines, where in 
referring to its earlier finding in EC-Hormones, it found that, “based on” does not mean the same thing as, 
“conform to”. 
130 Bossche et al  op cit 11. 
131 Bossche et al op cit  12.  
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The relationship between the TBT Agreement and the above mentioned agreements therefore 
provides a clear understanding of the TBT Agreement. At the same time, this relationship 
provides an analysis of the conditions for the application of each agreement and the potential 
conflict and overlap among these agreements.132 
2.5.1 The GATT and the TBT Agreement 
Since the TBT Agreement forms part of a single treaty it is often interpreted together with the 
GATT.133 Article XX of the GATT allows governments to act on trade in order to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, provided they do not discriminate or use this as 
disguised protectionism.134  The objectives of the TBT Agreement are reflected in Articles I, 
III, XI and XX of the GATT.135 More specifically, Article XX of the GATT provides: 
 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures…”136 
In view of paragraph 2 of the Preamble to the TBT Agreement, which is to the effect that the 
TBT Agreement was made to further the objectives of GATT, 137 it would mean that 
international standards are usually applied in relation to the most favoured nation (MFN) and 
national treatment (NT) principles of the WTO.  It is also noteworthy that the GATT does not 
specifically require the use of international standards at all although the least trade restrictive 
requirements in Article XX are aimed at maintaining a “balance between the right of the 
                                            
132 Marceau and Trachtman op cit 276. 
133 Marceau and Trachtman op cit 278; The TBT Agreement and its predecessor the, “1979 Standards Code”, 
however, provide more specific disciplines on national technical regulations and non- binding standards than 
those provided under the GATT. 
134 GATT 1947, Article XX. 
135 The main objective the TBT Agreement is to encourage the use of technical regulations and standards to 
facilitate trade. This, however, should not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. 
136 GATT 1947, Article XX. 
137 TBT Agreement, Preamble para 2. 
 
 
 
 
 29
Member to invoke one of the exceptions in Article XX and the substantive rights of the other 
Members under the GATT rules”.138  
 
In EC-Asbestos the panel also found that in a case where both the GATT 1994 and the TBT 
Agreement appear to apply to a given measure, a panel must first examine whether the 
measure at issue is consistent with the TBT Agreement, since the TBT Agreement deals 
specifically and in detail with TBT.139 This means that in cases where there is a conflict 
between the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement,140 the TBT Agreement would prevail. 
Professor Van den Bossche also notes that the relationship between the GATT 1994 and other 
multilateral agreements on trade in goods (in this case, being the TBT Agreement) is governed 
by the general interpretative note to Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement which settles the 
likelihood of any conflict between the two agreements.141 The general interpretative note to 
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement provides that: 
 
“In the event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (referred to in the agreements in Annex 1A as the “WTO 
Agreement”), the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.” 
 
2.5.2 The SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement 
The TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement both have their origins in the “1979 Tokyo 
Round Standards Code.” Unlike the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement specifically covers 
food safety, and animal, plant and human health.142 The SPS Agreement therefore imposes 
stronger principles relating to plant, animal and human health than the TBT Agreement, 
                                            
138 Marceau and Trachtman op cit 292; Trachtman op cit 25. 
139 European Communities – Measures affecting Asbestos – Containing Products, WT/DS 135/R 18 September 
200 Report of the panel para 8.16.  
140 The GATT 1994 consists of, among others, provisions of the GATT 1994, “as rectified, amended or modified 
by the terms of legal instruments which have entered into force of the WTO Agreement.” (GATT 1994, Article 
1). The GATT1994 is, however, legally distinct from the GATT 1947 (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
WTO, Article 4). 
141 Bossche et al op cit 14; See also Petersmann (1999) 200ff.  
142 SPS Agreement, Article 1.1 and 1.4. 
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because it was perceived that SPS standards “were used more frequently for protectionist 
purposes.”143 The SPS Agreement therefore provides for a special category of rules relating to 
TBT, while the TBT Agreement provides for the general category.144  
In respect to international standards, Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that:  
“Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except, as otherwise provided for in this 
agreement, and in paragraph 3.”145  
Further, Article 3.2 is to the effect that SPS measures of the WTO Members that are in 
conformity with international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be presumed to 
be consistent with the relevant provisions of SPS Agreement.  In EC- Hormones, the AB 
found that the term, “based on” means simply derived from, and provides greater flexibility to 
Members.146 This interpretation was later adopted in EC-Sardines.147 
The SPS Agreement, however, differs from the TBT Agreement in certain important respects: 
(i) the SPS Agreement requires a risk assessment to be carried out; the TBT Agreement does 
not have a similar provision.148 (ii) the TBT Agreement requires that product standards should 
be applied on a MFN basis; the SPS Agreement permits standards to be applied on a 
discriminatory basis provided that they do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail.149 This is based on the premise that, 
since there are different climatic conditions in different parts of the world, it is not appropriate 
to impose the same sanitary and phytosanitary standards on animal and plant products; and 
(iii) the SPS Agreement provides greater flexibility for countries to deviate from international 
standards than is permitted under the TBT Agreement.150 Article 5 of the SPS Agreement is to 
the effect that a country may introduce or maintain a SPS measure resulting in a higher level 
                                            
143 Trachtman op cit 3. 
144 Bossche et al  op cit 4.  
145 SPS Agreement, Article 3.1. 
146 EC-Hormones AB supra at para 165. 
147 EC-Sardines supra at para 243. 
148 See SPS Agreement, Article 5.1, Annex A para 1 and 4 and Annex B para 3(c).  
149 International Trade Centre et al (1995) 125. 
150 International Trade Centre et al ibid. 
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of SPS protection than that achieved by an international standard if there is scientific 
justification thereof.151 
2.5.3 The GPA and the TBT Agreement 
Article 1.4 of the TBT Agreement states: 
  
“…that purchasing specifications prepared by governmental bodies for production or 
consumption requirements… are not subject to the provisions of this Agreement but are 
addressed in the Agreement on Government Procurement [GPA], according to its coverage.”152  
 
This therefore means that the government purchasing specifications in the procurement of 
military hardware would not be covered under the TBT Agreement. The relevance of the TBT 
Agreement to the GPA would, however, be in relation to technical regulations, which are 
government specification requirements within a country’s jurisdiction.153 Government 
procurement is an area that is still closed to competition because not all the Members of the 
WTO have acceded to the GPA. Since government procurement practices are not covered by 
the TBT Agreement, some government standards which violate the non-discrimination 
principles, relevant to fair employment, protection of the environment, labour standards and 
encouraging local industries in poor communities are seen as potential barriers to trade. That 
aside, the GPA also lacks clear provisions relating to transparency and market access which 
are key elements in curbing TBT.  
2.5.4 The GATS and the TBT Agreement 
The GATS covers trade in services, except bilateral air traffic rights and services purchased or 
supplied in the exercise of the government authority, that is, government procurement.154 
                                            
151 SPS Agreement, Article 5. 
152 TBT Agreement, Article1.4. 
153 See ISEAL Alliance and CIEL, ‘Referencing International Standards in Government Procurement’ RO52 – 
Legal Opinion Summary, July 2006  
< http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ISEALCIEL_Legal%20OpinionGPAR052_Jul06.pdf > [accessed on 9 August 
2007]. 
154 Annex 1B of the Marrekesh Agreement, Article I. There have been, however, mixed views regarding the 
GATS. Although, it is believed to be the most viable document governing trade in services, Professor Waincycer 
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Although the “GATS was negotiated separately from the goods agreements,”155 it contains 
principles remarkably parallel to those of the TBT Agreement. Article VI.4 of the GATS 
provides as follows: 
“With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in 
services, the Council for Trade in Services shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, 
develop any necessary disciplines….”156 [Emphasis added] 
The requirement that technical standards should not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade is 
a central element of the TBT Agreement. It is, however, noteworthy that the GATS, like the 
GATT, does not lay down specific guidelines for the application and preparation of standards 
in service trade. In fact, a further reading of Article VI.4 suggests that the negotiators intended 
to develop greater disciplines relating to service trade in future.  
Further, Article VI.5 of the GATS, 157 which requires a Member to take into account 
international standards developed by international standardization organisations, is similar to 
Article 2.6 of the TBT Agreement which provides: 
“With a view to harmonizing technical regulations on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall 
play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation by appropriate 
international standardizing bodies of international standards for products for which they either 
have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations.”158  
Mattoo, however, argues that the TBT Agreement disciplines are stronger than those of the 
GATS since they go further to impose additional disciplines on non-discriminatory 
measures.159 Specifically, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement is to the effect that technical 
                                                                                                                                         
considers the GATS as a “primitive” document both in detail and in coverage (Goode op cit 149). The GATS, 
however, contains the new concept of market access, a concept that does not feature in the TBT Agreement.  
155 Trachtman op cit 3 . 
156 GATS, Article VI.4. 
157 GATS, Article 6.5 (b); The term “relevant international organisation” is defined under foot note 3 thereof and 
refers to international bodies whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members. 
158 TBT Agreement, Article 2.6. 
159 Mattoo (2000) 76.  
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regulations shall not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.160 
Be that as it may, Article VI of the GATS is temporary and is indicative that greater 
disciplines shall be developed in future. 
Therefore, international standards vis- a- vis domestic regulation are not only relevant to trade 
in goods but also to trade in services. In EC-Bananas, the AB also found that the GATT 1994 
and the GATS may overlap in application to a particular measure.161 
2.6 Current Status and Future Development 
 
TBT are an issue for discussion on the ongoing DDA trade negotiations, and Member 
countries are yet to agree on issues of mutual interest. Most notable are the proposals by the 
Africa Group regarding technical assistance and S&D treatment.162 
 
As noted earlier, the development of the TBT Agreement remains an issue of enormous 
interest among the Members of the WTO. The definition of the terms and the scope of the 
TBT Agreement are areas which need to be addressed in light of the ongoing changes.  There 
is an increasing shift from TBT in goods to TBT in services. A “service” TBT Agreement 
similar to the current “goods” TBT Agreement or an extension or revision of the TBT 
Agreement, seems imminent. The adoption of the GATS and the ISO’s strategic objectives for 
2005 to 2010 also point to the fact that there is an urgent need for the amendment of the TBT 
Agreement.163 Thus the apparent need to devise disciplines which will regulate standardization 
in the area of services. In addition, following the Kyoto Protocol on Sustainable 
                                            
160 Mattoo ibid. 
161 European Communities – Regime for the Import and sale of Bananas, (hereafter referred to as EC-Bananas) 
WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997 Report of the AB para 222. 
162 The Africa Group is a grouping at the WTO composed of African countries. This group consists of forty one 
(41) countries including: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Congo (Democratic Republic), Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See WTO official website < 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd04_groups_e.htm > [accessed on 14 June 2007]. 
163 See Bryden, A ‘Report to the 29th ISO General Assembly under Agenda Item 4’ September 2006 ISO official 
website < http://www.iso.org/iso/...> [Accessed on 14 June 2007]. 
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Development,164 there has been significant environmental awareness and the need for 
environmental standards, and yet these standards do not explicitly fall within the scope of the 
TBT Agreement. Brack and Gray argue that “trade restrictions for social economic or cultural 
considerations, or labeling schemes for the purpose of providing information to the customer 
would fall under the requirements of the TBT Agreement.”165 At the same time, the 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) issues in standardization which were raised by China during 
the Fourth Triennial Review have also not been fully resolved.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
Standards usually reflect the trade interests of a particular community, country or group of 
persons during a specific period of time.166 During the late 1940’s, the period during which the 
GATT and the ISO were founded, there existed standards for industrial and agricultural 
products. The standards developed during that time were all related to industrial and 
agricultural products. Consequently the first TBT Agreement covered only industrial and 
agricultural products. The second TBT Agreement negotiated at the Uruguay Round extended 
to PPMs and manufactured products; it also included a Code of Good Practice. During the 
Second Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement, a decision regarding the principles for the 
development of international standards, guides and recommendations was made. This decision 
strengthened the provisions relating to transparency, openness, impartiality, effectiveness, 
coherence and standards development under the TBT Agreement. 
Today the concerns over the environment and sustainable development have triggered the 
wide use of eco-labels. The need for good corporate governance has also led to the 
development of management systems standards, while the need to regulate trade in the area of 
services has also led to the development of standards in accounting systems, education and 
other services. 
                                            
164 See Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) News ‘Kyoto Protocol – Important Tool for Sustainable 
Development’ FAO official website  
< http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2005/89781/index.html > [accessed on 14 June 2007]. The Kyoto 
protocol was followed by the Cartegana Protocol and the Stockholm and Rotterdam Conventions. 
165 Brack and Gray (2003) 23. 
166 WTO (2005) 31. 
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Additionally, although the TBT Agreement specifically covers TBT, some trade barriers are 
covered under other WTO Agreements, such as, the SPS Agreement, GPA and GATS. While 
the SPS Agreement provides stricter provisions than those provided for under the TBT 
Agreement, the GATS merely states that, “the Council for Trade in Services shall, through 
appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines.” The measures covered 
under these agreements, though, are expressly excluded from the scope of the TBT Agreement 
provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the TBT Agreement and also 
point to areas for its revision. As noted above, the need for national and international standards 
always arises when there is a need to protect national interests or a particular industry and at 
the same time to regulate the quality of products or service. Thus as WTO Member countries 
continue to address their peculiar national interests, the importance of standards development 
becomes apparent.  
Lastly, in light of the ISO strategic vision for 2005-2010, and with the development of the 
GATS, it is evident that the development of the TBT Agreement to regulate these new areas of 
trade will be high on the agenda of the WTO and the ISO in years to come. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  KEY PRINCIPLES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS AND THE ISO UNDER THE TBT AGREEMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Although the TBT Agreement makes provision for technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures, the provisions relating to international standards, the ISO 
and LDCs under the TBT Agreement are not elaborate.167 The Code of Good Practice, 
nonetheless, sets out some procedures for the adoption and preparation of standards.   
WTO Member countries are under an obligation to adhere to the GATT fundamental 
principles of non-discrimination embedded in the TBT Agreement. In addition, the TBT 
Agreement specifically makes provision for the prevention of unnecessary obstacles to trade, 
transparency, mutual recognition, use of relevant international standards, and harmonisation, 
among others.  In practice, however, these key principles, due to the uncertainty regarding the 
meaning of some key terms and concepts, have not been adhered to.  
Apart from non-discrimination, harmonization and transparency provisions, provisions 
relating to technical assistance and S&D treatment have not been fully implemented. The 
participation of LDCs in the activities of the ISO has also been limited and the standards 
developed by the ISO do not reflect the development needs of these LDCs.  
The TBT Agreement also recognises the special needs and challenges faced by the LDCs in 
meeting their obligations under the Agreement and the important contribution played by the 
international standards setting organizations, such as the ISO, in relation to standardization 
work. Although provisions relating to technical assistance and S&D treatment have been in 
existence, the institutional framework in these LDCs in relation to standardization work is still 
weak.   
This chapter therefore focuses on some key principles which relate to international standards 
and the ISO as provided for under the TBT Agreement. 
                                            
167 As noted in the previous chapter, the term “international standards” is not clearly defined. This lack of clarity 
has therefore led to confusion in the application and interpretation of the Code of Good Practice.  
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3.2 Non-Discrimination Principle 
The TBT Agreement is hinged on the WTO fundamental principle of non-discrimination, 
which encompasses the MFN and NT.168 Thus, a requirement that imported goods must meet 
certain standards and yet no such requirement exists for domestically produced goods, would 
constitute a violation of the non-discrimination principle. More specifically, paragraph D of 
the Code of Good Practice provides that: 
 
“In respect of standards, the standardizing body shall accord treatment to products originating in 
the territory of any other Member of the WTO no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.”169 [Emphasis 
added] 
 
The concept of “like products” has not been defined in the context of the TBT Agreement, and 
yet it would appear that products of the same specifications, that is to say, products of the 
same standard, are “like.”170 The concept of likeness, however, goes beyond the physical 
characteristics of a product. In Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II (hereafter referred to 
as Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II),171 the AB in interpreting the term “likeness” as used under 
Article III of the GATT 1994,172 noted as follows: 
 
“The concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The 
accordion of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the 
WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of those places must be 
determined by the particular provision in which the term “like” is encountered as well as by the 
                                            
168 In the context of the TBT Agreement, MFN means that a Member should not discriminate between “like 
products” imported from different WTO Members. Whereas, NT means that a Member should not discriminate 
between domestic and imported “like products.” Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement requires: “…treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products originating in another country.” The main MFN provision in the 
GATT is Article I.1.  
169 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para D. 
170 In fact, in EC-Sardines, the panel and AB did not address Peru’s claims concerning the violation of GATT 
Article III.4 which involved discrimination against “like products” (Shaffer and Mosoti op cit 15) 
171 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II WT/DS11/AB/R, 1 November 1996 Report of the AB at 114. 
172 Article III.4 specifically provides: “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use…” 
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context and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that provision may 
apply.”173 
 
The interpretation of the AB implies that the concept of “likeness” is dependent upon the 
peculiar circumstances of each case and the WTO Agreement in question.174 Therefore, the 
four general criteria applied in examining “likeness” under the GATT 1994 would also apply 
to the TBT Agreement.175 The Working Report on Border Tax Adjustments, in respect to “like 
or similar products,” also provides that the interpretation of the term should be examined on a 
case by case basis, which would allow a fair assessment in each case of different elements that 
constitute a “similar product”.176 Davey and Pauwelyn argue, however, that the interpretation 
of “likeness” by the AB is not always clear since the WTO/GATT case law accords 
considerable discretion to Members in subdividing products into different tariff categories for 
purposes of Article II without fear of violating Article I.1 of the GATT.177 Hudec suggests that 
the like product concept should be given a broader interpretation by defining it in terms of 
competitive relationships between the products in question.178 Consequently, there has been no 
agreement on the precise definition of the term “likeness.”179 Qin also argues that the criteria 
for determining “likeness” or “similarity” must be conducive to or necessary for the rule in 
question.180 And that not having a clear understanding of the relationship between the purpose 
of the rule and the basis for determining likeness or similarity would lead to an insufficient 
result.181 
 
                                            
173 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II AB supra at 114. 
174 Davey and Pauwelyn (2000) 27. 
175 The four general criteria are: (i) physical characteristics; (ii) tariffs classification; (iii) consumers’ tastes and 
habits; and (iv) product end users (EC-Asbestos AB supra at para 101).  
176 Working Paper Report on Border Tax Adjustments, Adopted on 2 December 1970, BISD 18S/97, para 18. 
177 Davey and Pauwelyn op cit 31. 
178 Hudec (2000)112. 
179 Mavroidis (2000)125. 
180 Qin (2005) 295. 
181 Qin ibid. 
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In determining, however, whether or not there is an international standard for the product in 
dispute, the physical characteristics, tariffs classifications, consumers’ tastes, product end 
users and the competitiveness of the product would have to be considered.182 
3.3 Prevention of Unnecessary Obstacles to International Trade  
An important aspect of the TBT Agreement is the prevention of unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade. Paragraph E of the Code of Good Practice requires standardizing bodies to 
prepare, adopt and apply standards in a way that does not create unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade.183 Unnecessary obstacles are, however, not defined under the TBT 
Agreement, but the Agreement makes provision for legitimate objectives,184 which are often 
raised by countries seeking to protect their industries against foreign competition.  In fact, 
Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement presumes that if a Member bases a domestic regulation on 
an international standard, that domestic regulation is presumed not to create an unnecessary 
obstacle to international trade. A Member must therefore prove that the objective pursued is 
necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.185 This means that a Member would have to 
prove that there is no alternative measure consistent with the GATT which a Member could 
reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its regulatory objective.186 
 
Although what is reasonable has not been defined for TBT Agreement purposes, it could be 
established if: (i) there is no alternative measure consistent with the GATT which the Member 
could reasonably be expected to achieve by employing its regulatory objective;187 (ii) upon an 
assessment being made, it is proved that the alternative measure contributes to the realization 
of the end pursued; (iii) the common interests or values pursued are of great importance; and 
                                            
182 In Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the AB found that: “Like products are a subset of directly 
competitive or substitutable products: all like products are, by definition, directly competitive or substitutable 
products, whereas not all directly competitive or substitutable products are like.” (Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, WT/DS84/AB/R 18 January 1999 Report of the AB para 118). See also Mavroidis op cit 128. 
183 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para E. 
184Legitimate objectives include national security requirements, prevention of deceptive practices, protection of 
human health or safety, protection of animal life or health, protection of the environment and other undefined 
objectives (TBT Agreement, Article 2.2). 
185 UNCTAD (2003) 24; WTO (2006) 151. 
186 UNCTAD (2003) 23. 
187 See Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R-375/200 7 
November 1990 Report of the panel para 74 -75. 
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(iv) despite the administrative difficulties faced by a Member, the measure remains the best 
alternative.188 
3.4 Harmonization 
Another central tenet of the TBT Agreement is harmonization.189 Harmonization is based on 
the understanding that domestic policies and laws can hinder the benefits of trade policies, and 
that the WTO must reach beyond border measures.190 In addition, the emphasis on 
harmonization is based on the view that: (i) trade is disrupted less if Members use 
internationally agreed standards as a basis for domestic regulations and standards; and (ii) 
producers and consumers benefit from the degree of harmonization.191  Harmonization of 
national standards around international standards greatly facilitates the conduct of 
international trade by minimizing the variety of requirements exporters have to meet in their 
export markets.192 Harmonization is therefore often seen as a remedy for curing market 
failures.193 The TBT Agreement does not, however, require regulatory harmonization in the 
form of a single international standard.194 An important aspect of the TBT Agreement is the 
need to balance trade liberalization and domestic regulatory objectives.195 In this regard it sets 
out rules relating to (i) adoption of international standards; (ii) participation in international 
standardizing bodies;196 and (iii) procedure for preparation, adoption and application of 
standards.197 Thus, paragraph F of the Code of Good Practice provides: 
 
“Where international standards exist or their completion is imminent, the standardizing body 
shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for the standards it develops, except 
where such international standards or relevant parts would be ineffective or inappropriate, for 
                                            
188 TBT Agreement, Article 2.2; UNCTAD (2003) 24. 
189 Mayeda defines harmonization as, “the process of making different domestic laws, regulations, principles and 
governmental policies substantially or effectively the same or similar” (Mayeda (2004) 740).                                     
190 McDonald op cit 251. 
191 UNCTAD (2003) 25. 
192 Bossche (2005) 460. 
193 Chen, M X and Matoo, A ‘Regionalism in Standards: Good or Bad for Trade’ (2004) 
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=963210... > [accessed on 20 June 2007]. 
194 McDonald op cit 251. 
195 McDonald ibid.  
196 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para G. 
197 McDonald op cit 251. 
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instance, because of an insufficient level of protection or fundamental climatic or geographical 
factors or fundamental technological problems.”198 
 
The obligation to adopt international standards and to participate in the activities of 
standardizing bodies is further strengthened by paragraph G of the Code of Good Practice, 
which requires standardizing bodies to participate fully within the limit of their resources in 
the preparation of international standards. While standardization bodies play an important role 
in harmonizing standards, it is noteworthy that the participation of LDCs in Africa in these 
standardizing bodies is limited by, among others, lack of resources and infrastructure. Mayeda 
argues that harmonization is not an effective tool for dealing with development issues.199 
Mayeda suggests: (i) increasing capacity of developing countries, to engage in national 
regulation; (ii) increasing the scope for national regulation; (iii) increasing capacity for 
developing countries participation; and (iv) removing barriers that compound problems of 
market access.200 
3.5 Equivalence and Mutual Recognition 
Although the concepts of equivalence and mutual recognition do not extend to standards under 
the TBT Agreement, the Agreement requires WTO Members to consider accepting the 
technical regulations and conformity assessments procedures of other Members.201 The basis 
of the concept of equivalence (originally developed by the European Community),202 is that 
technical barriers to international trade are lengthy and costly to prepare and implement. Thus, 
instead of adopting different technical regulations to fulfil the same policy objective, two or 
more countries may agree that their technical regulations in respect to a particular protective 
measure are equivalent. This would also apply, in the same way, to mutual recognition where 
                                            
198 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para F. 
199 Mayeda op cit 761.    
200 Mayeda op cit 762.                                     
201 See TBT Agreement, Articles 2.7, 6.1 and 9. 
202 The mutual recognition principle arose from the Cassis de Dijon Judgment of the European Court of Justice in 
1979 (Chen and Matoo op cit 6); TBT Agreement, Article 2.7. 
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WTO Members are encouraged to enter into negotiations with other Members for the mutual 
acceptance of conformity assessment results.203 
Chen and Matoo argue that regional agreements on standards lead to a significant increase in 
trade between participating countries.204 Unlike the traditional agreements on tariffs, Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRAs) on standards are not simple to negotiate because the 
objective of these MRAs is not trade protection but the enhancement of welfare by remedying 
market failures.205 Chen and Mattoo further argue that if restrictive rules of origin are 
imposed, then MRAs between countries can be expected to increase at the expense of imports 
from the non-contracting countries.206 Although mutual recognition of existing standards may 
appear to be the simplest and most effective way to deal with varied national standards, it does 
not favour circumstances where countries are at different levels of economic development.207 
For example, mutual recognition of standards may not be possible between the US and 
Uganda since Uganda might lack equivalent protectionist measures. Consequently, the trend 
has been towards the harmonisation of standards, MRAs on conformity assessment procedures 
and the use of the supplier’s declaration of conformity where applicable. 
3.6 Use of Relevant International Standards  
The TBT Agreement encourages Members to use relevant international standards in cases 
where technical regulations are required. Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement provides that: 
“Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for 
their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be 
an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for 
instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological 
problems.”208  
                                            
203 TBT Agreement, Article 6.3. 
204 Chen and Matoo op cit 22. 
205 Chen and Matoo op cit 2. 
206 Chen and Matoo op cit 3. 
207 Chen and Matoo op cit 5ff. 
208The TBT Agreement, Article 2.4; Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement was first interpreted by the panel and AB 
in EC-Asbestos, in which the AB found that the French decree was inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT 
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Although the use of international standards is aimed at harmonizing standards, this provision 
poses difficult questions for law and policy makers,209 in relation to: (i) how and when to draw 
the line between national sovereignty and international commitments; (ii) the presumption that 
if a technical regulation is made pursuant to the legitimate objectives mentioned in Article 2.2 
of the TBT Agreement, it is not an obstacle to international trade;210 and  (iii) challenging 
WTO consistency with the TBT Agreement and proving that a particular international 
standard is effective and appropriate to fulfil the legitimate objective at issue.211  
 
A reading of EC-Sardines suggests that a complaining party bears a high burden of proof, and 
yet many LDCs have poor capacity building programmes. Thus, there is need to review the 
policy considerations behind the use of international standards. Chapter Four examines in 
detail the legal and policy implications of the use of international standards where technical 
regulations do not exist. 
3.7 Transparency  
The preparation, adoption and application of standards also depend on a Member’s ability to 
communicate, distribute and explain a particular standard. Thus, Article 10.1 of the TBT 
Agreement is to the effect that each Member shall ensure that an enquiry point exists, which is 
able to answer all reasonable enquiries from other Members and interested parties in other 
Members.  
Further, paragraph J of the Code of Good Practice requires that: 
“At least once every six months, the standardizing body shall publish a work programme 
containing its name and address, the standards it is currently preparing and the standards which it 
has adopted in the preceding period. ... No later than at the time of publication of its work 
                                                                                                                                         
Agreement, since the international standards identified by Canada were neither relevant to, nor an effective or 
appropriate means of, achieving France’s public health objective (EC-Asbestos AB supra at para 47). This Article 
is discussed further in chapter four of this thesis. 
209 Horn and Weiler op cit 13. 
210 TBT Agreement, Article 2.5. 
211 EC-Sardines AB supra at paras 289 and 315 (g). 
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programme, the standardizing body shall notify the existence thereof to the ISO/IEC Information 
Centre in Geneva.”212 
Standardisation bodies are therefore under an obligation to provide information to the TBT 
Committee on the status of notifications of the existence of a work programme regarding the 
standards which are being prepared. The standardisation bodies should, however, give sixty 
days notice to the other Members to allow them to make comments, 213 and once the standard 
has been adopted, it shall be promptly published.214 It is noteworthy that “to publish” and “to 
make publicly available” do not mean the same thing. “To publish” means to make generally 
available through an appropriate medium rather than simply making publicly available.215 
Complaints and queries relating to standards are covered under paragraph Q of the Code of 
Good Practice, which provides that: 
“The standardizing body shall afford sympathetic consideration to, and adequate opportunity for, 
consultation regarding representations with respect to the operation of this Code presented by 
standardizing bodies that have accepted this Code of Good Practice.  It shall make an objective 
effort to solve any complaints.”216 
 
In a nutshell, a Member seeking to adopt a standard is required to provide drafts of the 
standard and to allow other Members to give their comments. Thereafter the standard would 
be published and a notice given to the secretariat. The enquiry points would also be in position 
to provide relevant information and documents relating to the standard. 
3.8 Special Provisions 
Apart from the above provisions, there are also other provisions in the TBT Agreement which 
cover emergency situations, technical assistance and S&D treatment.  
                                            
212 TBT Agreement, Annex 3. 
213 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para L. The sixty day requirement gives the private actors a right to comment 
(Charnovitz (2002b) 42). 
214 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para O. 
215 See Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products,  
WT/DS207/R 3 May 2002  Report of the panel para 7.128. 
216 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para Q. 
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3.8.1 Emergency Situations 
Matters relating to safety, health and the environment may sometimes require urgent attention. 
The TBT Agreement therefore makes provision for waiving the sixty-day rule allowed for 
comment.217 Thus, paragraph L of the Code of Good Practice provides that: 
 
“Before adopting a standard, the standardizing body shall allow a period of at least 60 days for 
the submission of comments on the draft standard by interested parties within the territory of a 
Member of the WTO.  This period may, however, be shortened in cases where urgent problems 
of safety, health or environment arise or threaten to arise...”218 
 
3.8.2 Technical Assistance 
 
The TBT Agreement makes provision for technical assistance to WTO developing country 
Members.219 These provisions require developed countries to provide technical and expert 
assistance to developing countries in relation to the establishment of national standardization 
bodies and participation in international standardization bodies. Special attention is accorded 
to LDC Members since these countries face a lot of difficulty in complying with the TBT 
Agreement. Several commitments have been made by developed country Members. In 
practice, however, very few of these developed countries have assisted developing country 
Members by way of providing technical and expert assistance.  
 
3.8.3 S&D Treatment 
                                            
217 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para L. 
218 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para L. 
219 TBT Agreement, Articles 11 and 12. 
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The TBT Agreement contains provisions relating to S&D treatment. S&D treatment is an 
exception to the MFN principle of the WTO since S&D treatment provisions under the TBT 
Agreement require a developing country Member to accord a developing country and a LDC 
Member more favourable treatment. The application of international standards should also be 
applied while recognizing the developmental and trade needs of developing country Members, 
and at the same time ensuring that indigenous technology and production methods in LDCs are 
preserved.  
Therefore, LDCs are not expected to use international standards which are not appropriate to 
their development, financial, or trade needs as a basis for their standards.220 International 
standardizing bodies are encouraged also to take into account the needs of LDCs in 
developing standards, which are within the interest of developing country Members.221 The 
TBT Agreement requires developing countries with infrastructure and institutional problems, 
to be given consideration by the TBT Committee, upon their request, for specified and time 
limited exceptions in whole or in part from their obligations under the TBT Agreement. 
In practice, however, the S&D treatment provisions have to a large extent not been effective 
in meeting the trade needs of LDCs, since products from LDCs are not accorded any special 
treatment at import ports. It is also worth noting that despite the S&D treatment accorded to 
LDCs, there has been no significant improvement in the infrastructure and institutional set up 
of the standardizing bodies in these countries. At the same time, despite the participation of 
these LDCs in some key sectors, there have been very few complaints raised in the TBT 
Committee. 
3.9 ISO 
Although the TBT Agreement does not explicitly mandate the ISO as an international standard 
setting body, its contribution towards harmonization of standards cannot be ignored. A 
standardizing body within the territory of any Member of the WTO wishing to accept or 
                                            
220 TBT Agreement, Article 12.4. 
221 TBT Agreement, Article 12.5. 
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withdraw from the Code of Good Practice is required to notify the ISO/IEC.222 In addition, 
most of the definitions under Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement are taken from ISO 
documents.223 
The ISO is a leading network of the national standards institutes of 157 countries and consists 
of at least one Member per country.224 Since the ISO is a NGO, its Members are not only 
representatives of national governments but are also representative of the private sector.225   
These structures enable the ISO to play a greater role than the WTO, since public and private 
bodies are involved in ISO work.226 Paragraph G of the Code of Good Practice requires 
standardization bodies to play a full part within the limit of their resources in the preparation 
and adoption of standards.227 In this regard, the ISO encourages consensus agreements 
between national delegations representing all the economic stakeholders concerned, suppliers, 
users, government regulators, and other interest groups.228 These international standards, 
therefore, provide a “reference framework” or “common technological language” between 
suppliers and consumers which facilitates international trade.229 
The TBT Agreement, therefore, ensures that country Members encourage these efforts. Some 
countries, however, have used this as a means of promoting their domestic standards by way 
of increasing their participation in the ISO standards development activities. These 
international standards can also be used by governments to block imports.230 In effect, LDCs 
are faced with a challenge of adopting and enforcing international standards which do not 
meet their own development needs since non-compliance to international standards would lead 
to a decrease in exports.  
3.10 Conclusion 
                                            
222 TBT Agreement, Annex 3; Decision on Review of the ISO/IEC Information Centre Publication (WTO (1999) 
396);  
223 OECD (1999) 12. 
224 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/... > [accessed on 3 July 2007]. 
225 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/... > [accessed on 3 July 2007]. 
226 OECD (1999) 12. 
227 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para G. 
228 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/... > [accessed on 3 July 2007]. 
229 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/... > [accessed on 3 July 2007]. 
230 Wilson op cit 429. 
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As noted above, there is still uncertainty as to the meaning of some GATT key principles for 
purposes of the TBT Agreement. This uncertainty would lead to different interpretations 
depending on the facts of a particular case. The TBT Agreement nonetheless is a true 
reflection of the objectives and aims of the WTO. 
Although the impact of standards on economic development in LDCs has been noted by 
several international organisations,231 the mechanisms for regulating international standards 
under the TBT Agreement have not been very effective and should be reviewed. This can be 
achieved through encouraging greater participation by LDCs in the activities of the ISO, and 
at the same time encouraging efforts towards building infrastructure and capacity in these 
LDCs. 
CHAPTER FOUR: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND 
SELECTED CONCERNS 
  
4.1 Introduction 
 
Standards and regulations are increasingly at the forefront of trade disputes.232 The TBT 
Agreement, the key agreement regulating standards, has, however, not been frequently 
subjected to the legal interpretation of the DSB.233 In fact, there have been only six AB and 
panel compliance reports adopted which relate to the interpretation of the provisions of the 
TBT Agreement (see Table 1, p. 107).234 Yet, it is only the EC-Sardines matter, which fully 
addressed the intricate issues contained in the TBT Agreement. In EC-Asbestos, (a case which 
considered the applicability of the TBT Agreement) it was found by the panel that the TBT 
                                            
231 These international organizations include: the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), WTO and the 
ISO. 
232 Egan op cit 52. 
233 Dillon (2002) 130. 
234 See WTO official website 
 < http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/tbt_02_e.htm > [accessed on 12 July 2007].  
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Agreement was not applicable to an import ban such as the measure at issue in the dispute,235 
and yet, on appeal, the AB found that the TBT Agreement was applicable.236  
 
It would, however, be wrong to suggest that there have been no other disputes involving the 
TBT Agreement. On the contrary, many of the disputes have been resolved at the committee 
level through the TBT Committee, which meets regularly to discuss and address matters of 
mutual interest while some cases are still pending. Those standards and domestic regulations 
which are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the TBT Agreement are usually 
reviewed to conform to the TBT Agreement without recourse to adjudication.  In that regard, 
the mechanisms for dispute settlement provided for under the TBT Agreement have to a 
certain extent been effective in curbing the use of domestic regulations as protectionist means.  
 
With the emergence of increased consumer awareness and safety, however, there have been 
measures put in place by some countries to protect consumers and producers. Although these 
measures reflect the policy objectives of the Member country, they are in certain respects a 
violation of the underlying principles of the TBT Agreement. Put differently, measures which 
are necessary may be unreasonable. In addition, the TBT Agreement does not cover standards 
for products that may arise in the future.237 Thus, the dispute settlement procedures help to 
remedy the incompleteness of the TBT Agreement.238 Trade disputes and concerns relating to 
the TBT Agreement are also driving demands for a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between standards in trade and the harmonization of standards.239 Consequently, some of these 
concerns relating to the adoption of international standards which have been raised at national, 
regional and international level through the various standardization bodies remain unresolved. 
An interpretation and clarification of the key concepts contained in the TBT Agreement would 
therefore address some of these discrepancies. 
 
                                            
235 European Communities – Measures affecting Asbestos-Containing Products WT/DS/135/R, 18 September 
2000 Report of the panel para 9.1 (a). 
236  EC- Asbestos AB supra at para 192(a).  
237 Battigalli, P and Maggi, G, ‘International Agreements on Product Standards: An Incomplete Contracting 
Theory’ (2003) 1 < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=379340... > [accessed on 13 August 
2007]. 
238 Battigalli and Maggi op cit 2.  
239 Egan op cit 51. 
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This chapter examines the interpretation and application of the provisions relating to 
international standards under the TBT Agreement by the DSB and also explores selected 
concerns.  
 
4.2 WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 
The two central facets of the DSB are security and predictability.240 In the settlement of 
disputes, Members are required to abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU through the 
multilateral adjudication process of the panel and the AB.241 In doing so, however, Members 
must also have regard to other methods of reaching a settlement such as consultations, 
negotiations, good offices, conciliation and mediation.242 There have therefore been a 
significant number of disputes which have been settled through negotiations at the 
consultation stage.243 The procedures stipulated under the DSU therefore ensure that the rights 
and obligations of Members are preserved. Settlement of disputes through the DSU also 
clarifies the existing provisions of the covered agreements.244  
 
One of the shortcomings of the DSB, however, is that although either party can appeal against 
the panel’s report to the AB, a consensus among all WTO Members is required to overturn the 
AB’s decision.245 In addition, the GATT system of negotiation and compromise has been 
replaced by the adversarial system which is too costly for LDCs in Africa since the negotiation 
and litigation process requires experts who can be costly to acquire.246 Therefore, this move 
towards the adversarial system has clearly not benefited LDCs but has instead favoured the 
rich industrialized Member countries of the WTO. 
 
4.2.1 A Historical Overview of the Dispute Settlement System 
 
                                            
240 Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereafter referred to as 
DSU), Article 3.2. 
241 DSU, Article 23 paras 1 and 2. 
242 DSU, Article 3.7; See also Bossche op cit 185; Members are required to act in good faith in an effort to 
resolve the dispute (DSU, Article 3.10).  
243 Bossche op cit 184. 
244 Bossche ibid. 
245 Srinivasan, T N ‘Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System after Doha’ (2002) 
< http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=301394... > [accessed on 27 July 2007]. 
246 Srinivasan op cit 14.  
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The GATT 1947, Articles XXII and XXIII, did not provide for a clearly defined dispute 
settlement system.247 Consequently, this caused a lot of uncertainty and confusion in the early 
years of the GATT since consensus among all Contracting Parties was required for the 
adoption of the panel’s report.248 With the emergence of NTBs after the Kennedy Round, 
however, there was a move towards revisiting the dispute settlement system.249 Thus, in the 
context of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations in the late 1970s the Contracting Parties 
codified the emerging dispute settlement procedures.250 Even then, some key elements such as: 
(i) the establishment and composition of the panel; (ii) the adoption of a panel report; and (iii) 
the authorization of concessions, still remained contentious.251 At the Uruguay Round, 
however, agreement was reached on the DSU, which provides an elaborate dispute settlement 
system.  
 
 
 
Most significantly the DSU provided for: 
 
a) The quasi-automatic adoption of requests for the establishment of panels and the 
suspension of  concessions; 
b) The strict timeframes for various stages of the dispute settlement process; and 
c) The appellate review of panel reports.252 
 
In principle, therefore, the DSU is based on rules and in circumstances where the rules of the 
DSU conflict with the rules of any other agreement, the special and additional rules contained 
in the DSU prevail.253 
 
                                            
247 Bossche op cit 176. 
248 Srinivasan loc cit; Bossche op cit 177. 
249 Bossche ibid. 
250 Bossche op cit 178. 
251 Bossche op cit 180. 
252 Bossche op cit 181. 
253 DSU, Article 1.2. 
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At the on-going DDA trade negotiations, agreement is yet to be reached on provisions relating 
to third party rights, strictly confidential information, measures under review, post retaliation, 
transparency,  remand and issues relating to S&D treatment.254 
 
4.2.2 Dispute Settlement and LDCs 
 
The dispute settlement system provides for special rules for developing country Members, 
particularly the LDCs.255 These special rules which follow from the decision of 5 April 1966 
of the GATT Contracting Parties have, however, not been used much to date.256 Most 
specifically, Article 24.1 of the DSU provides: 
 
“At all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute settlement 
procedures involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration shall be given 
to the special situation of least-developed country Members. In this regard, Members shall 
exercise due restraint in raising matters under these procedures involving a least-developed 
country Member. If nullification or impairment is found to result from a measure taken by a 
least-developed country Member, complaining parties shall exercise due restraint in asking for 
compensation or seeking authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other 
obligations pursuant to these procedures.” 257 
The DSU therefore recognizes the difficulties and challenges faced by LDCs in dispute 
settlement.258 To this end, Article 27.2 of the DSU requires the WTO secretariat to make 
qualified legal experts available to help any LDC that so requests.259 The legal experts may 
not, however, act on behalf of the LDC in a dispute with another Member for reasons of 
impartiality.260 As a result, the advice and assistance rendered is only limited to the 
preliminary phases of the dispute.261  
 
                                            
254 WTO (2007) 48. 
255 DSU, Articles 3.12, 4.10, 8.10, 12.10, 12.11, 24 and 27; Alavi (2007) 27; WTO (2004) 113. 
256 Bossche op cit 226. 
257 DSU, Article 24.1. 
258 Bossche loc cit. 
259 Bossche op cit 227. 
260 Bossche ibid. 
261 Bossche ibid. 
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A significant development in dispute settlement in relation to LDCs was the establishment of 
the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) in July 2001.262 The ACWL was established as an 
independent body to provide legal services and training exclusively to its Members and the 
LDCs free of charge up to a maximum number of hours determined by the management 
board.263 On 15 June 2007, however, through the decision by the AWCL General Assembly, 
the nominal fees which were previously charged were scrapped.264 Currently, a LDC Member 
which has reserved its right to participate in a WTO panel proceeding as a third party may 
now request that the ACWL provide its services in connection with that proceeding and any 
subsequent AB proceeding free of charge.265 The rationale behind the adoption of the decision 
was to encourage capacity building efforts in the LDCs and also help these countries to gain 
practical experience in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Although none of the LDCs in 
Africa is a Member of the ACWL,266 all WTO Members that have been designated by the 
United Nations as LDCs are entitled to the services of the AWCL without having to become 
Members of the Centre.267 Albeit this decision is commendable, it has a few shortcomings. 
These are: 
 
a) The ACWL may not provide assistance where the support would cause financial and 
operational problems for the ACWL. 
b) The ACWL only provides training to delegates based in Geneva. 
 
Since lowering the fees charged by the ACWL did not have any impact in the involvement of 
LDCs in Africa in WTO disputes, it is unlikely that scrapping the fees charged will have any 
                                            
262 See ACWL official website < http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about_e.aspx > [accessed on 12 July 2007]. 
263 See Schedule of fees set out in Annex IX of the Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 
ACWL official website < http://www.acwl.ch/e/pdf/annex_4_e.pdf > [accessed on 31 August 2007]. 
264 See ACWL official website < http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news...> [accessed on 31 August 2007]. 
265 See ACWL official website ibid. 
266 As of 31 August 2007, Ten (10) Developed country Members, including: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and Switzerland.  Twenty seven (27) Developing country 
Members, including: Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong 
Kong (China), India, Kenya, Nicaragua, Pakistan, panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Jordan, Oman, Mauritius, Turkey, El Salvador, Indonesia and Chinese Taipei, were entitled 
to the services of the ACWL. And two (2) Members including: Costa Rica and Georgia were in the process of 
accession to the ACWL (ACWL official website < http://www.acwl.ch/e/members/members_e.aspx > [accessed 
on 31 August 2007]). 
267 See ACWL official website < http://www.acwl.ch/e/members/members_e.aspx.> [accessed on 31 August 
2007]. 
 
 
 
 
 54
significant impact. To this end, one must have regard to the LDCs shares and patterns of trade, 
and the retaliation opportunities that these provide.268  Training legal personnel and building 
capacity is still vital for LDCs in Africa to effectively participate in the WTO dispute 
settlement system.   
 
There are efforts to increase legal capacity on the African continent which include: the training 
of trade lawyers through Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (known as “tralac”),269 the 
legal capacity building initiative of the University of Pretoria270and the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD).271  In addition, the Africa Group has made proposals for the 
amendment of the DSU, in particular the proposals for the amendment of Article 10 of the 
DSU to allow developing countries without a trade or economic interest in the matter to be 
admitted as third parties at any time of the dispute.272 These steps could, however, be 
misdirected. A closer network between African governments, the private export sector and 
trade lawyers should be established.273 Shaffer points out that a “central part of any dispute 
settlement process is the identification of potential legal claims – naming and blaming.”274 
Thus, LDCs should focus on mechanisms aimed at identifying and reporting trade barriers. 275 
 
4.3 Dispute Settlement Under the TBT Agreement 
 
                                            
268 Alavi loc cit. 
269 Tralac was established in February 2002 with the objective of building trade law capacity in the Southern 
Africa region; in governments, the private sector and civil society (See tralac official website  
< http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=2862 > [accessed on 31 August 2007]. 
270 The legal capacity building initiative for international trade and investment was begun in 2002 with assistance 
for the Carnegie Corporation (New York), World Bank, Rockefeller,  Australian Government Aid and Africa 
Caribbean Pacific – European Union, in conjunction with the University of Western Cape, University of Pretoria, 
American University (Washington),  University of Amsterdam and Erasmus University (See Centre for Human 
Rights of the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria  
< http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm2/llm2.html > [accessed on 31 August 2007]). 
271 NEPAD is an initiative of African governments which aims at providing a homegrown response to Africa’s 
development challenges in the new globalizing environment (NEPAD official website  
< http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/home.php > [accessed on 31 August 2007]. 
272 See Africa Group proposal TN/DS/W/15. Other proposals are contained in TN/DN/W/17 and TN/DS/W/42 
(Alavi op cit 30). 
273 Shaffer (2006) 4. 
274 Shaffer op cit 7. 
275 Shaffer ibid. 
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The TBT Agreement constitutes an integral part of the WTO Agreement, and as a “covered 
agreement,” the TBT Agreement is subject to the DSU.276  In interpreting the provisions of the 
TBT Agreement, the DSB follows the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.277 The rules and procedures of the DSU are also 
applied subject to the special rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the TBT 
Agreement, and where there is a conflict, the special and additional rules set forth in Appendix 
2 of the DSU prevail.278 
 
Article 14.1 of the TBT Agreement provides that: 
“Consultations and the settlement of disputes with respect to any matter affecting the operation 
of this Agreement shall take place under the auspices of the Dispute Settlement Body and shall 
follow, mutatis mutandis, the provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994, as 
elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.” 279 
 
The TBT Agreement sets out the criteria for the selection of a technical expert group, 
establishes the authority of experts to seek information and advice, protects confidential 
information and allows parties and third parties to comment on the draft report developed by 
the technical expert group.280 In the event of non-compliance with international standards, a 
Member may commence DSU proceedings.281  
The following section explores the key elements in the interpretation of Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement which specifically provides for the use of international standards. 
                                            
276 DSU, Article 1.1. Appendix 1 lists the agreements covered by the DSU and in Guatemala – Cement 1, the AB 
was of the view that, “…[a] rticle 1.1 of the DSU establishes an integrated dispute settlement system which 
applies to all of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU (covered agreements). The DSU is a coherent 
system of rules and procedures for dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements.”(Guatemala – Anti 
Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R, Report of the AB para 64). 
277 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. These rules were clarified in US-Gasoline, inter 
alia, that it is the duty of the treaty interpreter to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty (United States- 
Standards for Reformatted and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R Report of the AB at 18).  
278 DSU, Article 1.2. In Guatemala – Cement 1, the AB, in interpreting Article 2.2 stated that special and 
additional rules within the meaning of Article 1.2 of the DSU apply only in the case of inconsistency or the 
difference between these rules and the provisions of the DSU (Guatemala – Cement 1 supra at paras 65 and 66 ). 
279 TBT Agreement, Article 14.1. 
280 TBT Agreement, Article 14.2 and Annex 2. 
281 TBT Agreement, Article 14.4. 
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4.3.1 Burden of Proof 
 
It is a settled principle of law that, “he who alleges must prove.”282 The burden of leading 
evidence is an obligation that shifts between parties over the course of the hearing in certain 
respects.283 The rules on burden of proof under the WTO jurisprudence were summed up in 
Turkey – Textiles284 as follows:  
 
a) It is for the complaining party to establish the violation it alleges; 
b) It is for the complaining party invoking an exception or an affirmative  defence to 
prove that the conditions contained therein are met; and 
c) It is for the party asserting a fact to prove it. 
 
Further, the issue of burden of proof and when it shifts was considered more exhaustively by 
the AB in US –Wool Shirts and Blouses.285 In that matter the AB found that: 
“…if that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, 
the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to 
rebut the presumption.” 286 
The burden of proof for purposes of the TBT Agreement was considered in EC-Sardines. In 
that case, the panel ruled that the burden of proof under Article 2.4 should be borne by the 
respondents. The panel was of the view that the TBT Agreement created a general rule in 
favour of international standards and provided an exception to that rule.287 This approach 
placed the burden of proving the exception on the EC.288 The AB, however, held that that the 
burden of proof should be borne by the complaining Member seeking a ruling of inconsistency 
                                            
282 The burden of proof is the duty of a party to litigation to prove a fact or issue (Martin and Law (2006) 66). 
283 In cases where the other party pleads an exception to the general rule or makes an assertion or affirmation. 
284 Turkey – Restrictions on imports of Textile and Clothing Products WT/DS34/R, 31 May 1999 Report of the 
panel para 9.57.  
285 United States –Measure affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India,  WT/DS33/AB/R, 
Report of the AB 25 April 1997 (hereafter referred to as US-Wool Shirts and Blouses) 
286 US - Wool Shirts and Blouses AB supra at 14. 
287 EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.50. 
288 McDonald op cit 263. 
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with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.289 Specifically, the AB stated, in relation with Articles 
3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, that there is no “general rule-exception” relationship 
between the first and second parts of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.290 The AB was of the 
view that: 
 
“[T]here are strong conceptual similarities between, on the one hand, Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement and, on the other hand, Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, and our reasoning 
in EC – Hormones is equally opposite for this case. The heart of Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement is a requirement that Members base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on 
international standards, guidelines, or recommendations. Likewise, the heart of Article 2.4 of the 
TBT Agreement is the requirement that Members use international standards as a basis for their 
technical regulations. Neither these requirements in these two agreements is absolute….the 
circumstances envisaged in the second part of Article 2.4 are excluded from the scope of 
application of the first part of Article 2.4. Accordingly, as with Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS 
Agreement, there is “no general rule-exception” relationship between the first and the second 
parts of Article 2.4. Hence, in this case, it is for Peru-as the complaining Member seeking a 
ruling on the inconsistency with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement of the measure applied by the 
European Communities-- to bear the burden of proving its claim. This burden includes 
establishing that Codex Stan 94 has not been used “as a basis for the EC Regulation, as well as 
establishing that Codex Stan 94 is effective and appropriate to fulfil the “legitimate objectives” 
pursued by the European Communities through the EC Regulation.”291 
 
Horn and Weiler have argued that it is normally better to put the burden of proof on the more 
informed party.292 Horn and Weiler further argue that the complaining party should simply 
establish a prima facie case, as it is difficult for a Member to obtain information at the enquiry 
point for purposes of legal assessment.293 McDonald also argues that the AB’s rejection of the 
general rule exception relationship in respect to international standards accords a greater 
                                            
289  EC - Sardines AB supra at para 275. This interpretation has been contended for on the basis of Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention which provides that words have to be interpreted in their context and in light of the object 
and purpose of the instrument in question, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969 (Horn and 
Weiler op cit 27). 
290 EC - Sardines AB supra at para 274. 
291 EC-Sardines AB ibid. 
292 Horn and  Weiler op cit 20 
293 Horn and Weiler op cit 21.  
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degree of deference to sovereign policy and will make it easier for Members to maintain more 
severe domestic measures.294 
 
Article 6.2 of the DSU also provides a better understanding of the effect of putting the burden 
of proof on the complaining party. Article 6.2 provides that the request for the establishment 
of the panel must be: (i) in writing; (ii) indicate whether consultations were held; (iii) identify 
the specific measures at issue; and (iv) provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the 
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.295 Ingredients (iii) and (iv) are the main 
concern here. The panel is required to identify the specific measure at issue: in the case of the 
TBT Agreement, the panel would identify the measures that have been taken by the 
responding party in view of the complaint. On top of this requirement, the panel would 
provide a “legal” basis for the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.  This 
procedure assists the panel in drawing the terms of reference, which fulfil an important due 
process objective and establish the jurisdiction of the panel by defining the precise claims at 
issue in the dispute.296  
 
True, the dispute settlement process provides opportunities for the complainant to obtain the 
necessary information to build the case,297 but the responding party may withhold information 
at the consultation and at the panel phase.298 The information obtained at the enquiry point 
                                            
294 McDonald op cit 264. 
295 DSU, Article 6.2; Article 6.2 was considered in Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of certain 
Dairy Products (Hereafter referred to Korea – Dairy) WT/DS98/AB/R 14 December 1999 Report of the AB para 
120. In that case, the AB quoting its earlier findings in EC-Bananas, emphasised that the request for the 
establishment of the panel must be examined, “…very carefully to ensure its compliance with both the letter and 
the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU. It is important that a panel request be sufficiently precise for two reasons. 
First, it often forms the basis for the terms of reference of the panel pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU and, second, 
it informs the defending party and the third party of the legal basis of the complaint…” (Korea – Dairy AB supra 
at para 122).  Further, it went on to find that, “…if we were in fact attempting to construct such a rule in that case, 
there would have been little point to our enjoining panels to examine a request for a panel “very carefully to 
ensure its compliance with both the letter and the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU.” (Korea – Dairy AB supra at 
para 123) 
296 Brazil – Measures affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R 21 February 1997 Report of the AB 22. 
297 DSU, Article 13.1 and 2. 
298The AB in EC-Sardines found that, “… the dispute settlement process itself also provides opportunities for the 
complainant to obtain the necessary information to build the case. Information can be exchanged during the 
consultation phase and additional information may well become available during the panel phase itself.” (EC - 
Sardines AB para 280).  
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may, therefore, not be sufficient to establish more than a prima facie case and more so to 
establish that the “standard” is effective and appropriate to fulfil the legitimate objective 
pursued. 
 
Thus, the ground may not be levelled to enable the complaining party to present its case 
clearly. Further, transaction costs would be high for a financially constrained complaining 
party if the complaining party bears the burden of proof.299 This therefore makes it difficult for 
a LDC in Africa during consultations and at the presentation of the case before the DSB. 
 
In addition, the AB relied on its findings in EC-Hormones and the similarities between Article 
3.1 of the SPS Agreement and Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement to conclude that there was no 
general rule exception relationship.300 The AB did not focus on the inherent differences 
between the two Agreements.  
 
As discussed above,301 although the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement share a common 
history, the growth, importance and development of these two Agreements differs in certain 
important respects. The SPS Agreement imposes more stringent measures as compared to the 
TBT Agreement. Specifically, Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides greater flexibility 
for countries to deviate from international standards than is permitted under the TBT 
Agreement. Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement only allows a country to deviate from 
international standards, if this is necessitated by fundamental climatic or geographical factors 
or fundamental technological problems.302  
One could therefore conclude that the panel’s finding on the burden of proof was sound in 
logic as it addresses the practical difficulties and challenges faced by a complaining party 
especially if the other party is invoking the exception under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. 
Such a finding would encourage financially constrained countries like LDCs in Africa to 
enforce their rights and obligations under the TBT Agreement. In contrast, the findings of the 
AB were, borrowing the words of Horn and Weiler, “…without any meaningful analysis or 
                                            
299 Horn and Weiler op cit 27. 
300 McDonald op cit 263. 
301 See Chapter Two: Relationship between the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. 
302 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4; International Trade Centre op cit 125 
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even indication of an awareness of the deeper policy issues and consequences that are at 
stake.” 303 
 
4.3.2 Relevant International Standard 
 
In the context of the TBT Agreement, international standards are those adopted by an 
international body.304 The AB in EC-Sardines upheld the panel’s conclusion that even if not 
adopted by consensus, an international standard can constitute a “relevant international 
standard.”305 In EC-Sardines, the AB had this to say: 
 
“…the definition of “standard” in the ISO/IEC Guide expressly includes a consensus 
requirement. Therefore, the logical conclusion, in our view, is that the omission of a consensus 
requirement in the definition of “standard” in Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement was a deliberate 
choice on the part of the drafters of the TBT Agreement, and that the last two phases of the 
explanatory note were included to give effect to this choice.” 306 
 
This means that international standards could be prepared on the basis of consensus.307  Yet 
international standards that are not adopted by consensus are also within the scope of the TBT 
Agreement.  
 
Although it is beyond the AB’s powers to delve into the activities of the international 
standardization bodies, a reading of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement suggests that Members 
are under an obligation to use international standards (including those not derived through 
consensus) as a basis for their technical regulations. Of course, some standardization bodies, 
like the ISO, do not adopt international standards by consensus. Instead the adoption of 
international standards is done through a voting process. This raises issues of whether or not 
there is effective representation or participation of most WTO Member countries in these 
                                            
303 Horn and Weiler op cit 33. 
304 Horn and Weiler op cit 8.  
305 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 227. 
306 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 225; The ISO/IEC Guide 2 defines an international standard as “a standard that 
is adopted by an international standardising/ standards organisation and made available to the public.”   
307 EC- Sardines AB supra at para 223. 
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international standardization bodies. And if there was effective participation, would a national 
standardization body be willing to adopt a standard it voted against. Is consensus really 
necessary? Horn and Weiler argue that the decision of the “AB on the requirement of 
consensus may or may not be correct in terms of substance. But the hermeneutics behind the 
outcome of the decision does not give credibility to the outcome.”308 This contention is also 
true in view of the fact that the AB often departs from its textual strictness in matters where its 
legal powers are being threatened or challenged. 309 McDonald argues, however, that the AB’s 
decision sought to enhance the effectiveness of the TBT Agreement’s harmonization 
objectives by ensuring that its mechanisms, including bodies to which standard-setting 
functions are delegated, are best adapted to achieve their designated roles.310 Although this 
could have been the objective, in its findings the AB clearly avoided to dwell on the 
requirement of consensus and its effect on harmonization and merely stated its jurisdictional 
competence.311  
 
A key consideration in regard to international standards is the delegation of regulatory power 
from the WTO to the standardization bodies.312 Yet, in determining the disputes before the 
DSB, the AB is not mandated to seek the input of the standardization bodies. McDonald 
argues that as a matter of principle, the WTO panel should determine unilaterally the 
application of international instruments created outside the WTO system.313 This does not, 
however, mean that the DSB is completely locked in its own cage. Article 13 of the DSU 
gives the panels discretion to seek additional information.314 McDonald suggests that in 
instances where the interpretation of international standards is concerned the panel should 
invite experts rather than rely on factual information to interpret particular standards. 
McDonald also suggests that greater disciplines allowing experts from the international 
standardization bodies to actively participate should be developed within the DSU.315  
                                            
308 Horn and Weiler op cit 11. 
309 Horn and Weiler op cit 10. 
310 McDonald op cit 261. 
311 McDonald ibid. 
312 McDonald op cit 262. 
313 McDonald ibid. 
314 McDonald ibid. 
315 McDonald op cit 263. 
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A step towards greater involvement of the international standardization bodies in dispute 
settlement would, however, be a way of usurping the duties of the DSB and the main 
objectives of the WTO. This move would be turning international standardization bodies into 
“world legislators”.316 Unlike the ISO, the WTO is based on a system of rules, rights and 
obligations and there is no classification of Members. Participation of LDCs in the activities of 
the WTO may be limited by financial constraints, but participation in the ISO, in addition to 
financial constraints, is limited by the fact that most LDCs are not participating Members. 
Therefore, involving standardization bodies in dispute settlement would not be representative 
of the LDCs.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the WTO does not develop standards but only deals with issues 
which arise from the violation of the rules relating to international standards. As a result, 
WTO does not therefore consider how the standard was developed but aims at harmonizing 
these international standards. In view of the above, the requirement of consensus and full 
participation of WTO Members in the standardization work of the ISO are the real issues 
which should be addressed.  
 
4.3.3 Basis for 
 
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement provides on the one hand that: 
 
“…Members shall use them [relevant international standards], or the relevant parts of them, as a 
basis for their technical regulations…”317 [Emphasis added] 
 
and on the other hand: 
 
“…except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or 
inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because 
of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.”318 
                                            
316 EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.77. 
317 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4. 
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In regard to the first part, in EC-Sardines, the AB opined that an international standard could 
not be considered as a basis for a technical regulation if the two are contradictory.319 The AB’s 
finding that “basis for” does not mean, “to conform to”, however, gives room for developed 
countries to reluctantly use international standards as a litmus test for their domestic 
regulations.320 Horn and Weiler, in explaining the differences in the jurisprudence of the panel 
and the AB, considered the procedural and substantive approaches to the issue of the use of 
the term, “as a basis for”.321 Horn and Weiler argue that procedurally (in the context of 
international standards), an international standard could serve “as a basis for” a technical 
regulation and yet the technical regulation could, after deliberation be different from the 
international standard due to the decisional rules of parliament.322 As a result, the international 
standard and the technical regulation will not be the same. Considering the substantive 
approach, Horn and Weiler argue that the main concern is whether the technical regulation 
conforms to the international standard.323 The approach taken by the panel and the AB in EC-
Sardines, however, imposes a substantive obligation to employ or apply the international 
standard as a principal element for the purpose of enacting the technical regulation.324  
 
The second part, however, affords a Member an opportunity not to conform to the 
international standard. Although this exception provides a compromise, the national regulator 
is able to articulate objectives, to assess means, and to rationalize results but be less concerned 
with the eventual substantive compliance.325 The second part is further considered below. 
 
 
4.3.4 Ineffective or Inappropriate Means 
 
                                                                                                                                         
318 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4. 
319 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 248. 
320 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 242. 
321 Horn and  Weiler op cit 11. 
322 Horn and Weiler ibid. 
323 Horn and Weiler ibid. 
324 Bossche op cit 460 ; EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.110 and EC-Sardines AB supra at para 249. 
325 Horn and Weiler op cit 12. 
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In circumstances where an international standard is inappropriate and ineffective, TBT 
disciplines permit a Member not to base their measures on the international standard.326  
In EC-Sardines, the AB defined “ineffective or inappropriate means” as: 
 
“…an ineffective means is a means which does not have the function of accomplishing the 
legitimate objective pursued, whereas an inappropriate means is a means which is not specially 
suitable for the fulfilment of the legitimate objective pursued.”327 
 
It is, however, possible to have a measure which is effective but inappropriate, or appropriate 
but ineffective.328 Professor van den Bossche explains that an international standard would be 
effective if it had the capacity to accomplish all objectives pursued and would be appropriate 
if it were suitable for the fulfilment of all objectives.329 As the panel put it: 
 
“[W]hen a relevant international standard is found to be an effective means, it does not 
automatically follow that it is also an appropriate means. The question of effectiveness bears 
upon the results of the means employed, whereas the question of appropriateness relates more to 
the nature of the means employed.”330 
 
The complaining party is therefore under an obligation to prove these two elements. As the 
AB found, Peru had indeed discharged its duty to demonstrate that the international standard 
met the legal requirements of effectiveness and appropriateness.331 
 
4.3.5    Legitimate Objectives 
 
Although legitimate objectives are not elaborated under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, in 
the context of international standards, legitimate objectives would cover the objectives 
explicitly mentioned in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, namely: national security 
requirements, prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human health and safety, animal 
                                            
326 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4; Horn and Weiler op cit 31. 
327 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 261. 
328 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 289. 
329 Bossche op cit 461. 
330 EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.116. 
331 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 290. 
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or plant life or health or the environment.332 These objectives, however, go beyond those 
stated because of the use of the words, “inter alia”, which are derived from the Latin word, 
“inter” which means, “among” and “alia” which means, “other, another or something else”.333  
These “other” objectives must, however, be subjected to scrutiny and examination in order to 
determine the legitimacy of the objectives of the measure. 334  
 
The issue of whether or not legitimate objectives apply to standards has not been addressed by 
the DSB.335 It would, however, appear that the objectives enumerated for technical regulations 
would equally apply to standards. In respect to international standards, therefore, a Member 
country is allowed to deviate from a particular international standard if that standard does not 
fulfil any of its legitimate objectives. If a Member, however, bases a domestic regulation on an 
international standard, and that domestic regulation is for one of the legitimate objectives 
mentioned in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, it is rebuttably presumed not to create an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade.336 
 
4.4 To Adopt or Not to Adopt International Standards 
 
Although international standards are seen as barriers to trade, standards play an important role 
in increasing economic efficiency and dealing with market failures.337 The WTO disciplines 
do not require that Members should have product standards. The main focus of the WTO, 
however, is to ensure that technical regulations, voluntary standards, testing and certification 
of products do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.338 “Adopting international 
standards has an enormous potential for promoting efficiency and economic growth”; 
however, “the asymmetries of participation can lead to imbalanced results.”339 Where no 
                                            
332 See UNCTAD (2003) 23. 
333 Latin-English Dictionary < http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Lexis/Latin/> [accessed on 16 June 2007]. 
334 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 286. 
335 See UNCTAD (2003) loc cit. 
336 See UNCTAD (2003) ibid. 
337 WTO (2005) 29. 
338See TBT Agreement, Articles 2.4 and 2.2; Wilson op cit 432; Although the TBT Agreement does not mandate 
harmonisation of standards, it provides strong incentives for the adoption of international standards (McDonald 
op cit 257). 
339 Charnovitz (2002a) 30. 
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international standard has been established, Members may adopt their own measures.340 It is 
also presumed that technical regulations that accord with international standards are consistent 
with the TBT Agreement’s obligation to avoid unnecessary obstacles to trade.341 
 
In light of the EC- Sardines decision, a Member may choose to adopt or not to adopt 
international standards as long as that Member can show that the product requirements are 
based on, or adapted to suit, international standards. 342 In addition, if an existing international 
standard cannot fulfil a legitimate objective, a WTO Member has the right to adopt its own 
standard. 
 
4.5 Selected Concerns 
 
As noted earlier, there have been several concerns relating to the application and 
implementation of the TBT Agreement. These concerns arise from the voluntary private 
standards which become mandatory and the proliferation of standards which are set without 
proper consultation. As a result, a supplier who does not conform is usually excluded from the 
market. The use of international standards is a serious challenge for LDCs in Africa since 
countries in Europe, Asia and America have focused their efforts on the ISO by way of 
providing more financial support to their own standardization bodies.343 Although some of 
these concerns have been settled through the TBT Committee, which meets regularly to 
address issues that arise from the implementation of the TBT Agreement, there are cases of 
excessive protectionism which have not been resolved and yet continue to raise important 
issues in the standards debate. A study carried out by the OECD found that there is increasing 
pressure for standard adoption in industry in order to respond to requirements in regard to 
security and protection of health and the environment from governments in order to satisfy an 
                                            
340 McDonald op cit 257. 
341 TBT Agreement, Article 2.5; This provision was considered in EC-Sardines, in which Peru argued that the EC 
regulation prohibited the Peruvian sardinops sagax as “pacific sardines”, and that this was inconsistent with 
Codex Stan 94 as a relevant international standard. Thus, the EC regulation was inconsistent with Article 2.4 of 
the TBT Agreement (EC-Sardines panel supra at para 7.97).  
342 McDonald op cit 266. 
343 Marks, R B ‘Government Approaches to Standardization in World Trade’  
< http://emarks.net/mediaviewstds/MediaViewStd2003_04E.pdf > [accessed on 13 June 2007]. 
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“emerging demand for higher quality standards expressed by consumers and, more generally, 
the civil society.”344  An aspect which has posed serious questions for policy makers as a 
potential barrier to trade is the issue of intellectual property rights in standardization. The 
section below examines the Chinese technology policy, a controversial aspect in relation to the 
international standards debate.  
 
4.5.1 China – WAPI Functions 
 
As a result of long talks and negotiations, China acceded to the WTO on 10 November 
2001.345 China’s accession to the WTO was seen as an opportunity for the rest of the world to 
trade freely with China’s billion population, and at the same time as a means of regulating 
China’s aggressive trade policy within the world trade system. In 2003, however, the Chinese 
government announced that all the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)346 equipment sold 
within China would have to comply with Wireless Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure 
(WAPI).347 The Chinese authorities argue that, although the WLAN is similar to the existing 
ISO standard published as ISO 8802:11:1999 (Wi-Fi),348 it uses a different security protocol 
called WAPI.349  Foreign firms were required to acquire a licence through negotiations with 
any one of the firms designated by the Chinese government.350 The US and other governments 
reacted strongly and urged China to reconsider its WAPI policy, noting that the directions 
would appear to be inconsistent with China’s WTO commitments.351 In addition, this 
requirement would constrain efforts directed towards market access and harmonization.352 
 
                                            
344 OECD (2007) 54. 
345 See WTO official website < http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm > [accessed on 13 
June 2007]. 
346 Cromer, Z K ‘China’s WAPI Policy: Security Measure or Trade Protectionism?  
< http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2005dltr0018.pdf > [accessed on 13 June 2007]. 
347 Cromer op cit para 3. 
348 Wi-Fi, also known as Wireless Fidelity, is a wireless technology brand owned by the Wi-Fi alliance intended 
to advance the interoperability of WLAN products. See Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia  
< http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi .> [accessed on 13 June 2007]. 
349 Gibson, C S ‘Technology Standards – New Technical Barriers to Trade?  
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=960059...> [accessed on 13 June 2007]. 
350 Cromer op cit para 4. 
351 Cromer op cit para 7. 
352 Gibson op cit 4. 
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In the heat of this debate, however, China raised Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) issues in 
standardization at the TBT Committee in 2006.353 China argued that IPR issues in preparing 
and adopting international standards had become an obstacle for Members to adopt 
international standards and facilitate international trade. Further, China proposed that it is 
necessary for the WTO to consider negative impacts of this issue on multilateral trade and 
explore appropriate trade policies to resolve difficulties arising from IPR issues in 
standardization.354 Earlier China had submitted the WAPI standard for consideration as an 
international standard to the ISO.355 In March 2006, however, the ISO Committee voted 
against the WAPI standard and instead voted in favour for the adoption of the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) proposed 802:11i security specification.356 
 
Yet, China did not completely withdraw from the move towards developing mandatory 
domestic technology standards based on Chinese technology. China has sought to increase its 
role in international standardization bodies rather than adopt existing industry or international 
technical standards and to require license fees for non-Chinese technology. At the Fourth 
Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement in 2006, the representative of the EC sought 
clarification on the scope of application of the Wireless Authentication and Privacy 
Infrastructure (WAPI). In particular, the European representative stressed that: 
 
“…a unilateral decision by China to adopt mandatory specific encryption requirements in the 
area where an international standard was being prepared would be inconsistent with Article 2.4 
of the TBT Agreement, which stated that, where international standards existed or their 
completion was imminent, Members should use them as a basis for their technical regulation.” 357 
 
In response, the Chinese representative noted the concerns raised but recalled that WAPI 
standards were developed to protect national information safety and that the Chinese 
                                            
353 Background Paper for Chinese Submission to WTO on Intellectual Property Right Issues in Standardization 
(G/TBT/W/251) WTO official website < http://docsonline.wto...> [accessed on 13 June 2007]. 
354 G/TBT/W/251 ibid. 
355 Gibson loc cit. 
356 Gibson ibid. 
357 Minutes of the TBT Committee Meeting (G/TBT/M/39), para 64 WTO official website  
< http://docsonline.wto.org/... > [accessed on 12 June 2007]. 
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authorities were working closely with the ISO and IEC.358 Although steps have been made to 
harmonize these standards, China has made no commitment that it will change its position but 
rather its focus is on increasing its participation and influence in the ISO. For China, it does 
not matter much whether other countries follow Chinese standards as China is a large market 
which the rest of the world cannot give up.359 China’s position has been that when 
international standards cannot fulfil a legitimate objective, a WTO Member has the right to 
adopt its own standard.360 As part of its long term standards strategy, China launched a 
standards program to accomplish the following goals: 
a) To form a new voluntary technical standards system and enhance the market 
adaptability of technical standards by 2010; 
b) To complete and perfect the technical standards system and raise the level of Chinese 
technical standards development by 2020; and 
c) To ensure Chinese technical standards hold a prominent international status by 2050.361 
 
Barradough, however, argues that in the long run, China will lose out since the domestic 
market will be full, as happened in Japan.362 It is, however, unlikely that China will fall into 
the same predicament, since unlike Japan; China is now playing an increasing role in 
international standardization by ensuring that her homegrown standards are recognized by the 
ISO. In effect, all countries which intend to develop standards will have to use these Chinese 
standards as a basis for their technical regulations. Therefore, unless these issues are addressed 
within the context of the TBT Agreement, other countries may follow the same trend in other 
areas. 
 
                                            
358 G/TBT/M/39 ibid. 
359 Barradough, E ‘Winning the IP Standards Game: The Chinese Government says it is Tired of Seeing 
Companies Paying Royalties Abroad and Wants to Develop Some Technology Standards of its Own. Should the 
Rest of the World be Worried?’  1 July 2005 Gale Group, Inc. < http://web.lexis-nexis.com/professional/...> 
[accessed on 12 June 2007]. 
360 Gibson op cit 5. 
361 Gibson op cit 6. 
362 Barradough loc cit. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
Within the context of the TBT Agreement, there is on the one hand, a need to protect local 
industries and on the other hand, an obligation to use international standards where they exist. 
The findings of the AB that the burden of proof is on the complaining party to prove its claim 
in light of the different elements of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement is seemingly 
problematic.363 Although the AB relied on its earlier findings regarding a similar provision,364 
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement and Article 3.1 of the 
SPS Agreement differ, in that Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides greater flexibility.  
 
A central issue addressed in this chapter is whether or not the AB in arriving at its findings 
addressed the policy considerations behind the TBT Agreement and practical difficulties faced 
by a complaining party. As noted, the constraints faced by a complaining party were 
overlooked by the AB. In light of the recent concerns, however, developed countries, like the 
US, Canada and the UK which have invested heavily in information technology, are becoming 
particularly affected by China’s move towards promoting its homegrown standards. The 
burden of proof, as found in EC-Sardines, is therefore placed on any WTO Member country to 
prove that the Wi-Fi international standard is effective and appropriate to fulfil legitimate 
objectives pursued by China through the WAPI functions requirement. This would be a 
difficult task since China alleges that this requirement has an objective of protecting her 
security interests. Product standards have been aspects of many trade agreements, but China’s 
rise as a market for leading exporters has forced renewed focus on the use of standards as 
TBT.365 In contrast, LDCs in Africa which do not have the capacity to develop their own 
standards are therefore at a disadvantage since they are at the “receiving end” of the standards 
game. The next chapter examines the implications of adopting international standards for these 
LDCs. 
 
 
                                            
363 The two elements are: (i) a general rule which requires the use of international standards; and (ii) an 
exception, which may be invoked by a country seeking not to use the international standard. 
364 WTO (2006) 336. 
365 Glusksman, D I ‘Standards Go Abroad’ 1 July 2005 Washington Watch, Gale Group, Inc  
< http://web.lexis-nexis.com/professional/...> [accessed on 12 June 2007]. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR LDCs IN AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As part of the single undertaking principle of the WTO, LDCs in Africa (that are Members of 
the WTO) are signatories to the TBT Agreement.366 Therefore the rights and obligations which 
accrue to the developed country Members extend, to the same extent, to LDCs in Africa 
relative to the “enabling clause”,367  the S&D treatment provisions in the TBT Agreement,368 
and the ministerial declarations and decisions which favour LDCs.369   
 
The existence of product standards is vital for international trade and business since parties to 
the transaction must be assured of the nature and quality of products.370 There are, however, 
differing domestic regulations among WTO Member countries due to differing consumer 
tastes and preferences. As a result of these differing consumer tastes and preferences, 
government assessment of risks among countries leads to the adoption of differing product 
standards which increases the cost of exporting goods from LDCs to the developing and 
developed countries.371 In a bid to address these differing domestic regulations some 
standardization bodies in these LDCs became Members of the ISO.372 
                                            
366 LDCs in Africa which have signed the WTO Agreement are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda and Zambia. See UNCTAD (2007) iii. 
367 The enabling clause, as it is commonly referred to, is the Decision on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries adopted in 1979.  
368 TBT Agreement, Articles 11.8 and 12. 
369 These include, among others, the Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries (1993), the 
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed 
and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (1993), the Decision on the Acceptance of and Accession to the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1993), the Decision on Trade and Environment (1993), 
the Singapore Ministerial Declaration (1996), the  Comprehensive and Integrated WTO Plan of Action for the 
Least Developing Countries (1996), the Geneva Ministerial Declaration (1998) and the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration (2001).  
370 See WTO (2005) 31. 
371 WTO (2005) ibid. 
372 These standardization bodies include: Angolan Institute of Standards and Quality (IANORQ), Benin Centre of 
Standardization and Quality (CEBENOR), Burkina Faso National Standards Organization (FASONORM), 
Burundi Bureau of Standards (BBN), Lesotho Standards and Quality Assurance Section (LSQAS), Madagascar 
Bureau of Standards (BNM), Malawi Bureau of Standards (MBS), Mozambique Institute of Standards and 
Quality (INNOQ), Rwanda Bureau of Standards (Rwanda), Senegal Standardization Association (ASN), 
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These national standardization bodies do not, however, play a significant role in 
standardization work since most of them are correspondent and subscriber Members. Although 
these standardization bodies have attained a level which would enable them to develop 
standards for their national markets, greater participation in the ISO would assist in producing 
“documents” which are relevant to their domestic needs. Of course, regard has to be had to the 
financial difficulties these countries face and their share in world trading. In addition, one 
should also consider the poor application of standards and the lack of capacity to test 
products.373 
 
A central argument set forth in this chapter, in the context of the TBT Agreement,  is that, in 
addition to the need for S&D treatment and technical assistance, there is need to address other 
key issues namely: (i) the implications of the application and interpretation of international 
standards provided under the TBT Agreement on poor African economies; (ii) the 
participation of LDCs in Africa in the activities of the ISO relative to the “political will” and 
commitment towards standardization work in these countries; and (iii) whether or not the 
provisions relating to technical assistance and S& D treatment are meaningful and effective. 
 
Furthermore, standards issues in some LDCs are usually left exclusively to governments, and 
yet there is limited capacity to deal with these issues in terms of technical experts and 
infrastructure. The role played by the private sector, producers, consumers, and NGOs in 
creating relevant standards and bringing complaints to the attention of their home governments 
is highlighted. 
 
This chapter therefore addresses the implication of the use of international standards for LDCs 
in Africa. 
 
5.2 Standards Development in Selected LDCs in Africa 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS), Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS),  Zambia Bureau of 
Standards (ZABS), among others. 
373 Communication between the Author and John Okumu, 28 June 2007 to 24 July 2007 – Available on file with 
the Author. 
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National standards in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are developed by their respective 
government bodies. These standards are mainly based on the standards set by international 
standard setting bodies, which include, among others, ISO, British Standards Institute (BSI), 
South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) and Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS).374 With 
particular reference to the ISO, international standards are developed through TCs of the ISO, 
through which these countries are able to participate. Additionally, Rwanda and Uganda 
(being correspondent Members), do not have any voting rights accorded to them, and as such 
do not play a significant role in the ISO. Even Tanzania which participates as a Member body 
is limited by her own institutional weaknesses. Yet compliance with international standards is 
an important step for goods and services from these LDCs to gain access to international 
markets and at the same time meet their international trade obligations. 
 
In addition, some of these national standardization bodies of these LDCs have weak links to 
markets, since only a few major producers are involved in standardization work. Consumers 
and NGOs also do not play a significant role in the setting of standards, since the consumer 
groups in these countries are so weak.  Below is an overview of three selected LDCs in Africa 
in relation to standardization work and the ISO.   
 
         Country One: Rwanda  
Rwanda has been a Member of WTO since 22 May 1996. The Rwanda Bureau of Standards 
(RBS) is a public institution which was established by Rwanda Government Legislation No. 
03/2002 of 19 January 2002, to undertake all activities pertaining to the development of 
Rwanda’s standards, quality assurance and metrology.375 The RBS is also the only body in the 
country with powers to define, adopt and possess national standards at the national level. 376 
Rwanda is a correspondent Member of the ISO. The RBS has not participated in any TC of the 
ISO.377  
 
Country Two: Tanzania 
                                            
374 Communication between the Author and John Okumu, 28 June 2007 to 24 July 2007 – Available on file with 
the Author. 
375 RBS official website < http://www.rwanda-standards.org/about-rbs.html > [accessed on 19 June 2007]. 
376 RBS official website ibid. 
377 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members.htm > [accessed on 6 September 2007]. 
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Tanzania became a Member of the WTO on 1 January 1995.378 Standards development in 
Tanzania is carried out by the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) whose mission is to develop 
and promote standardization and quality assurance work in industry and commerce.379 TBS, 
unlike RBS and UNBS, is a Member body of the ISO and has participated in one hundred and 
forty two (142) TCs of the ISO.380 
 
         Country Three: Uganda 
Uganda has been a Member of the WTO since 1 January 1995. Standards development in 
Uganda is carried out by the UNBS, a government body which ensures the harmonization of 
standards.381 Uganda standards are carried out by national technical committees, which consist of 
consumers, traders, academicians, manufacturers, government and other stakeholders.382 
Currently there are eleven (11) national technical committees, which have been established to 
deliberate on standards. The UNBS is also the National Enquiry Point (NEP) for the 
implementation of the TBT Agreement. As a correspondent Member of the ISO, the UNBS does 
have any voting rights in the ISO. The UNBS has, however, participated in only two (2) TCs of 
the ISO. 383  
 
5.3 Bearing the Burden of Proof 
 
The key issues which need to be addressed in the context of bearing the burden of proof are: 
a) Whether or not LDCs in Africa can easily access reliable and adequate information at 
enquiry points in view of the institutional challenges they face. 
b) Whether the rights of LDCs are fully covered under the DSU. 
                                            
378 Tanzania has been a third party in three (3) disputes namely: (i) European Communities – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar  (Australia) WT/DS265/AB/R 28 April 2005, Report of the AB; (ii) European Communities – Export 
Subsidies on Sugar  (Brazil) WT/DS266/AB/R 28 April 2005 Report of the AB, and (iii) European Communities 
– Export Subsidies on Sugar  (Thailand) WT/DS283/AB/R 28 April 2005. See WTO official website < 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/tanzania_e.htm > [accessed on 6 September 2007]. 
379 See Tanzania Government official website < http://www.tanzania.go.tz/tbs.htm > [accessed on 6 September 
2007]; TBS was established by an Act of Parliament No. 3 of 1975 under the Ministry of Trade and Industry and 
became operational in April 1976. 
380 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members.htm > [accessed on 6 September 2007]. 
381 The UNBS was established by an act of parliament and became operational in 1989. The UNBS has its 
headquarters in Kampala, with regional offices in only four districts (See UNBS official website  
< http://www.unbs.go.ug/index.php > [accessed on 30 July 2007]). 
382 A Uganda standard is defined as a document declared as such by the National Standards Council (See UNBS 
official website < http://www.unbs.go.ug/main.php?menuid=20 > [accessed on 30 July 2007]). 
383 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members.htm > [accessed on 6 September 2007]. 
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c) Whether the legal capacity in these countries is adequate and effective 
 
As noted earlier, the integration of LDCs in the world trading system is constrained by their 
own institutional weaknesses which will require additional time and technical assistance.384 
Yet integration into the world trading system is crucial for economic development in these 
countries. Although Article 12.8 of the TBT Agreement allows LDCs to request an extension 
of time in regard to the fulfillment of their obligations, 385it should not be used as an “escape 
provision”. Wilson argues, that if “developing countries lack resources to access information 
on international standards or to participate in their development, a key link between the rule of 
law as specified in the WTO system, developing countries” ability to fulfil their obligations 
and defend their rights is called into question.”386 In addition, Alavi argues, that “whereas the 
development objectives are institutionalized in the preparatory work for many trade 
agreements and even written into their preambles, decisions made by panels and the AB 
appear to sideline these objectives and refer to other principles entirely.”387  
 
The negative implication of bearing the burden of proof is that, since there are no proper 
institutions in place to collect adequate information in these LDCs, their participation in the 
dispute settlement system is greatly restrained. Yet the AB in EC-Sardines, in allocating the 
burden of proof, did not address the difficulties a complaining party may face in bearing the 
burden of proof and development objectives of the WTO.  
 
5.3.1 Institutional Challenges 
 
Most of the LDCs lack the resources to implement international standards and technical 
regulations of other countries. Regulations in other countries are also very stringent, and it 
may not be easy for a poor exporting country in Africa, to export effectively. As such, LDCs 
have to upgrade their systems in order to comply with the demands of the international 
                                            
384 Michalopoulos op cit 24. 
385 TBT Agreement, Article 12.8. 
386 Wilson op cit 437. 
387 Alavi op cit 37. For a fuller discussion on development objectives in relation to the GATT and the enabling 
clause See European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries 
WT/DS246/AB/R, 7 April 2004 Report of the AB.   
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standards, and to even include standards that are not covered by the TBT Agreement.388 For 
example, in 1998, fish products from Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda were 
rejected in the EC markets because of the use of pesticides, and yet the fish products had met 
these countries’ national standards.389 In addition, some producers are not aware of the 
international standards which should be fulfilled.390 
   
Be that as it may, disputes brought before the dispute settlement mechanism are usually 
assessed on their merits in regard to the evidence that has been obtained. The lack of pre-case 
assistance to LDCs is therefore a disadvantage.391 There have been efforts by the Africa Group 
during the ongoing Doha Round trade negotiations to address this institutional challenge, and 
many others. Alavi argues, however, that the Africa Group proposals do not clearly address 
this aspect.392 Instead, the group suggests that the dispute settlement mechanism should 
provide assistance in the form of a pool of experts and lawyers in the preparation and conduct 
of cases, the payment of fees and the expenses incurred, among others.393 Alavi suggests, that 
the African countries should use the dispute settlement system (i) to highlight broadly the 
negative effects of WTO rules in their economies and development ambitions; and (ii) to use 
the ongoing review process to try, through negotiations, to raise their concerns and amend the 
existing rules.394 Although trying to amend the existing rules is important, a strong link 
between the industry and the African governments is crucial in addressing some of the 
institutional challenges faced by these LDCs. 
 
5.3.2 Lack of Capacity 
                                            
388 Some standards which have been recognized as barriers to trade like the environmental standards and social 
standards have been accepted in some developed countries. Issues of implementation have, however, become a 
problem in these countries since they are not subject to the TBT Agreement disciplines and do not also fall within 
the SPS agreement. Further, advocates of PPM labels have proposed that a labelling system should be established 
to let the consumers know what processes have been used in the production of a good (Goode op cit 282). 
389 The ban was still in effect in July 2000. The action caused considerable losses in the fish industry in these 
countries (Wilson op cit 430).  
390 For example, Uganda honey (contained in plastic bottles) was rejected by Japanese authorities because Japan 
only imports honey in glass bottles. See Muwanga, D ‘Exports Can Fetch Revenue’ New Vision 27 September 
2007 < http://www.newvision.co.ug/detail.php?mainNews... > [accessed on 27 September 2007]. See also 
Muwanga (2007) 8. 
391 Alavi op cit 32. 
392 Alavi ibid. 
393 Alavi ibid. 
394 Alavi op cit 40. 
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At the ongoing DDA negotiations, the Africa Group proposals in regard to the DSB identified 
three principal obstacles: (i) entry barriers to using the dispute settlement mechanism; (ii) the 
inadequate and appropriate nature of retaliatory mechanism, and; (iii) the lack of a 
development orientation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.395 These obstacles 
highlight the lack of capacity in terms of qualified personnel, technical experts and resources. 
There are regional capacity building efforts within the East African Community (EAC),396 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC). These efforts have, however, focused on lack of 
technology, establishing regional accreditation services and strengthening regional 
cooperation. As noted earlier, these efforts may not address the negative effects of the WTO 
rules on LDCs, and that these countries should focus on mechanisms aimed at identifying and 
reporting trade barriers.397 A key link between industry and government bodies within an 
institutional and legal framework would therefore encourage greater participation.  
 
5.4 Meeting International Standards 
 
The Code of Good Practice requires Members to ensure that their central government 
standardizing bodies accept and comply with the Code. In addition, Article 4.1 of the TBT 
Agreement requires Members to take reasonable measures to ensure that local and non-
governmental standardization bodies comply with the Code. Acceptance of the Code must be 
communicated to the ISO/IEC information centre. And acceptance of the Code is an 
acknowledgement of complying with the principles of the TBT Agreement.398 
 
When a new international standard has been approved and published, the national 
standardization body may either adopt the standard as is, or develop a national standard which 
reflects the trade needs and interests of the country. Since most of the LDCs have weak 
                                            
395 Alavi op cit 31. 
396 For example, the trade capacity building project funded by Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) 
and implemented by United Nations Agency for Industrial Development (UNIDO) in the EAC launched in 
December 2006. See Uganda Trade Ministry official website  
< http://www.mtti.go.ug/docs/EAC%20TCB%20PROJECT.pdf  > [accessed on 6 September 2007].  
397 Shaffer op cit 7. 
398 TBT Agreement, Article 4.2. 
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infrastructure, adopting the international standard may be the only viable option. The industry 
which, of course, did not participate in the standard development process has no other option 
but to adjust to the new requirements. This process can be so costly for local producers. Yet 
the flexibility offered to these LDCs does not contribute to meeting their long term trade and 
development objectives, that is to say, to promote trade and investment. Those firms in these 
countries which do not meet the required international standards are forced to focus on the 
domestic market. 
 
5.4.1 A Challenge for Exporting Firms  
 
In recent times there has been increased standardization activity due to, among others, 
consumer demand for high quality products and services, technological innovations and 
expansion of global commerce.399 Since standards are voluntary specifications emanating from 
market forces,400 market standard setting tends to favour large, influential producers.401 This 
market approach also favours firms that are innovative, as it eliminates the need to obtain 
institutional support for new technologies. These large multinational corporations, through 
their national standardization bodies, play a significant role in the ISO. As a result, decisions 
on the preparation and adoption of international standards made by the ISO are generally 
influenced by large multinational corporations and developed countries.  
 
In view of the above, exporters in LDCs (mainly small medium private enterprises and 
subsidiaries of multinational firms) often make strategic decisions to adopt international 
standards as a means of entering foreign markets. These firms, however, incur huge 
compliance costs, in terms of additional equipment and technical personnel to ensure quality 
assurance. Chen et al, basing their conclusions on the findings of the World Bank TBT 
Survey, have found that standards in developed countries affect firms’ propensity to export in 
                                            
399 WTO (2005) 29; Mutasa, M ‘ISOs Role as an International Standards Setting Organization’ Presentation at the 
WTO Regional Workshop on TBT for English Speaking African Countries Held at Gaborone, Botswana 
Between 19 to 21 June 2007 Slide 4 – Available on file with the Author. 
400 Egan op cit 52. 
401 Abbot, K W and Snidal, D ‘International Standards and International Governance’ (2000)  
< http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/About/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp_00_18.pdf … > [accessed on 13 
June 2007]. 
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developing countries.402 In addition, the difference in standards across foreign countries causes 
disharmony of scale for firms, and affects decisions whether to enter export markets.403  
Small firms in LDCs which intend to export their products to foreign markets are therefore 
discouraged from exporting their products and adopting international standards. Consequently, 
this non-compliance with international standards affects these firms’ propensity to export their 
products, and therefore affects international trade and commerce in a negative way.   
 
5.4.2 Complying with the Code of Good Practice 
 
The TBT Agreement holds central governments accountable for the standards developed by 
local government and non-governmental bodies in their countries, and yet there are no proper 
institutions in place to regulate these bodies.404 Although the Code of Good Practice lays down 
some fundamental rules regarding the development of standards at both the national and 
international level, its application in LDCs in Africa is greatly constrained since the national 
standardization bodies are inadequately funded by their national governments.405 
Standardization work in these countries is mainly carried out by a central body. In fact, NGOs 
and consumers are not encouraged to participate in standardization work, since standards are 
perceived as a means of regulating business and protecting the public through Acts and 
regulations of parliament. This centralized system therefore inhibits the important contribution 
that consumers, the private sector and non-government organizations could play in 
standardization work since these countries face a serious problem of lack of funds, personnel 
and other resources. Of course, the potential shortcomings of encouraging NGOs and 
consumer groups in standardization work should also not be underestimated.   
 
                                            
402 Chen, M X et al, ‘Do Standards Matter for Export Success?’ (2006) World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3809, 24 World Bank official website < http://www-wds.worldbank.org/...> [accessed on 27 June 
2007]. 
403 Chen et al ibid. 
404 TBT Agreement, Article 4.1. 
405 For example, in Uganda, the UNBS requires a budget of Ugshs. 12 billion and yet it currently operates on a 
budget of Ugshs. 4.8 billion (See Obore, C ‘Producers, Dealers in Fake Goods Exposed’ Daily Monitor 6 August 
2007 < http://www.monitor.co.ug/news/news08062.php > [accessed on 24 August 2007]). 
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As a result, national standardizing bodies have to adopt international standards which do not 
reflect the needs of their market since it is cheaper and time saving. Complying with the Code 
of Good Practice is therefore still a problem for LDCs. 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Non - Product Related PPMs 
 
As noted earlier, 406 there is still debate as to whether or not the TBT Agreement covers 
environmental, labour and social standards. Trade, business and investment in most LDCs in 
Africa have exposed the environment to risks of damage and degradation. In addition, 
globalization of trade through e-commerce has led to new barriers to trade which have the 
potential to distort trade in LDC markets. As a result, although the relevance of unincorporated 
PPMs for trade policy is still unclear, consumers and governments in the importing country 
may care about the way in which the imported good is produced.407 The primary concern for 
LDCs therefore is the application of non-product related PPMs requirements by importing 
countries, and whether LDCs should also adopt these methods. The market trends suggest a 
move towards the adoption of social, environmental and labour standards. Of course these 
standards may also be used for purposes of gaining competitive advantage since some 
consumers may not buy a particular product or service, if it is “environmentally unfriendly”, 
from a country which does not meet labour standards, or if it has been produced by a company 
that does not have any social responsibility. An international standard which fulfils any of 
these requirements would be easily adopted.  These standards therefore have the potential of 
acting as barriers to trade if products from these countries are rejected at the various entry 
points or if it causes unreasonably high expense to the producer in terms of conformity and 
compliance costs.   
 
5.5 Participation in Standardization Work 
 
                                            
406 See Chapters One, Two and Three. 
407 WTO (2005) 35. 
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The TBT Agreement’s Code of Good Practice “seeks to supervise how standard-setting bodies 
at the national level participate at the international level.”408 All bodies in a territory interested 
in a particular subject matter are required to participate through one delegation at the 
international body.409 The requirement to participate in international standardizing bodies 
therefore ensures that LDCs play a significant role in the standards development. In practice, 
however, the provisions regarding participation have not been effective since the majority of 
these LDCs do not have any voting rights.410 As a result, the standards which are developed do 
not often reflect the trade interests of these LDCs.  
 
As noted earlier, the ISO has been recognized by the WTO as a leading international 
standardizing body, and most of the definitions in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement are taken 
from the ISO documents. The participation of LDCs in activities of the ISO has, however, 
been insignificant. Apart from the national standardization bodies in Congo and Tanzania, 
several national standardizing bodies in LDCs are only correspondent, and subscriber 
Members, and some other countries are not represented at all (see Table 3, p. 109).411  
 
Additionally, the composition and decision making organs and standard setting procedures of 
the ISO or other international standardizing body have also not been subjected to the TBT 
Agreement disciplines. In fact, as seen in EC-Sardines, the AB did not delve into the affairs of 
CAC. 412 
 
Hamilton argues that some of these organizations are not competent to handle standards 
development as they do not have fair and transparent systems in place.413 The basis of this 
argument stems from the fact that some of these standards are not consensual. Consensus is an 
important aspect in so far as acceptability, relevance and implementation of standards are 
                                            
408 Charnovitz (2002a) 9. 
409 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 para G.  
410 As of this writing, only two LDCs in Africa, that is, Congo and Tanzania, have voting rights in the ISO. 
411 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isomembers...> [accessed on 23 August 2007]. 
412 EC-Sardines AB supra at para 227.  
413 Hamilton, P ‘Debate Begins on Standards for International Trade’  
< http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=9706082700 > [accessed on 27 June 2007]. 
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concerned. Thus, it has made it increasingly difficult for some countries to accept the 
standards set by the ISO.414  
 
Although the participation of LDCs has been recognized by the ISO,  there has been no 
significant improvement in participation.415 Morikawa and  Morrison also note that developed 
countries send more experts to TCs of the ISO than others, while some countries send no 
delegates at all. 416 Further, developed countries hold more leadership positions within these 
TCs. The negative implication that follows from this predicament is that LDCs are left out of 
standards development, and yet non-compliance with international standards is fatal to their 
economic growth and development. International standard setting organs should be subjected 
to TBT Agreement disciplines, though, this should not be done to undermine their 
independence. Alternatively, the DSB should consult these organs whenever a particular 
standard needs interpretation. Since the WTO delegated the duty of standard setting, it should, 
therefore, leave the duty of interpreting and analyzing a particular standard to the international 
standard setting body. But again, this would be turning them into “world legislators”. A 
compromise therefore has to be reached between eliminating protectionist tendencies and 
trade liberalization, and at the same time encouraging participation of WTO Members in 
standardization work.  
 
5.5.1 ISO’s Standard Development Process 
 
The first step is when a particular industry notifies the national Member of the ISO in regard 
to the need for a standard (see Table 2, p.108).417 The national Member then notifies the ISO. 
At this stage the Members take a vote as to whether a standard is required. If it is approved, 
                                            
414 As the case for China and Wi-Fi standards. See chapter four of the thesis.  
415 Morikawa and Morrison loc cit. In 1967, the ISO created DEVCO, its policy committee on developing 
country matters. DEVCO’s mandate was to identify the needs and requirements of developing countries in the 
field of standardization and related activities. ISO also established the Developing Countries Task Force (DCFT), 
which developed a program of action in 2003 to further deal with the under representation challenge. The 
establishment of these committees has, however, not improved the participation of LDCs (Morikawa and 
Morrison op cit 13). 
416 Morikawa and Morrison op cit 10. 
417 ISO official website <http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/processes... > [accessed on 25 August 
2007]. 
 
 
 
 
 83
the TCs are then set up to develop a working draft. These TCs develop the standard and 
forward it to the working group’s parent committee for the consensus building phase. Upon 
completion of the first committee draft standard, it is registered by the ISO central secretariat 
and distributed for comment in relation to its technical content. This draft international 
standard (DIS) is then circulated to all ISO Member bodies by the ISO central secretariat for 
voting and comments. After five months, the final DIS is circulated to all ISO Member bodies 
for a final “yes” or “no” vote within a period of two months. The text is approved as an 
international standard if a two thirds majority of participating Members of the TC is in favour, 
and not more than one-quarter of the total number of votes cast are negative. Upon approval, 
the final text is sent to the ISO central secretariat which publishes the international standard.  
  
As noted above, the voting starts at an early stage. Therefore, ensuring that a particular 
standard is approved and not rejected at the earliest stage would require a lot of lobbying and 
resources. This puts LDCs at a disadvantage since they do not have the necessary financial and 
human resources to cope easily with the rapid technological innovation taking place. Yet the 
standards development process should not be delayed, as new international standards are 
always required to address issues of market failures. This explains why there are time frames 
within which a Member is required to cast a vote. In practice, and in view of the institutional 
challenges in these LDCs, it may not be possible for all the stakeholders, i.e. producers, 
consumers and NGOs, to adequately comment on the DIS. For those LDCs that are not 
participating Members, this process is of course not relevant since they do not have any voting 
rights. 
 
5.5.2 LDC Representation in the ISO 
 
LDCs are poorly represented in the ISO (see, Table 3, p.109). This has been due to factors not 
limited to financial constraints and lack of technical personnel. A large number of the 
standardization bodies in LDCs are correspondent and subscriber Members.418 Some countries 
are not represented at all. This therefore limits their participation in the ISO. For meaningful 
participation to occur, these countries would have to foster and encourage greater 
                                            
418  See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isomembers...> [accessed on 23 August 2007]. 
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representation in the ISO. This, however, remains a challenge for these LDCs given the level 
of commitment towards standardization work in these countries. 
 
5.6 Options for LDCs 
 
LDCs in Africa experience, among others, low levels of income per capita, limited exports, 
weak infrastructure, and unemployment. Trade liberalization, however, offers new 
opportunities for governments, individuals and firms in these LDCs to export their products, 
which in turn fosters economic development. Yet international standards and labelling 
requirements are increasing the costs of trading. A study carried out by the OECD in relation 
to the role played by standardization bodies in its Member countries found that: 
 
“If the world of standardisation were dominated by a few players, with established procedures 
embodying a large number of common principles and definitions; in which exceptions are either 
rare or generally unimportant; and in which co-ordination with regulatory authorities and 
industry is managed through non-governmental national standards bodies, then, in order to 
improve continuously and meet the changing needs of international trade development, it should 
identify the ways in which that uniform model can be adapted, or fine-tuned. 
 
However, the world of standardisation covers a diverse mixture of organisations, in which 
alternative models of participation for industry and government exist. The variety evident in the 
structures used in standardisation, both at sectoral level or in multi-sectoral regional/global 
programmes, suggests a need for closer analysis of exactly how they operate. Is there an 
“optimum” model? Can circumstances be defined where industry leadership is more important 
than government leadership, or vice versa, if standards are to play an effective role in trade 
liberalisation?” 419 
 
The OECD study emphasized the need for accurate, transparent information about what goes 
on in the standardization field.420 LDCs should therefore focus on mechanisms which suit their 
development needs and industry and only adopt international standards which do not cause 
fundamental technological problems.  
                                            
419 OECD (1999) 17. 
420 OECD ibid. 
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5.6.1 Harmonization or Equivalence 
 
One should consider whether the international standards set by the ISO are in fact relevant to 
the prevailing circumstances in these LDCs, since these countries have not attained a level of 
development which would accelerate the implementation of international standards. 
Harmonizing standards proposed by LDCs with those set by developed countries is a difficult 
process, since these LDCs do not have voting rights in the ISO.  
 
In addition, unlike in developed countries, the enforcement mechanisms in LDCs are so weak, 
and there is also lack of consumer awareness and ignorance among consumers and small 
medium enterprises.421 Standardization is also not an issue of great concern in some of these 
LDCs.  
 
Another impediment to harmonization is the language barrier among countries. For example, it 
is reported that only 50 standards have so far been harmonized among the SADC Member 
states as opposed to the over 700 standards which have been harmonized under the EAC.422 
During the Second Triennial Review, the TBT Committee recognized equivalency of 
standards as an interim measure in the facilitation of international trade.423 Chen et al also 
suggest, that negotiating on testing procedures towards mutual recognition with importing 
countries could stimulate exports.424 Therefore, mutual recognition, though, it is not a key 
principle of the TBT Agreement in relation to standards, could be an effective means in 
reducing the existing trade barriers. 
 
5.6.2 Alternative Approaches to Standardization 
 
                                            
421 Communication between the Author and John Okumu, 28 June 2007 to 24 July 2007 – Available on file with 
the Author. 
422 Gumbo, P ‘Standards Bureau Decries Lack of National Accreditation Body’ IPP Media /Guardian News 30 
August 2007 < http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/guardian/2007/08/30/97354.html > [accessed on 31 August 2007]. 
423 Minutes of the Second Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the TBT Agreement 
(G/TBT/9), para 23 < http://docsonline.wto.org/... > [accessed on 31 August 2007]. 
424 Chen et al op cit 24.   
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Since the interpretation of Article 2.4 of the TBT allows countries to deviate from 
international standards where they are not applicable,425 LDCs should also consider 
developing standards which are relevant to their trade needs. Like China, these countries could 
focus on promoting their homegrown standards.  The problem, however, is that it will be so 
costly for the government. But with the support of the private sector and NGOs it may be 
possible to develop their own standards. Stephenson notes that there is no single process 
worldwide for creating and adopting national standards, and that it is up to each country to 
choose a system which it finds appropriate.426 In doing so, however, a country should 
consider: (i) the size and concentration of the industry; (ii) the dominance of specific suppliers 
or buyers; (iii) the level of speed of technological advance; and (iv) the public interests.427  
 
Stephenson considers four (4) types of approaches to standards development (see Table 4, 
p.110).428 The first type involves a government agency and accredited developers; the second 
type involves a private sector organization; the third type involves national coordination 
organization and accredited developers; and the fourth type involves both the government 
body and the private sector coordination organization. 
 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda use a government agency, with a limited involvement of the 
private sector. This approach has, however, not been very successful. This rather centralized 
system should instead be replaced with a system involving the greater private sector, local 
governments and NGOs but with the over all supervision of the central government body. This 
would ensure that the interests of the public are catered for, and at the same time the 
infrastructural and technological difficulties facing the national standardizing bodies are 
addressed.  
 
5.6.3 Regional Integration Arrangements and Other Partnerships 
 
                                            
425 See Chapter Four: To Adopt or Not to Adopt International Standards. 
426 Stephenson op cit 23. 
427 Stephenson ibid. 
428 Stephenson ibid. 
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Hufbauer et al suggest that regionalization of technical experts and methods reduce on 
operation costs.429 There are efforts within the EAC, COMESA and SADC to harmonize 
standards and to establish a joint legal framework, infrastructure and public awareness.430 The 
Treaty for the establishment of the EAC recognizes the need to co-operate in the area of 
standardization, quality assurance, metrology and testing (SQMT) in order to facilitate 
sustainable modernization in the Community. 431 Since the launch of the East Africa 
Standardization Committee in 1998 there are over 700 standards which have been 
harmonized.432  There is a need for a regional accreditation body since most of the testing 
laboratories do not have accreditation facilities and have to seek accreditation elsewhere, 
particularly in South Africa.433 Chen et al, in relation to exporting firms in developing 
countries, also suggest that facilitating information exchange with importing countries on 
standards and technical regulations could also stimulate firms' propensity to export.434 
 
Additionally, LDCs which are not yet full Members of the ISO should take steps to becoming 
full Members of the ISO. It is through full participation that they will be able to influence the 
technical content of standards. 
 
5.6.4 Increased Private Sector and Consumer Participation 
 
As noted earlier, the need for a standard begins at the industry level. Industry consists of 
several key players, among others, suppliers, producers, distributors, and consumers. The 
participation of consumer groups has, however, been very limited in the selected LDCs. In 
addition, there is low consumer awareness in relation to standardization work.435 Yet 
producers, consumers and NGOs can play a significant role in fostering the development of, 
and adherence to, international standards. It has also been recognized that the participation of 
                                            
429 Hufbauer et al (2002) 1014. 
430 The establishment of the East African Quality and Metrology Centre. EAC- Quality official website  
< http://www.eac-quality.net/> [accessed on 31 August 2007]. SADCSTAN (SADC Cooperation in 
Standardization) official website < www.sadcstan.co.za/overview.html > [accessed on 31 August 2007]. 
431 Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC, Chapter 13, Article 81. 
432 Gumbo loc cit. 
433 Gumbo ibid. 
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all stakeholders in the development of international standards is important to ensure 
confidence in technical regulations based on these standards.436 Public awareness should 
therefore be directed towards the participation of all stakeholders in the industry, and not 
towards punishing those who do not comply with the required standards. 
 
5.6.5 Privatisation  
 
National standardisation bodies in LDCs in Africa should consider licensing private 
companies to take over some of the non-core duties and responsibilities. This would allow the 
national standardisation body to concentrate on purely standard development work.437  
5.6.6 Capacity Building Efforts 
 
Lack of capacity has been identified as one of the reasons deterring the participation of LDCs 
in both the WTO438 and the ISO. There are already efforts to increase capacity in these LDCs, 
but these capacity building efforts must be supported by the manufacturing and service 
industries. Increasing capacity alone without sensitizing the producers in these countries 
would not be fruitful. The private sector in LDCs has typically viewed WTO dispute 
settlement as the government’s business.439 Yet information regarding the effect of a given 
measure and its impact on trade cannot be assessed by the government alone, given the weak 
administrative systems in these countries. Public-private partnership would therefore go a long 
way in re-enforcing the capacity building efforts. There is also need for further training and 
strengthening of LDCs NEPs, updating to accommodate rather dynamic market driven and 
mandatory standards.  
 
As regards the lack of legal and technical experts: LDCs should initiate capacity building 
efforts at the national level by way of training, or supporting efforts towards increasing 
                                            
436 OECD (2000) 3. 
437 Privatization of quality testing services is to be done in Kenya to allow the national standards body, KEBS, to 
concentrate on creating and developing standards. See Mugambi, K ‘Kenya: Standards Bureau May Privatize 
Services’ The Nation 10 August 2007 < http://allafrica.com/stories/200708091005.html > [accessed on 23 
August 2007]. 
438 The trade ministers at the Doha Ministerial Conference pledged to continue efforts geared towards capacity 
building (Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (01) Dec/1 20 November 2001, paras 2, 16, 20, 21, 33, 36, 38, 42. 
439 Shaffer op cit 7. 
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learners, in WTO law. In the meantime, LDCs should utilize the services of the ACWL at 
Geneva. The Centre’s rates vary, depending on a country’s membership status, share of world 
trade and per capita income. 440 These rates are low compared to those charged by other 
international trade lawyers and private law firms. Those LDCs which wish to appear as third 
parties are also offered free legal services.441 In addition, links to markets should be 
established to ensure accurate, adequate and reliable information on the effect and impact of 
the measures imposed by the trading partners. 
 
 
 
 
5.6.7 Technical Assistance  
 
Standards development is a highly technical area which requires experts, technicians and 
persons familiar with standardization work. Yet LDCs in Africa do not have the required 
infrastructure in place to assure adequate development of standards, dissemination of 
information and notification of standards. Technical assistance is also essential for meaningful 
progress.442 
 
There were proposals, during the ongoing DDA trade negotiations, for mandatory and 
preferential technical assistance for developing countries to meet technical standards.443 
Developed countries opposed the Africa Group’s requests for a new fund to provide technical 
assistance specifically for TBT obligations, and for impact assessments of technical standards 
on developing countries before implementation.444 Switzerland, Canada and the EU, however, 
argued that these matters were better taken up in the TBT Committee.445 
                                            
440 LDCs are charged US$ 25 per hour during the WTO dispute settlement proceedings and are given free legal 
advice, subject to a maximum of hours determined by the management  board (Schedule of Fees set out in Annex 
IV of the Agreement Establishing the ACWL). < http://www.acwl.ch/e/pdf/annex_4_e.pdf > [accessed on 31 
August 2007]. 
441 See ACWL official website < http://www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news...> [accessed on 31 August 2007]. 
442 OECD (2001) 21. 
443 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 24 October 2002, Vol. 6 (36) ICTSD official website  
< http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-10-24/story2.htm > [accessed on 10 August 2007]. 
444 Bridges ibid. 
445 Bridges ibid. 
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One could argue that technical assistance is a rather controversial topic which may not be 
accomplished within the TBT Committee. A commitment towards providing technical 
assistance is a bigger issue which would best be addressed through trade negotiations.  In this 
regard, concessions have to be made and agreements have to be reached at a higher level. 
Trade liberalization in LDCs would also require the identification of standards-related 
technical assistance as part of an overall development strategy which is demand-driven and 
coupled with a country-owned process undertaken in partnership with aid agencies.446  
 
As Srinivasan quotes: 
 
“…And they [developed countries] have promised technical assistance to enhance the capacity 
of developing countries to participate in the WTO and in trade. So many promises - and such 
little action. The record of industrialized countries in the area of trade policy is one of heroic 
underachievement. They have collectively reneged on every commitment made.” 447[Emphasis 
added]. 
 
The need for developed countries to honour their commitments, and to provide technical 
assistance, to LDCs, has therefore been a topic of interest. To this end the trade ministers at 
Paris resolved as follows: 
 
“We, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development 
and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, meeting in Paris on 2 March 
2005, resolve to take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and 
manage aid…”448 
 
 
                                            
446 Finger, M J and Wilson, J S ‘Implementing a WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation: What Makes Sense?’ 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3971 World Bank official website   
< http://www-wds.worldbank.org/...> [accessed on 10 August 2007]. 
447  Srinivasan op cit 4. See also Oxfam ‘Eight Broken Promises: Why the WTO Isn’t Working for the World’s 
Poor’, (2001), Briefing Paper 9, 1 Oxfam official website  
< www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers... > [accessed on 27 July 2007]. 
448 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Meeting in Paris on 2 March 2005, para 1. 
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In the past less emphasis was placed on the level of commitment and “political will” for trade 
and development in these countries, and whether or not there are proper institutions in place in 
these countries in support of technical assistance, relative to the levels of corrupt practices 
which are prevalent in some of these countries and the mechanisms in place to fight them.449 
Yet mismanagement, corruption and poor co-ordination of activities characterized and 
continues to affect the institutional structures in these countries. The Paris Declaration, 
however, as it has been suggested, may make a significant difference for three (3) reasons: (i) 
the Paris Declaration goes beyond previous agreements since it lays down a practical and 
action oriented road map; (ii) the declaration lays down indicators to monitor progress in 
achieving results; and (iii) the Paris Declaration promotes a model of partnership that 
improves transparency and accountability in the use of development resources.450 In addition, 
there are also efforts within the WTO, through a joint DDA Trade Capacity Building Database 
(TCBDB) with the OECD, to provide information on trade-related technical assistance and 
capacity building projects.451 These and many other initiatives are likely to improve the way in 
which LDCs respond and fulfil their obligations under the TBT Agreement. 
 
5.6.8 S&D Treatment 
 
LDCs in Africa are given S&D treatment in regard to the implementation of the TBT 
Agreement.452 The factors which are put into consideration are the special development, 
financial and trade needs of the developing country Members. The rationale behind the S&D 
treatment, in relation to standards, is that standards should not create unnecessary obstacles to 
exports from developing countries. In practice, however, international standards which are 
primarily set by developed country Members have acted as significant barriers to trade, since 
                                            
449 The prosecution of standards officers in Rwanda and the institution of a separate corruption court in Uganda 
are, in this context, seen as a step in the right direction. In Rwanda, two senior officials of the RBS were 
convicted after pleading guilty to offences relating to corruption, embezzlement and misuse of office (Agaba, G 
‘Migabo Acquitted’ The New Times 10 October 2007  
< http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=1314&article=1526 > [accessed on 24 October 2007]. See 
Xinhua, ‘Uganda Government to Set Up Anti-Corruption Court’ People’s Daily 28 April 2007  
< http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/6239740.html > [accessed 10 September 2007]. 
450 See OECD official website < http://www.oecd.org/...> [accessed on 10 September 2007]. 
451 See TCBDB official website < http://tcbdb.wto.org/index.aspx > [accessed on 10 September 2007]. 
452 TBT Agreement, Article 12.3. 
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the development needs of LDCs are not considered in the preparation and adoption of 
international standards. Setting the international standard and complying with that standard are 
two different things. Even standards developed and set by standardization bodies in LDCs are 
not adhered to by some producers. One should, however, consider the effectiveness and future 
relevance of S&D treatment in developing and promoting trade in LDCs, and whether these 
provisions are necessary.453 
 
Mayeda argues that S&D treatment has not been effective in improving the productivity of 
developing nations.454 Mayeda gives three reasons for this: (i) developing countries have a 
limited ability to take advantage of preferential market access; (ii) since conventional 
liberalization measures already cover much of the field, there is little need for improvements 
under S&D treatment; and (iii) non-reciprocity harms economic growth.455 Mayeda suggests 
that developing countries should focus on institutional and capacity building.456 This 
contention is true, in view of the fact that, despite the numerous declarations in favour of 
LDCs, there has not been a significant impact of S&D provisions in fostering trade in these 
countries. Similarly, the emphasis of the TBT Committee has been towards technical 
assistance rather than S&D treatment.457 In addition, LDCs should consider the GATS 
formulation of S&D treatment provisions, since these provisions allow flexibility for the 
incorporation of development objectives.458 In respect to the TBT Agreement, market access 
and national treatment would therefore be negotiated in areas and sectors which require 
liberalization.459 
 
5.7 Beyond Doha 
 
On the question whether or not NTBs would cease, Professor Jackson noted: 
 
                                            
453 OECD (2001) 25. 
454 Mayeda op cit 748.                                     
455 Mayeda ibid.                                   
456 Mayeda ibid.                                    
457 Rata, P ‘Technical Assistance and S&D Treatment’ Presentation at the WTO Regional Workshop on TBT for 
English Speaking African Countries Held at Gaborone, Botswana Between 19 to 21 June 2007 Slide 12 – 
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458 OECD (2001) 14. 
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“The ingenuity of man to devise various subtle as well as explicit ways to inhibit the importation 
of competing goods is so great that any inventory of such measures quickly becomes quite large. 
In addition, it is clear that this ingenuity will never cease: like ways to avoid income tax, human 
invention of non-tariff barriers will undoubtedly go on forever. The international and national 
institutions designed to cope with this problem must recognize this as part of the circumstances 
that they must contend with.”460 
 
National governments and standardization bodies in the LDCs in Africa do not, however, have 
adequate systems in place, to deal with the negative effects of the use, formulation and 
adoption of international standards. 
 
At the onset of the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, the trade ministers called upon 
developed country Members to provide, to the extent possible, the financial and technical 
assistance necessary to enable LDCs to respond adequately to the introduction of any new 
TBT measures which may have significant negative effects on their trade. In addition, the 
trade ministers noted the actions taken by the Director-General of the WTO to facilitate the 
increased participation of Members at different levels of development in the work of the 
relevant international standard setting organizations.461  
 
In October 2006 the General Council of the WTO agreed to recommendations and 
understandings adopted by the Dedicated Session regarding measures to assist small 
economies in meeting their obligations under the TBT Agreement, as a means of enabling 
their fuller integration into the multilateral trading system.462 The Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) negotiations, which had collapsed, resumed in February 2007. There has, however, not 
been any breakthrough in most of the areas, particularly issues pertaining to LDCs. In light of 
the recent developments, i.e. the Paris Declaration, and the establishment of the TCBDB, 
however, there is optimism that LDCs are likely to make significant achievements in the areas 
of technical assistance and S&D treatment. 
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461 Decision on Implementation of Related Issues and Concerns, Doha Ministerial Conference, 9 to14 November 
2001, WTO/MIN (01)17, 4. 
462 WTO (2007) 9. 
 
 
 
 
 94
5.8 Conclusion 
 
As noted above, the participation of LDCs in the activities of the ISO is constrained by both 
internal and external factors. Although there have been efforts to address these factors at the 
international level, a lot has to be done at the national level. LDCs still lack the necessary 
resources necessary for standard development work, and as a result have to adopt international 
standards which do not suit their development needs, in a bid to compete with foreign firms. 
Making firms in LDCs competitive will require a concerted effort by the government, 
consumer groups, NGOs and producers. This should, however, be done within an institutional 
and legal framework which will encourage complaints and trade concerns to be identified. 
Regional integration arrangements and partnerships currently in place should also be 
encouraged. In order to allow LDC national standardization bodies to focus on purely 
standardization work, the non-core duties should be delegated. 
 
Within the context of the DDA, proposals geared towards allowing LDCs to gather, process 
and prioritize information at the sectoral level should be formulated. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
International standards play a significant role in the liberalisation and facilitation of 
international trade around the world. Following the reduction of tariff levels of countries, 
standards have, however, been used as a means of protectionism. On the one hand, there is the 
need to promote domestic industries, technical changes and consumer safety, but then, on the 
other hand, there is also a desire to expand trade and improve market access. The TBT 
Agreement tries to balance these two conflicting interests by ensuring that international 
standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade by being trade restrictive. At the same 
time, the TBT Agreement seeks to promote the efficacy and legitimacy of international 
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standards relative to domestic laws. In practice, however, some WTO Member countries 
continue to use standards as a means of promoting their domestic industries. China, for 
example, has adopted a policy aimed at encouraging the development of its homegrown 
technology standards, and increasing its influence within the ISO. Countries in Europe and 
America are also focusing on increasing their financial support for their national and regional 
standardising bodies. Although these methods are permitted under the TBT Agreement, they 
act as significant barriers to trade, especially for the LDCs in Africa which have to comply 
with the standards developed by the ISO, for them to effectively integrate into the world 
trading system.  
 
 
The development of new standards, such as social, labour and environment standards which 
do not explicitly fall under the TBT Agreement, is another area which has attracted enormous 
debate. The language of the TBT Agreement suggests that it is not applicable to non-product 
related PPMs, and yet these standards are of particular concern to LDCs in Africa which 
support sustainable development and good governance. These countries very often need to 
strike a balance between trade expansion and the protection of the environment. At the same 
time, the service industry has grown tremendously over the years, and yet services are not 
covered by the TBT Agreement. With the adoption of the GATS and the ISO strategic vision 
for 2005-2010, these non-product related PPMs standards could be incorporated into the TBT 
Agreement. 
 
As regards the interpretation of the TBT Agreement, the DSB ensures that countries observe 
and adhere to their commitments and obligations under the TBT Agreement. In the context of 
the TBT Agreement and the DSB, there is a policy obligation to ensure that standards do not 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade. At the same time, a Member country is obliged to 
protect its citizens against harmful products. The AB decision in EC-Sardines is, however, not 
a true reflection of the policy considerations behind the TBT Agreement as well as the 
practical difficulties faced by LDCs in Africa. In practice, LDCs do not have solid 
infrastructure, technical personnel and legal mechanisms to enable them to meet their 
obligations under the TBT Agreement. Thus, it would be necessary to promote a greater 
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coherence between the objectives, policy and implementation of the TBT Agreement. In 
addition, LDCs would need to monitor the development of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, assert their own interests and train their own legal personnel to handle these 
matters. 
 
Further, the TBT Agreement encourages countries to use international standards where such 
standards already exist. The majority of these international standards are set by NGOs which 
represent consumer groups and national standardisation bodies. This has placed the ISO at the 
forefront of standards development and yet the participation of LDCs in Africa in this 
standardisation body is limited. The outcome is that the standards developed by the ISO do not 
suit the development needs of these LDCs, and thus the need to adopt these standards mutatis 
mutandis. This, however, requires building expertise and devoting additional resources to 
modern technology, technical personnel and management. In this regard LDCs in Africa 
would have to influence the development of international standards through the use of global 
information technology networks which already exist. The WTO, World Bank and the ISO 
would also have to continue with their efforts to provide technical assistance and specialists to 
these countries, and by encouraging LDCs to play an increased role in standardization work. 
On the other hand, LDCs should also devote resources towards: (i) increasing participation in 
standardization work of the ISO; (ii) mutual recognition of standards, where applicable; (iii) 
considering the developments of standards which reflect their trade needs; (iv) regional 
integration arrangement and partnerships; (v) increased producer and consumer participation; 
and (vi) increasing capacity at the sectoral level. 
 
Lastly, despite the S&D treatment afforded to LDCs, there has been no significant impact of 
conforming to, and complying with, international standards in these countries. These countries 
continue to face institutional challenges and will require the concerted effort of all the 
stakeholders. Extending the time frames for compliance by the LDCs without providing the 
necessary financial and technical assistance may therefore not be the most appropriate remedy; 
but rather, the development of technical infrastructure and capacity building as well as 
ensuring that the little resources are not misappropriated or embezzled. In this regard the 
private sector and NGO’s could play a greater role in ensuring that product testing and 
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conformity procedures are in place so as to promote free trade. In addition, these efforts 
should be supported by a legal framework which encourages adequate reporting and collection 
of information in regard to trade concerns in these countries. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis, the following recommendations are made. 
 
6.2.1 Standard 
 
Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement defines the term “standard” as follows: 
 
“Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with 
which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method.” 
 
Annex 1.2 should be amended as follows: 
 
“Document approved by a recognized body or system, that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products, process and services, with which 
compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production 
and service. This Agreement covers also non-product and process methods.” 
 
This would clarify the position with regard to non-product and process methods now in place 
and the services which are not covered under the TBT Agreement. 
 
6.2.2 Explanatory Note to the Term “Standard” 
 
The explanatory note to the term “standard” provides as follows: 
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“The terms as defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2 cover products, processes and services. This 
Agreement deals only with technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures related to products or processes and production methods. Standards as defined by 
ISO/IEC Guide 2 may be mandatory or voluntary. For the purpose of this Agreement standards 
are defined as voluntary and technical regulations as mandatory documents. Standards prepared 
by the international standardization community are based on consensus. This Agreement covers 
also documents that are not based on consensus.” 
 
Instead, it should be amended to provide as follows: 
 
“This Agreement deals with technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures related to products or processes and services. Standards as defined by ISO/IEC Guide 
2 may be mandatory or voluntary. For the purpose of this Agreement standards are defined as 
voluntary and technical regulations as mandatory documents. Standards prepared by the 
international standardization community are based on consensus.”  
 
This amendment would clarify on the requirement of consensus in relation to the formulation 
and adoption of international standards. 
 
6.2.3 International Body or System 
 
Annex 1.4 of the TBT Agreement which defines an “International body or system” as a “Body 
or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members” should be 
amended to emphasize participation of Members in standardization work as follows: 
 
“Body or system to which the relevant bodies of all Members are full Members” 
 
6.2.4 Mutual Recognition Agreements 
 
In recent times, Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) have been negotiated between 
industrialised nations, for example, those between the US and the EU. These agreements 
identify and establish common platforms for product testing methods and conformity 
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procedures between countries. These agreements have significantly reduced the effects of 
TBT. These agreements, however, only cover technical regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures. Similar agreements should be entered into in regard to voluntary standards. Thus, 
LDCs should enter into these agreements with their trading partners.  
 
6.2.5 Capacity Building Efforts and Dispute Settlement 
 
In addition to utilising the services of the AWCL, LDCs should build their own capacity in 
terms of identifying and collecting information regarding trade concerns at a sectoral level. 
This would involve encouraging efforts towards the establishment of a Centre on WTO law, as 
well as offer training to members of the private sector, NGOs and lawyers in these LDCs. At 
the same time, there is a need to build research institutions training lawyers and economists 
within their universities, with emphasis on the trade needs of their countries. 
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? General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
? General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. 
? General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
? Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
? Treaty Establishing the East African Community. 
? Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
? Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. 
 
WTO Case Authority 
 
? Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, 21 February 1997 
Report of the AB. 
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? Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural 
Products, WT/DS207/R, 3 May 2002 Report of the panel. 
? European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Australia) WT/DS265/AB/R, 28 
April 2005 Report of the AB.  
? European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Brazil) WT/DS266/AB/R, 28 
April 2005 Report of the AB.  
? European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Thailand) WT/DS283/AB/R, 28 
April 2005 Report of the AB. 
? European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries WT/DS246/AB/R, 7 April 2004 Report of the AB. 
? European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos – Containing Products, 
WT/DS/135/R, 18 September 2000 Report of the panel. 
? European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos – Containing 
Products WT/DS/135/R1 2 March 2001 Report of the AB.  
? European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998 Report of the AB.  
? European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R 25 September 1997 Report of the AB. 
? European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS/231/R, 29 May 
2002, Report of the panel.  
? European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R, 
WT/DS231/AB, 26 September 2002 Report of the AB.  
? Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, 
WT/DS60/AB/R 2 November 1998 Report of the AB. 
? Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II) 
WT/DS11/AB/R, 1 November 1996 Report of the AB. 
? Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 
WT/DS98/AB/R, 14 December 1999 Report of the AB. 
? Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS84/R, 17 September 1998 Report of the 
panel. 
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? Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS84/AB/R, 18 January 1999 Report of 
the AB. 
? Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R-
375/200, 7 November 1990 Report of the panel. 
? Turkey – Restrictions in Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, 31 
May 1999 Report of the panel. 
? United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from 
India, WT/DS33/AB/R, 25 April 1997 Report of the AB.  
? United States – Standards for Reformatted and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996 Report of the AB. 
 
Minutes, Decisions and Ministerial Declarations 
 
? Background Paper for Chinese Submission to WTO on Intellectual Property Rights in 
Standardization (G/TBT/W/251). 
? Decision on Implementation of Related Issues and Concerns, Doha Ministerial 
Conference, 9-14 November 2001, WTO/MIN (01)17.  
? Decision of the TBT Committee on Principles for the Development of International 
Standards and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the 
TBT Agreement (G/TBT/9, Annex 4). 
? Decision on Review of the ISO/IEC Information Centre Publication.  
? Decision on the Termination of the Tokyo Round TBT Agreement, Adopted on 20 
October 1995 TBT/M/50. 
? Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, Min (73) 1. 
? Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 25 September 1986 GATT/1396. 
? Minutes of the Meeting of the TBT Committee, 31 July 2006 G/TBT/M/39. 
? Minutes of the TBT Committee at the First Triennial Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the TBT Agreement, 19 November 1997 (G/TBT/5). 
? Minutes of the TBT Committee at the Second Triennial Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the TBT Agreement, 16 November 2000 (G/TBT/9/Corr.1). 
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? Minutes of the TBT Committee at the Third Triennial Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the TBT Agreement, 11 November 2003 (G/TBT/13). 
? Minutes of the TBT Committee at the Fourth Triennial Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the TBT Agreement under Article 15.4, 14 November 2006 
(G/TBT/19). 
? Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, meeting in Paris on 2 March 2005. 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1: Cases 
 
  Case Name Case 
Number
Invoked Articles Status 
 EC - Wine WT/DS263 Articles 2,12 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 Argentina – Pharmaceutical 
Products 
WT/DS233 Articles 
2.2,5.1,5.2,12 
Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 Mexico - Swine WT/DS203 Articles 2,5 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 US - Cattle, Swine and Grain WT/DS144 Articles 2,3,5,7 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 EC - Wood of Conifers WT/DS137 Articles 2 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 EC - Rice WT/DS134 Article 2 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 US - Poultry WT/DS100 Articles 2,5 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 US - Shrimp (Philippines) WT/DS61 Article 2 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 Korea – Agricultural 
Products II 
WT/DS41 Articles 2,5,6 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 Korea – Agricultural 
Products I    
WTDS3 Article 5,6 Consultations Requested – 
No panel or Settlement 
 EC – Biotech  WTDS291, 
WTDS292, 
WTDS293 
Articles 
2.1,2.2.2.8,5.1,5.2,12 
Completed panel and AB 
Review 
 EC - Sardines WT/DS231 Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 Report of the panel and 
AB Adopted 
 EC - Trademarks WT/DS174,
WT/DS290 
Article 2 Report of the panel 
Adopted 
 US - Gasoline WT/DS2 Articles 2.1, 2.2 Report of the panel and 
AB Adopted 
 EC - Asbestos WT/DS135 Articles 2.1,2.2, 2.4, Report of the panel and 
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2.8 AB Adopted 
 Argentina - Textiles and 
Apparel 
WT/DS56 Articles 2.1, 2.2 Report of the panel and 
AB Adopted 
 EC - Hormones (Canada) WT/DS48 Articles 2.1, 2.2 Report of the panel and 
AB Adopted 
 EC - Hormones (US) WT/DS26 Articles 2.1, 2.2 Report of the panel and 
AB Adopted 
 US – Textiles and Apparel WT/DS151  Article 2 Settled by Mutual 
Agreement 
 US – Textiles and Apparel WT/DS85  Article 2 Settled by Mutual 
Agreement 
 EC – Butter  WT/DS72 Article 2 Settled by Mutual 
Agreement 
 Korea – Bottled Water WT/DS20 Article 2 Settled by Mutual 
Agreement 
 EC - Scallops WT/DS7, 
WTDS12,W
TDS14 
Article 2 Settled by Mutual 
Agreement 
 Korea – Shelf Life WT/DS5 Article 2 Settled by Mutual 
Agreement 
 Mexico - Matches WT/DS232 Articles 1,2,5 Settled by Mutual 
Agreement 
 
 
Source: WTO official website463 
  
 
Table 2: ISO’s Standard Development Process 
 
 
Stages Process Action by 
Stage 1 Proposal Industry Sector 
Stage 2 Preparatory  Working Group of Experts 
Stage 3 Committee  Working Group’s Parent Committee 
Stage 4 Enquiry  Participating Members of the TCs 
Stage 5 Approval  Participating Members of the TCs 
Stage 6 Publication ISO Central Secretariat 
   
  
 
                                            
463 See Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/31 22 August 2007 WTO official website 
<http:dosconline.wto.org/…> [accessed on 1 September 2007]; See also WTO official website  
< http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/tbt_02_e.htm > [accessed on 12 July 2007]. 
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Source: ISO official website464 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Current LDC Representation in the ISO 
 
 
Country  Organization Status 
Angola  IANORQ Correspondent 
Benin  CEBENOR Correspondent  
Burkina Faso  FASONORM Correspondent  
Burundi BBN Subscriber  
Central African Republic            - 
Chad            - 
Congo  OCC Member Body 
Djibouti            - 
Gambia           - 
Guinea           - 
Guinea Bissau           - 
Lesotho  LSQAS Subscriber 
Madagascar  BNM Correspondent  
Malawi  MBS Correspondent  
Mali            - 
Mauritania           - 
Mozambique  INNOQ Correspondent 
Niger            - 
Rwanda  RBS Correspondent  
Senegal  ASN Correspondent  
Sierra Leone            - 
Tanzania  TBS Member Body 
Togo CSN Correspondent  
Uganda UNBS Correspondent  
Zambia ZABS Correspondent  
                                            
464 ISO official website  
< http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/processes_and_procedures/stages_description.htm > [accessed 
on 25 August 2007]. 
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Source: ISO official website465 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Alternative Approaches to Standards Development 
 
 
Types Organization Technical Standard 
Type 1 Government Agency  Committees, 
Accredited 
Developers 
and Bureaus 
Mandatory and Voluntary Standards  
Type 2 Private Sector Committees 
and Bureaus 
Voluntary Standards (Mandatory when 
adopted by Government 
Type 3 National Coordination 
Organization 
Accredited 
Developers –
Private and 
Government  
Mandatory and Voluntary Standards 
Type 4a Government Agency Government 
Agency 
Mandatory Standards 
Type 4b Private Sector Accredited 
Developers 
Voluntary Standards 
 
 
Source: Stephenson466 
 
Note: 
                                            
465 See ISO official website < http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isomembers...> [accessed on 23 August 2007]. 
466 Stephenson op cit 24. 
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The above tables are based on the author’s research and findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE A: TBT AGREEMENT 
 
Members,  
 
 Having regard to the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations; 
 
 Desiring to further the objectives of GATT 1994; 
 
 Recognizing the important contribution that international standards and conformity 
assessment systems can make in this regard by improving efficiency of production and 
facilitating the conduct of international trade; 
 
 Desiring therefore to encourage the development of such international standards and 
conformity assessment systems;  
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 Desiring however to ensure that technical regulations and standards, including 
packaging, marking and labelling requirements, and procedures for assessment of conformity 
with technical regulations and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade;  
 
 Recognizing that no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to 
ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers 
appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement; 
 
 Recognizing that no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interest;  
 
 Recognizing the contribution which international standardization can make to the 
transfer of technology from developed to developing countries; 
 
 Recognizing that developing countries may encounter special difficulties in the 
formulation and application of technical regulations and standards and procedures for 
assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards, and desiring to assist them 
in their endeavours in this regard; 
 
 Hereby agree as follows:  
 
 
Article 1 
 
General Provisions 
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1.1 General terms for standardization and procedures for assessment of conformity shall 
normally have the meaning given to them by definitions adopted within the United Nations 
system and by international standardizing bodies taking into account their context and in the 
light of the object and purpose of this Agreement.  
 
1.2 However, for the purposes of this Agreement the meaning of the terms given in Annex 
1 applies. 
 
1.3 All products, including industrial and agricultural products, shall be subject to the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
 
1.4 Purchasing specifications prepared by governmental bodies for production or 
consumption requirements of governmental bodies are not subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement but are addressed in the Agreement on Government Procurement, according to its 
coverage.  
 
1.5 The provisions of this Agreement do not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
as defined in Annex A of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures. 
 
1.6 All references in this Agreement to technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures shall be construed to include any amendments thereto and any 
additions to the rules or the product coverage thereof, except amendments and additions of an 
insignificant nature. 
 
 
TECHNICAL REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS 
 
Article 2 
 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations 
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by Central Government Bodies 
 
 With respect to their central government bodies:  
 
2.1 Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from 
the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded 
to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country. 
 
2.2 Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  For 
this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.  Such legitimate 
objectives are, inter alia:  national security requirements;  the prevention of deceptive 
practices;  protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment.  In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia:  
available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-
uses of products. 
 
2.3 Technical regulations shall not be maintained if the circumstances or objectives giving 
rise to their adoption no longer exist or if the changed circumstances or objectives can be 
addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner. 
 
2.4 Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or 
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis 
for their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would 
be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives 
pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental 
technological problems. 
 
2.5 A Member preparing, adopting or applying a technical regulation which may have a 
significant effect on trade of other Members shall, upon the request of another Member, 
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explain the justification for that technical regulation in terms of the provisions of paragraphs 2 
to 4.  Whenever a technical regulation is prepared, adopted or applied for one of the legitimate 
objectives explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2, and is in accordance with relevant 
international standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to 
international trade. 
 
2.6 With a view to harmonizing technical regulations on as wide a basis as possible, 
Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation by 
appropriate international standardizing bodies of international standards for products for which 
they either have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations.  
 
2.7 Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical 
regulations of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they 
are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations. 
 
2.8 Wherever appropriate, Members shall specify technical regulations based on product 
requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics. 
 
2.9 Whenever a relevant international standard does not exist or the technical content of a 
proposed technical regulation is not in accordance with the technical content of relevant 
international standards, and if the technical regulation may have a significant effect on trade of 
other Members, Members shall: 
 
2.9.1 publish a notice in a publication at an early appropriate stage, in such a 
manner as to enable interested parties in other Members to become 
acquainted with it, that they propose to introduce a particular technical 
regulation;  
 
2.9.2 notify other Members through the Secretariat of the products to be 
covered by the proposed technical regulation, together with a brief 
indication of its objective and rationale.  Such notifications shall take 
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place at an early appropriate stage, when amendments can still be 
introduced and comments taken into account;  
 
2.9.3 upon request, provide to other Members particulars or copies of the 
proposed technical regulation and, whenever possible, identify the parts 
which in substance deviate from relevant international standards; 
 
2.9.4 without discrimination, allow reasonable time for other Members to 
make comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and 
take these written comments and the results of these discussions into 
account.  
 
2.10 Subject to the provisions in the lead-in to paragraph 9, where urgent problems of 
safety, health, environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to arise for a 
Member, that Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in paragraph 9 as it finds 
necessary, provided that the Member, upon adoption of a technical regulation, shall:  
 
2.10.1 notify immediately other Members through the Secretariat of the 
particular technical regulation and the products covered, with a brief 
indication of the objective and the rationale of the technical regulation, 
including the nature of the urgent problems; 
 
2.10.2 upon request, provide other Members with copies of the technical 
regulation; 
 
2.10.3 without discrimination, allow other Members to present their comments 
in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take these written 
comments and the results of these discussions into account.  
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2.11 Members shall ensure that all technical regulations which have been adopted are 
published promptly or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable interested 
parties in other Members to become acquainted with them. 
 
2.12 Except in those urgent circumstances referred to in paragraph 10, Members shall allow 
a reasonable interval between the publication of technical regulations and their entry into force 
in order to allow time for producers in exporting Members, and particularly in developing 
country Members, to adapt their products or methods of production to the requirements of the 
importing Member. 
 
 
Article 3 
 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations 
by Local Government Bodies and Non-Governmental Bodies 
 
 With respect to their local government and non-governmental bodies within their 
territories: 
 
3.1 Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
compliance by such bodies with the provisions of Article 2, with the exception of the 
obligation to notify as referred to in paragraphs 9.2 and 10.1 of Article 2. 
 
3.2 Members shall ensure that the technical regulations of local governments on the level 
directly below that of the central government in Members are notified in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraphs 9.2 and 10.1 of Article 2, noting that notification shall not be 
required for technical regulations the technical content of which is substantially the same as 
that of previously notified technical regulations of central government bodies of the Member 
concerned. 
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3.3 Members may require contact with other Members, including the notifications, 
provision of information, comments and discussions referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10 of 
Article 2, to take place through the central government. 
 
3.4 Members shall not take measures which require or encourage local government bodies 
or non-governmental bodies within their territories to act in a manner inconsistent with the 
provisions of Article 2. 
 
3.5 Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all 
provisions of Article 2.  Members shall formulate and implement positive measures and 
mechanisms in support of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other than central 
government bodies. 
 
 
Article 4 
 
Preparation, Adoption and Application 
of Standards 
 
4.1 Members shall ensure that their central government standardizing bodies accept and 
comply with the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards in Annex 3 to this Agreement (referred to in this Agreement as the "Code of Good 
Practice").  They shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that local government and non-governmental standardizing bodies within their territories, as 
well as regional standardizing bodies of which they or one or more bodies within their 
territories are members, accept and comply with this Code of Good Practice.  In addition, 
Members shall not take measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or 
encouraging such standardizing bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with the Code of Good 
Practice.  The obligations of Members with respect to compliance of standardizing bodies with 
the provisions of the Code of Good Practice shall apply irrespective of whether or not a 
standardizing body has accepted the Code of Good Practice. 
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4.2 Standardizing bodies that have accepted and are complying with the Code of Good 
Practice shall be acknowledged by the Members as complying with the principles of this 
Agreement. 
 
CONFORMITY WITH TECHNICAL REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS 
 
Article 5 
 
Procedures for Assessment of Conformity by Central Government Bodies 
 
5.1 Members shall ensure that, in cases where a positive assurance of conformity with 
technical regulations or standards is required, their central government bodies apply the 
following provisions to products originating in the territories of other Members: 
 
5.1.1 conformity assessment procedures are prepared, adopted and applied so 
as to grant access for suppliers of like products originating in the 
territories of other Members under conditions no less favourable than 
those accorded to suppliers of like products of national origin or 
originating in any other country, in a comparable situation; access 
entails suppliers' right to an assessment of conformity under the rules of 
the procedure, including, when foreseen by this procedure, the 
possibility to have conformity assessment activities undertaken at the 
site of facilities and to receive the mark of the system; 
 
5.1.2 conformity assessment procedures are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade.  This means, inter alia, that conformity assessment 
procedures shall not be more strict or be applied more strictly than is 
necessary to give the importing Member adequate confidence that 
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products conform with the applicable technical regulations or standards, 
taking account of the risks non-conformity would create. 
 
5.2 When implementing the provisions of paragraph 1, Members shall ensure that: 
 
5.2.1 conformity assessment procedures are undertaken and completed as 
expeditiously as possible and in a no less favourable order for products 
originating in the territories of other Members than for like domestic 
products; 
 
5.2.2 the standard processing period of each conformity assessment procedure 
is published or that the anticipated processing period is communicated 
to the applicant upon request;  when receiving an application, the 
competent body promptly examines the completeness of the 
documentation and informs the applicant in a precise and complete 
manner of all deficiencies;  the competent body transmits as soon as 
possible the results of the assessment in a precise and complete manner 
to the applicant so that corrective action may be taken if necessary;  
even when the application has deficiencies, the competent body 
proceeds as far as practicable with the conformity assessment if the 
applicant so requests;  and that, upon request, the applicant is informed 
of the stage of the procedure, with any delay being explained; 
 
5.2.3 information requirements are limited to what is necessary to assess 
conformity and determine fees; 
 
5.2.4 the confidentiality of information about products originating in the 
territories of other Members arising from or supplied in connection with 
such conformity assessment procedures is respected in the same way as 
for domestic products and in such a manner that legitimate commercial 
interests are protected; 
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5.2.5 any fees imposed for assessing the conformity of products originating in 
the territories of other Members are equitable in relation to any fees 
chargeable for assessing the conformity of like products of national 
origin or originating in any other country, taking into account 
communication, transportation and other costs arising from differences 
between location of facilities of the applicant and the conformity 
assessment body; 
 
5.2.6 the siting of facilities used in conformity assessment procedures and the 
selection of samples are not such as to cause unnecessary inconvenience 
to applicants or their agents; 
 
5.2.7 whenever specifications of a product are changed subsequent to the 
determination of its conformity to the applicable technical regulations 
or standards, the conformity assessment procedure for the modified 
product is limited to what is necessary to determine whether adequate 
confidence exists that the product still meets the technical regulations or 
standards concerned; 
 
5.2.8 a procedure exists to review complaints concerning the operation of a 
conformity assessment procedure and to take corrective action when a 
complaint is justified. 
 
5.3 Nothing in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall prevent Members from carrying out reasonable 
spot checks within their territories. 
 
5.4 In cases where a positive assurance is required that products conform with technical 
regulations or standards, and relevant guides or recommendations issued by international 
standardizing bodies exist or their completion is imminent,  Members shall ensure that central 
government bodies use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their conformity 
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assessment procedures, except where, as duly explained upon request, such guides or 
recommendations or relevant parts are inappropriate for the Members concerned, for, 
inter alia, such reasons as:  national security requirements;  the prevention of deceptive 
practices;  protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment;  fundamental climatic or other geographical factors;  fundamental technological 
or infrastructural problems. 
 
5.5 With a view to harmonizing conformity assessment procedures on as wide a basis as 
possible, Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation 
by appropriate international standardizing bodies of guides and recommendations for 
conformity assessment procedures. 
 
5.6 Whenever a relevant guide or recommendation issued by an international standardizing 
body does not exist or the technical content of a proposed conformity assessment procedure is 
not in accordance with relevant guides and recommendations issued by international 
standardizing bodies, and if the conformity assessment procedure may have a significant effect 
on trade of other Members, Members shall: 
 
5.6.1 publish a notice in a publication at an early appropriate stage, in such a 
manner as to enable interested parties in other Members to become 
acquainted with it, that they propose to introduce a particular 
conformity assessment procedure; 
 
5.6.2 notify other Members through the Secretariat of the products to be 
covered by the proposed conformity assessment procedure, together 
with a brief indication of its objective and rationale.  Such notifications 
shall take place at an early appropriate stage, when amendments can 
still be introduced and comments taken into account; 
 
5.6.3 upon request, provide to other Members particulars or copies of the 
proposed procedure and, whenever possible, identify the parts which in 
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substance deviate from relevant guides or recommendations issued by 
international standardizing bodies;        
 
5.6.4 without discrimination, allow reasonable time for other Members to 
make comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and 
take these written comments and the results of these discussions into 
account. 
 
5.7 Subject to the provisions in the lead-in to paragraph 6, where urgent problems of 
safety, health, environmental protection or national security arise or threaten to arise for a 
Member, that Member may omit such of the steps enumerated in paragraph 6 as it finds 
necessary, provided that the Member, upon adoption of the procedure, shall: 
 
5.7.1 notify immediately other Members through the Secretariat of the 
particular procedure and the products covered, with a brief indication of 
the objective and the rationale of the procedure, including the nature of 
the urgent problems; 
 
5.7.2 upon request, provide other Members with copies of the rules of the 
procedure; 
 
5.7.3 without discrimination, allow other Members to present their comments 
in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take these written 
comments and the results of these discussions into account. 
 
5.8 Members shall ensure that all conformity assessment procedures which have been 
adopted are published promptly or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable 
interested parties in other Members to become acquainted with them. 
 
5.9 Except in those urgent circumstances referred to in paragraph 7, Members shall allow a 
reasonable interval between the publication of requirements concerning conformity 
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assessment procedures and their entry into force in order to allow time for producers in 
exporting Members, and particularly in developing country Members, to adapt their 
products or methods of production to the requirements of the importing Member. 
 
 
 
Article 6 
 
Recognition of Conformity Assessment by Central Government Bodies 
 
 With respect to their central government bodies: 
 
6.1 Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4, Members shall ensure, 
whenever possible, that results of conformity assessment procedures in other Members are 
accepted, even when those procedures differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that 
those procedures offer an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or 
standards equivalent to their own procedures.  It is recognized that prior consultations may be 
necessary in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory understanding regarding, in particular: 
 
6.1.1 adequate and enduring technical competence of the relevant conformity 
assessment bodies in the exporting Member, so that confidence in the 
continued reliability of their conformity assessment results can exist;  in 
this regard, verified compliance, for instance through accreditation, with 
relevant guides or recommendations issued by international 
standardizing bodies shall be taken into account as an indication of 
adequate technical competence; 
 
6.1.2 limitation of the acceptance of conformity assessment results to those 
produced by designated bodies in the exporting Member. 
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6.2 Members shall ensure that their conformity assessment procedures permit, as far as 
practicable, the implementation of the provisions in paragraph 1. 
 
6.3 Members are encouraged, at the request of other Members, to be willing to enter into 
negotiations for the conclusion of agreements for the mutual recognition of results of each 
other's conformity assessment procedures.  Members may require that such agreements fulfil 
the criteria of paragraph 1 and give mutual satisfaction regarding their potential for facilitating 
trade in the products concerned. 
 
6.4 Members are encouraged to permit participation of conformity assessment bodies 
located in the territories of other Members in their conformity assessment procedures under 
conditions no less favourable than those accorded to bodies located within their territory or the 
territory of any other country. 
 
 
Article 7 
 
Procedures for Assessment of Conformity by Local Government Bodies 
 
 With respect to their local government bodies within their territories: 
 
7.1 Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
compliance by such bodies with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, with the exception of the 
obligation to notify as referred to in paragraphs 6.2 and 7.1 of Article 5. 
 
7.2 Members shall ensure that the conformity assessment procedures of local governments 
on the level directly below that of the central government in Members are notified in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 6.2 and 7.1 of Article 5, noting that notifications 
shall not be required for conformity assessment procedures the technical content of which is 
substantially the same as that of previously notified conformity assessment procedures of 
central government bodies of the Members concerned. 
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7.3 Members may require contact with other Members, including the notifications, 
provision of information, comments and discussions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of 
Article 5, to take place through the central government. 
 
7.4 Members shall not take measures which require or encourage local government bodies 
within their territories to act in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6. 
 
7.5 Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all 
provisions of Articles 5 and 6.  Members shall formulate and implement positive measures and 
mechanisms in support of the observance of the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 by other than 
central government bodies. 
 
 
Article 8 
 
Procedures for Assessment of Conformity by Non-Governmental Bodies 
 
8.1 Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that non-governmental bodies within their territories which operate conformity assessment 
procedures comply with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, with the exception of the obligation 
to notify proposed conformity assessment procedures.  In addition, Members shall not take 
measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such bodies 
to act in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6. 
 
8.2 Members shall ensure that their central government bodies rely on conformity 
assessment procedures operated by non-governmental bodies only if these latter bodies 
comply with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, with the exception of the obligation to notify 
proposed conformity assessment procedures. 
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Article 9 
 
International and Regional Systems 
 
9.1 Where a positive assurance of conformity with a technical regulation or standard is 
required, Members shall, wherever practicable, formulate and adopt international systems for 
conformity assessment and become members thereof or participate therein. 
 
9.2 Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that international and regional systems for conformity assessment in which relevant bodies 
within their territories are members or participants comply with the provisions of Articles 5 
and 6.  In addition, Members shall not take any measures which have the effect of, directly or 
indirectly, requiring or encouraging such systems to act in a manner inconsistent with any of 
the provisions of Articles 5 and 6. 
 
9.3 Members shall ensure that their central government bodies rely on international or 
regional conformity assessment systems only to the extent that these systems comply with the 
provisions of Articles 5 and 6, as applicable. 
 
INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE 
 
Article 10 
 
Information About Technical Regulations, Standards and 
Conformity Assessment Procedures 
 
10.1 Each Member shall ensure that an enquiry point exists which is able to answer all 
reasonable enquiries from other Members and interested parties in other Members as well as to 
provide the relevant documents regarding: 
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10.1.1 any technical regulations adopted or proposed within its territory by 
central or local government bodies, by non-governmental bodies which 
have legal power to enforce a technical regulation, or by regional 
standardizing bodies of which such bodies are members or participants; 
 
10.1.2 any standards adopted or proposed within its territory by central or local 
government bodies, or by regional standardizing bodies of which such 
bodies are members or participants; 
 
10.1.3 any conformity assessment procedures, or proposed conformity 
assessment procedures, which are operated within its territory by central 
or local government bodies, or by non-governmental bodies which have 
legal power to enforce a technical regulation, or by regional bodies of 
which such bodies are members or participants; 
 
10.1.4 the membership and participation of the Member, or of relevant central 
or local government bodies within its territory, in international and 
regional standardizing bodies and conformity assessment systems, as 
well as in bilateral and multilateral arrangements within the scope of 
this Agreement; it shall also be able to provide reasonable information 
on the provisions of such systems and arrangements; 
 
10.1.5 the location of notices published pursuant to this Agreement, or the 
provision of information as to where such information can be obtained;  
and 
 
10.1.6 the location of the enquiry points mentioned in paragraph 3. 
 
10.2 If, however, for legal or administrative reasons more than one enquiry point is 
established by a Member, that Member shall provide to the other Members complete and 
unambiguous information on the scope of responsibility of each of these enquiry points.  In 
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addition, that Member shall ensure that any enquiries addressed to an incorrect enquiry point 
shall promptly be conveyed to the correct enquiry point. 
 
10.3 Each Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure 
that one or more enquiry points exist which are able to answer all reasonable enquiries from 
other Members and interested parties in other Members as well as to provide the relevant 
documents or information as to where they can be obtained regarding: 
 
10.3.1 any standards adopted or proposed within its territory by non-
governmental standardizing bodies, or by regional standardizing bodies 
of which such bodies are members or participants; and 
 
10.3.2 any conformity assessment procedures, or proposed conformity 
assessment procedures, which are operated within its territory by non-
governmental bodies, or by regional bodies of which such bodies are 
members or participants; 
 
10.3.3 the membership and participation of relevant non-governmental bodies 
within its territory in international and regional standardizing bodies 
and conformity assessment systems, as well as in bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements within the scope of this Agreement; they shall 
also be able to provide reasonable information on the provisions of such 
systems and arrangements. 
 
10.4 Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that where copies of documents are requested by other Members or by interested parties in 
other Members, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, they are supplied at an 
equitable price (if any) which shall, apart from the real cost of delivery, be the same for the 
nationals467 of the Member concerned or of any other Member. 
                                            
467 "Nationals" here shall be deemed, in the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, to mean 
persons, natural or legal, who are domiciled or who have a real and effective industrial or commercial 
establishment in that customs territory. 
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10.5 Developed country Members shall, if requested by other Members, provide, in English, 
French or Spanish, translations of the documents covered by a specific notification or, in case 
of voluminous documents, of summaries of such documents. 
 
10.6 The Secretariat shall, when it receives notifications in accordance with the provisions 
of this Agreement, circulate copies of the notifications to all Members and interested 
international standardizing and conformity assessment bodies, and draw the attention of 
developing country Members to any notifications relating to products of particular interest to 
them. 
 
10.7 Whenever a Member has reached an agreement with any other country or countries on 
issues related to technical regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures which 
may have a significant effect on trade, at least one Member party to the agreement shall notify 
other Members through the Secretariat of the products to be covered by the agreement and 
include a brief description of the agreement.  Members concerned are encouraged to enter, 
upon request, into consultations with other Members for the purposes of concluding similar 
agreements or of arranging for their participation in such agreements. 
 
10.8 Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as requiring: 
 
10.8.1 the publication of texts other than in the language of the Member; 
 
10.8.2 the provision of particulars or copies of drafts other than in the language 
of the Member except as stated in paragraph 5; or 
 
10.8.3 Members to furnish any information, the disclosure of which they 
consider contrary to their essential security interests. 
 
10.9 Notifications to the Secretariat shall be in English, French or Spanish. 
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10.10 Members shall designate a single central government authority that is responsible for 
the implementation on the national level of the provisions concerning notification procedures 
under this Agreement except those included in Annex 3.  
 
10.11 If, however, for legal or administrative reasons the responsibility for notification 
procedures is divided among two or more central government authorities, the Member 
concerned shall provide to the other Members complete and unambiguous information on the 
scope of responsibility of each of these authorities. 
 
 
Article 11 
 
Technical Assistance to Other Members 
 
11.1 Members shall, if requested, advise other Members, especially the developing country 
Members, on the preparation of technical regulations. 
 
11.2 Members shall, if requested, advise other Members, especially the developing country 
Members, and shall grant them technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and conditions 
regarding the establishment of national standardizing bodies, and participation in the 
international standardizing bodies, and shall encourage their national standardizing bodies to 
do likewise. 
 
11.3 Members shall, if requested, take such reasonable measures as may be available to 
them to arrange for the regulatory bodies within their territories to advise other Members, 
especially the developing country Members, and shall grant them technical assistance on 
mutually agreed terms and conditions regarding: 
 
11.3.1 the establishment of regulatory bodies, or bodies for the assessment of 
conformity with technical regulations; and 
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11.3.2 the methods by which their technical regulations can best be met. 
 
11.4 Members shall, if requested, take such reasonable measures as may be available to 
them to arrange for advice to be given to other Members, especially the developing country 
Members, and shall grant them technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and conditions 
regarding the establishment of bodies for the assessment of conformity with standards adopted 
within the territory of the requesting Member. 
 
11.5 Members shall, if requested, advise other Members, especially the developing country 
Members, and shall grant them technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and conditions 
regarding the steps that should be taken by their producers if they wish to have access to 
systems for conformity assessment operated by governmental or non-governmental bodies 
within the territory of the Member receiving the request. 
 
11.6 Members which are members or participants of international or regional systems for 
conformity assessment shall, if requested, advise other Members, especially the developing 
country Members, and shall grant them technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and 
conditions regarding the establishment of the institutions and legal framework which would 
enable them to fulfil the obligations of membership or participation in such systems. 
 
11.7 Members shall, if so requested, encourage bodies within their territories which are 
members or participants of international or regional systems for conformity assessment to 
advise other Members, especially the developing country Members, and should consider 
requests for technical assistance from them regarding the establishment of the institutions 
which would enable the relevant bodies within their territories to fulfil the obligations of 
membership or participation. 
 
11.8 In providing advice and technical assistance to other Members in terms of paragraphs 1 
to 7, Members shall give priority to the needs of the least-developed country Members.  
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Article 12 
 
Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members 
 
12.1 Members shall provide differential and more favourable treatment to developing 
country Members to this Agreement, through the following provisions as well as through the 
relevant provisions of other Articles of this Agreement. 
 
12.2 Members shall give particular attention to the provisions of this Agreement concerning 
developing country Members' rights and obligations and shall take into account the special 
development, financial and trade needs of developing country Members in the implementation 
of this Agreement, both nationally and in the operation of this Agreement's institutional 
arrangements.  
 
12.3 Members shall, in the preparation and application of technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment procedures, take account of the special development, financial and 
trade needs of developing country Members, with a view to ensuring that such technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to exports from developing country Members.  
 
12.4 Members recognize that, although international standards, guides or recommendations 
may exist, in their particular technological and socio-economic conditions, developing country 
Members adopt certain technical regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures 
aimed at preserving indigenous technology and production methods and processes compatible 
with their development needs.  Members therefore recognize that developing country 
Members should not be expected to use international standards as a basis for their technical 
regulations or standards, including test methods, which are not appropriate to their 
development, financial and trade needs.  
 
12.5 Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that international standardizing bodies and international systems for conformity assessment are 
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organized and operated in a way which facilitates active and representative participation of 
relevant bodies in all Members, taking into account the special problems of developing 
country Members. 
 
12.6 Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that international standardizing bodies, upon request of developing country Members, examine 
the possibility of, and, if practicable, prepare international standards concerning products of 
special interest to developing country Members.  
 
12.7 Members shall, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11, provide technical 
assistance to developing country Members to ensure that the preparation and application of 
technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to the expansion and diversification of exports from developing country 
Members.  In determining the terms and conditions of the technical assistance, account shall 
be taken of the stage of development of the requesting Members and in particular of the least-
developed country Members. 
 
12.8 It is recognized that developing country Members may face special problems, 
including institutional and infrastructural problems, in the field of preparation and application 
of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures. It is further 
recognized that the special development and trade needs of developing country Members, as 
well as their stage of technological development, may hinder their ability to discharge fully 
their obligations under this Agreement.  Members, therefore, shall take this fact fully into 
account.  Accordingly, with a view to ensuring that developing country Members are able to 
comply with this Agreement, the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade provided for in 
Article 13 (referred to in this Agreement as the "Committee") is enabled to grant, upon 
request, specified, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part from obligations under this 
Agreement.  When considering such requests the Committee shall take into account the special 
problems, in the field of preparation and application of technical regulations, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures, and the special development and trade needs of the 
developing country Member, as well as its stage of technological development, which may 
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hinder its ability to discharge fully its obligations under this Agreement.  The Committee shall, 
in particular, take into account the special problems of the least-developed country Members.  
 
12.9 During consultations, developed country Members shall bear in mind the special 
difficulties experienced by developing country Members in formulating and implementing 
standards and technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, and in their desire 
to assist developing country Members with their efforts in this direction, developed country 
Members shall take account of the special needs of the former in regard to financing, trade and 
development. 
 
12.10 The Committee shall examine periodically the special and differential treatment, as 
laid down in this Agreement, granted to developing country Members on national and 
international levels. 
 
INSTITUTIONS, CONSULTATION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
Article 13 
 
The Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 
 
13.1 A Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade is hereby established, and shall be 
composed of representatives from each of the Members.  The Committee shall elect its own 
Chairman and shall meet as necessary, but no less than once a year, for the purpose of 
affording Members the opportunity of consulting on any matters relating to the operation of 
this Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives, and shall carry out such responsibilities as 
assigned to it under this Agreement or by the Members. 
 
13.2 The Committee shall establish working parties or other bodies as may be appropriate, 
which shall carry out such responsibilities as may be assigned to them by the Committee in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement. 
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13.3 It is understood that unnecessary duplication should be avoided between the work 
under this Agreement and that of governments in other technical bodies.  The Committee shall 
examine this problem with a view to minimizing such duplication. 
 
 
Article 14 
 
Consultation and Dispute Settlement 
 
14.1 Consultations and the settlement of disputes with respect to any matter affecting the 
operation of this Agreement shall take place under the auspices of the Dispute Settlement 
Body and shall follow, mutatis mutandis, the provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 
1994, as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  
 
14.2 At the request of a party to a dispute, or at its own initiative, a panel may establish a 
technical expert group to assist in questions of a technical nature, requiring detailed 
consideration by experts. 
 
14.3  Technical expert groups shall be governed by the procedures of Annex 2. 
 
14.4 The dispute settlement provisions set out above can be invoked in cases where a 
Member considers that another Member has not achieved satisfactory results under Articles 3, 
4, 7, 8 and 9 and its trade interests are significantly affected.  In this respect, such results shall 
be equivalent to those as if the body in question were a Member. 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 15 
 
Final Provisions 
 
Reservations 
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15.1 Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement 
without the consent of the other Members. 
 
Review 
 
15.2 Each Member shall, promptly after the date on which the WTO Agreement enters into 
force for it, inform the Committee of measures in existence or taken to ensure the 
implementation and administration of this Agreement.  Any changes of such measures 
thereafter shall also be notified to the Committee.  
 
15.3 The Committee shall review annually the implementation and operation of this 
Agreement taking into account the objectives thereof.  
 
15.4 Not later than the end of the third year from the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement and at the end of each three-year period thereafter, the Committee shall 
review the operation and implementation of this Agreement, including the provisions 
relating to transparency, with a view to recommending an adjustment of the rights and 
obligations of this Agreement where necessary to ensure mutual economic advantage 
and balance of rights and obligations, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 12.  
Having regard, inter alia, to the experience gained in the implementation of the 
Agreement, the Committee shall, where appropriate, submit proposals for amendments 
to the text of this Agreement to the Council for Trade in Goods. 
 
 
Annexes 
 
15.5 The annexes to this Agreement constitute an integral part thereof. 
 
ANNEX 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 141
TERMS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT 
 
 
 The terms presented in the sixth edition of the ISO/IEC Guide 2:  1991, General Terms 
and Their Definitions Concerning Standardization and Related Activities, shall, when used in 
this Agreement, have the same meaning as given in the definitions in the said Guide taking 
into account that services are excluded from the coverage of this Agreement. 
 
 For the purpose of this Agreement, however, the following definitions shall apply: 
 
1. Technical regulation 
 
 Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory.  It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production 
method. 
 
 Explanatory note 
 
The definition in ISO/IEC Guide 2 is not self-contained, but based on the so-called 
"building block" system. 
 
2. Standard 
 
 Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production 
methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.  It may also include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a 
product, process or production method. 
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 Explanatory note 
 
The terms as defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2 cover products, processes and services.  This 
Agreement deals only with technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures related to products or processes and production methods.  Standards as 
defined by ISO/IEC Guide 2 may be mandatory or voluntary.  For the purpose of this 
Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and technical regulations as mandatory 
documents.  Standards prepared by the international standardization community are 
based on consensus. This Agreement covers also documents that are not based on 
consensus. 
 
3. Conformity assessment procedures 
 
 Any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in 
technical regulations or standards are fulfilled. 
 
Explanatory note 
 
Conformity assessment procedures include, inter alia, procedures for sampling, testing 
and inspection;  evaluation, verification and assurance of conformity;  registration, 
accreditation and approval as well as their combinations. 
 
4. International body or system 
 
 Body or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all 
Members. 
 
5. Regional body or system 
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 Body or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of only some of the 
Members. 
 
6. Central government body 
 
 Central government, its ministries and departments or any body subject to the control 
of the central government in respect of the activity in question. 
 
Explanatory note: 
 
In the case of the European Communities the provisions governing central government 
bodies apply.  However, regional bodies or conformity assessment systems may be 
established within the European Communities, and in such cases would be subject to 
the provisions of this Agreement on regional bodies or conformity assessment systems. 
 
7. Local government body 
 
 Government other than a central government (e.g. states, provinces, Länder, cantons, 
municipalities, etc.), its ministries or departments or any body subject to the control of such a 
government in respect of the activity in question. 
 
8. Non-governmental body 
 
 Body other than a central government body or a local government body, including a 
non-governmental body which has legal power to enforce a technical regulation. 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2 
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TECHNICAL EXPERT GROUPS 
 
 
 The following procedures shall apply to technical expert groups established in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 14. 
 
1. Technical expert groups are under the panel's authority.  Their terms of reference and 
detailed working procedures shall be decided by the panel, and they shall report to the panel. 
 
2. Participation in technical expert groups shall be restricted to persons of professional 
standing and experience in the field in question. 
 
3. Citizens of parties to the dispute shall not serve on a technical expert group without the 
joint agreement of the parties to the dispute, except in exceptional circumstances when the 
panel considers that the need for specialized scientific expertise cannot be fulfilled otherwise. 
Government officials of parties to the dispute shall not serve on a technical expert group.  
Members of technical expert groups shall serve in their individual capacities and not as 
government representatives, nor as representatives of any organization.  Governments or 
organizations shall therefore not give them instructions with regard to matters before a 
technical expert group. 
 
4. Technical expert groups may consult and seek information and technical advice from 
any source they deem appropriate.  Before a technical expert group seeks such information or 
advice from a source within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall inform the government of 
that Member.  Any Member shall respond promptly and fully to any request by a technical 
expert group for such information as the technical expert group considers necessary and 
appropriate. 
 
5.    The parties to a dispute shall have access to all relevant information provided to a 
technical expert group, unless it is of a confidential nature.  Confidential information provided 
to the technical expert group shall not be released without formal authorization from the 
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government, organization or person providing the information.  Where such information is 
requested from the technical expert group but release of such information by the technical 
expert group is not authorized, a non-confidential summary of the information will be 
provided by the government, organization or person supplying the information. 
 
6. The technical expert group shall submit a draft report to the Members concerned with a 
view to obtaining their comments, and taking them into account, as appropriate, in the final 
report, which shall also be circulated to the Members concerned when it is submitted to the 
panel. 
 
 
ANNEX 3 
 
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR THE PREPARATION, ADOPTION AND 
APPLICATION OF STANDARDS 
 
General Provisions 
 
A. For the purposes of this Code the definitions in Annex 1 of this Agreement shall apply. 
 
B. This Code is open to acceptance by any standardizing body within the territory of a 
Member of the WTO, whether a central government body, a local government body, or a non-
governmental body; to any governmental regional standardizing body one or more members of 
which are Members of the WTO; and to any non-governmental regional standardizing body 
one or more members of which are situated within the territory of a Member of the WTO 
(referred to in this Code collectively as "standardizing bodies" and individually as "the 
standardizing body"). 
 
C. Standardizing bodies that have accepted or withdrawn from this Code shall notify this 
fact to the ISO/IEC Information Centre in Geneva.  The notification shall include the name 
and address of the body concerned and the scope of its current and expected standardization 
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activities.  The notification may be sent either directly to the ISO/IEC Information Centre, or 
through the national member body of ISO/IEC or, preferably, through the relevant national 
member or international affiliate of ISONET, as appropriate. 
 
 
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS 
 
D. In respect of standards, the standardizing body shall accord treatment to products 
originating in the territory of any other Member of the WTO no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other 
country. 
 
E. The standardizing body shall ensure that standards are not prepared, adopted or applied 
with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
 
F. Where international standards exist or their completion is imminent, the standardizing 
body shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for the standards it develops, 
except where such international standards or relevant parts would be ineffective or 
inappropriate, for instance, because of an insufficient level of protection or fundamental 
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems. 
 
G. With a view to harmonizing standards on as wide a basis as possible, the standardizing 
body shall, in an appropriate way, play a full part, within the limits of its resources, in the 
preparation by relevant international standardizing bodies of international standards regarding 
subject matter for which it either has adopted, or expects to adopt, standards.  For 
standardizing bodies within the territory of a Member, participation in a particular 
international standardization activity shall, whenever possible, take place through one 
delegation representing all standardizing bodies in the territory that have adopted, or expect to 
adopt, standards for the subject matter to which the international standardization activity 
relates. 
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H. The standardizing body within the territory of a Member shall make every effort to 
avoid duplication of, or overlap with, the work of other standardizing bodies in the national 
territory or with the work of relevant international or regional standardizing bodies.  They 
shall also make every effort to achieve a national consensus on the standards they develop.  
Likewise the regional standardizing body shall make every effort to avoid duplication of, or 
overlap with, the work of relevant international standardizing bodies. 
 
I. Wherever appropriate, the standardizing body shall specify standards based on product 
requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics. 
 
J. At least once every six months, the standardizing body shall publish a work 
programme containing its name and address, the standards it is currently preparing and the 
standards which it has adopted in the preceding period.  A standard is under preparation from 
the moment a decision has been taken to develop a standard until that standard has been 
adopted.  The titles of specific draft standards shall, upon request, be provided in English, 
French or Spanish.  A notice of the existence of the work programme shall be published in a 
national or, as the case may be, regional publication of standardization activities. 
 
 The work programme shall for each standard indicate, in accordance with any ISONET 
rules, the classification relevant to the subject matter, the stage attained in the standard's 
development, and the references of any international standards taken as a basis.  No later than 
at the time of publication of its work programme, the standardizing body shall notify the 
existence thereof to the ISO/IEC Information Centre in Geneva. 
 
 The notification shall contain the name and address of the standardizing body, the 
name and issue of the publication in which the work programme is published, the period to 
which the work programme applies, its price (if any), and how and where it can be obtained.  
The notification may be sent directly to the ISO/IEC Information Centre, or, preferably, 
through the relevant national member or international affiliate of ISONET, as appropriate. 
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K. The national member of ISO/IEC shall make every effort to become a member of 
ISONET or to appoint another body to become a member as well as to acquire the most 
advanced membership type possible for the ISONET member. Other standardizing bodies 
shall make every effort to associate themselves with the ISONET member. 
 
L. Before adopting a standard, the standardizing body shall allow a period of at least 60 
days for the submission of comments on the draft standard by interested parties within the 
territory of a Member of the WTO.  This period may, however, be shortened in cases where 
urgent problems of safety, health or environment arise or threaten to arise.  No later than at the 
start of the comment period, the standardizing body shall publish a notice announcing the 
period for commenting in the publication referred to in paragraph J.  Such notification shall 
include, as far as practicable, whether the draft standard deviates from relevant international 
standards. 
 
M. On the request of any interested party within the territory of a Member of the WTO, 
the standardizing body shall promptly provide, or arrange to provide, a copy of a draft 
standard which it has submitted for comments.  Any fees charged for this service shall, apart 
from the real cost of delivery, be the same for foreign and domestic parties. 
 
N. The standardizing body shall take into account, in the further processing of the 
standard, the comments received during the period for commenting.  Comments received 
through standardizing bodies that have accepted this Code of Good Practice shall, if so 
requested, be replied to as promptly as possible.  The reply shall include an explanation why a 
deviation from relevant international standards is necessary. 
 
O. Once the standard has been adopted, it shall be promptly published. 
 
P. On the request of any interested party within the territory of a Member of the WTO, 
the standardizing body shall promptly provide, or arrange to provide, a copy of its most recent 
work programme or of a standard which it produced.  Any fees charged for this service shall, 
apart from the real cost of delivery, be the same for foreign and domestic parties. 
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Q. The standardizing body shall afford sympathetic consideration to, and adequate 
opportunity for, consultation regarding representations with respect to the operation of this 
Code presented by standardizing bodies that have accepted this Code of Good Practice.  It 
shall make an objective effort to solve any complaints. 
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ANNEXURE B:  DECISION OF THE TBT COMMITTEE ON PRINCIPLES FOR 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, GUIDES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RELATION TO ARTICLES 2, 5 AND ANNEX 3 OF 
THE TBT AGREEMENT (G/TBT/9, Annex 4) 
 
1. The following principles and procedures should be observed, when international standards, 
guides and recommendations (as mentioned under Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT 
Agreement for the preparation of mandatory technical regulations, conformity assessment 
procedures and voluntary standards) are elaborated, to ensure transparency, openness, 
impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, coherence, and to address the 
concerns of developing countries. 
2. The same principles should also be observed when technical work or a part of the 
international standard development is delegated under agreements or contracts by international 
standardizing bodies to other relevant organizations, including regional bodies. 
B. TRANSPARENCY 
3. All essential information regarding current work programmes, as well as on proposals for 
standards, guides and recommendations under consideration and on the final results should be 
made easily accessible to at least all interested parties in the territories of at least all WTO 
Members Procedures should be established so that adequate time and opportunities are 
provided for written comments. The information on these procedures should be effectively 
disseminated.  
4. In providing the essential information, the transparency procedures should, at a minimum, 
include:  
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- The publication of a notice at an early appropriate stage, in such a manner as to enable 
interested parties to become acquainted with it, that the international standardizing body 
proposes to develop a particular standard; 
- the notification or other communication through established mechanisms to members of the 
international standardizing body, providing a brief description of the scope of the draft 
standard, including its objective and rationale. Such communications shall take place at an 
early appropriate stage, when amendments can still be introduced and comments taken into 
account; 
- upon request, the prompt provision to members of the international standardizing body of the 
text of the draft standard;  
- the provision of an adequate period of time for interested parties in the territory of at least all 
members of the international standardizing body to make comments in writing and take these 
written comments into account in the further consideration of the standard;  
- the prompt publication of a standard upon adoption; and 
- to publish periodically a work programme containing information on the standards currently 
being prepared and adopted.  
5. It is recognized that the publication and communication of notices, notifications, draft 
standards, comments, adopted standards or work programmes electronically, via the internet, 
where feasible, can provide a useful means of ensuring the timely provision of information. At 
the same time, it is also recognized that the requisite technical means may not be available in 
some cases, particularly with regard to developing countries. Accordingly, it is important that 
procedures are in place to enable hard copies of such documents to be made available upon 
request.  
C. OPENNESS 
6. Membership of an international standardizing body should be open on a non-discriminatory 
basis to relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members. This would include openness without 
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discrimination with respect to the participation at the policy development level and at every 
stage of standards development, such as the: 
- proposal and acceptance of new work items; 
- technical discussion on proposals; 
- submission of comments on drafts in order that they can be taken into account;  
- reviewing existing standards; 
- voting and adoption of standards; and 
- dissemination of the adopted standards.  
7. Any interested member of the international standardizing body, including especially 
developing country members, with an interest in a specific standardization activity should be 
provided with meaningful opportunities to participate at all stages of standard development. It 
is noted that with respect to standardizing bodies within the territory of a WTO Member that 
have accepted the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards by Standardizing Bodies (Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement) participation in a 
particular international standardization activity takes place, wherever possible, through one 
delegation representing all standardizing bodies in the territory that have adopted, or expected 
to adopt, standards for the subject-matter to which the international standardization activity 
relates. This is illustrative of the importance of participation in the international standardizing 
process accommodating all relevant interests  
D. IMPARTIALITY AND CONSENSUS 
8. All relevant bodies of WTO Members should be provided with meaningful opportunities to 
contribute to the elaboration of an international standard so that the standard development 
process will not give privilege to, or favour the interests of, a particular supplier/s, country/ies 
or region/s. Consensus procedures should be established that seek to take into account the 
views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments.  
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9. Impartiality should be accorded throughout all the standards development process with 
respect to, among other things: 
- access to participation in work;  
- submission of comments on drafts;  
- consideration of views expressed and comments made;  
- decision-making through consensus; 
- obtaining of information and documents;  
- dissemination of the international standard;  
- fees charged for documents;  
- right to transpose the international standard into a regional or national standard; and  
- revision of the international standard. 
D. EFFECTIVENESS AND RELEVANCE 
10. In order to serve the interests of the WTO membership in facilitating international trade 
and preventing unnecessary trade barriers, international standards need to be relevant and to 
effectively respond to regulatory and market needs, as well as scientific and technological 
developments in various countries. They should not distort the global market, have adverse 
effects on fair competition, or stifle innovation and technological development. In addition, 
they should not give preference to the characteristics or requirements of specific countries or 
regions when different needs or interests exist in other countries or regions. Whenever 
possible, international standards should be performance based rather than based on design or 
descriptive characteristics. 
11. Accordingly, it is important that international standardizing bodies: 
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- take account of relevant regulatory or market needs, as feasible and appropriate, as well as 
scientific and technological developments in the elaboration of standards;  
- put in place procedures aimed at identifying and reviewing standards that have become 
obsolete, inappropriate or ineffective for various reasons; and 
- put in place procedures aimed at improving communication with the World Trade 
Organization.  
 
 
E. COHERENCE 
12. In order to avoid the development of conflicting international standards, it is important that 
international standardizing bodies avoid duplication of, or overlap with, the work of other 
international standardizing bodies. In this respect, cooperation and coordination with other 
relevant international bodies is essential. 
E. DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION  
13. Constraints on developing countries, in particular, to effectively participate in standards 
development, should be taken into consideration in the standards development process. 
Tangible ways of facilitating developing countries participation in international standards 
development should be sought. The impartiality and openness of any international 
standardization process requires that developing countries are not excluded de facto from the 
process. With respect to improving participation by developing countries, it may be 
appropriate to use technical assistance, in line with Article 11 of the TBT Agreement. 
Provisions for capacity building and technical assistance within international standardizing 
bodies are important in this context. 
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ANNEXURE C: LIST OF LDC MEMBERS OF THE WTO 
 
Angola  
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi  
Central African Republic  
Chad  
Congo 
Democratic Republic of Djibouti  
Gambia  
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau  
Lesotho  
Madagascar 
Malawi  
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Mali  
Mauritania 
Mozambique  
Niger 
Rwanda  
Senegal  
Sierra Leone  
Tanzania 
Togo  
Uganda   
Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
